raiſing the Value of Money, above three Years ſince. All that I have ſaid here in anſwer to him, being nothing but the applying the Principles, I then went on, particularly now to Mr. *Lowndes*'s Arguments, as they came in my way; that ſo thereby others might judge what will, or will not be the Conſequences of ſuch a Change of our Coin, as he propoſes, the only way, I think, of *rendring his Deſign more agreeable to the publick Service.*

FIN

SEVERAL

PAPERS

Relating to

Money, Interest and *Trade*, &c.

Writ upon several Occasions, and Published at different Times.

By Mr. *JOHN LOCKE*,

LONDON:
Printed for *A.* and *J. Churchill*, at the *Black-Swan* in *Pater-Noster-Row*, 1696.

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Novemb. 27. 1691. *Ja. Fraser.*

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Some Considerations OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE *Lowering of Interest,* AND Raising the Value OF MONEY.

In a Letter sent to a Member of Parliament, 1691.

The Second Edition Corrected.

LONDON,
Printed for *Awnsham* and *John Churchil,* at the *Black-Swan* in *Pater-Noster-Row.* 1696.

SOME CONSIDERATIONS
OF THE
CONSEQUENCES
OF THE
Lowering of Interest,
AND
Raising the Value
OF
MONEY.

SIR,

THese Notions, concerning Coinage, having for the main, as you know, been put into Writing above Twelve Months since; as those other concerning Interest, a great deal above so many Years: I put them now again into your Hands, with a Liberty (since you will have it so) to communicate them farther, as you please. If, upon a Review, you continue your favourable Opinion of them, and nothing less than Publishing will satisfie you, I must desire you to remember, That you must be answerable to the World for

for the Stile; which is such as a Man writes carelesly to his Friend, when he seeks Truth, not Ornament; and studies only to be in the right, and to be understood. I have since you saw them last Year, met with some new Objections in Print, which I have endeavoured to remove; and particularly, I have taken into Consideration a Printed Sheet, entituled, Remarks upon a Paper given in to the Lords, *&c. Because one may naturally suppose, That he that was so much a Patron of that Cause would omit nothing that could be said in favour of it. To this I must here add, That I am just now told from* Holland, That the States, finding themselves abused by Coining a vast quantity

tity of their baſe [*Schillings*] Money, made of their own Ducatoons, and other finer Silver, melted down; have put a ſtop to the Minting of any but fine Silver Coin, till they ſhould ſettle their Mint upon a new Foot.

I know the ſincere Love and Concern you have for your Country, puts you conſtantly upon caſting about on all hands for any means to ſerve it; and will not ſuffer you to overlook any thing you conceive may be of any the leaſt uſe, though offer'd you from the meaneſt Capacities: You could not elſe have put me upon looking out my old Papers concerning the reducing of Intereſt *to* 4 per Cent. *which have ſo long lain by forgotten. Upon this new*

Survey

Survey of them, I find not my Thoughts now to differ from those I had near Twenty Years since: They have to me still the Appearance of Truth; nor should I otherwise venture them so much as to your sight. If my Notions are wrong, my Intention, I am sure, is right: And whatever I have failed in, I shall at least let you see with what Obedience I am,

Nov. 7 1691. Sir,

Your most humble Servant.

SIR,

SIR,

I Have so little Concern in Paying or Receiving of *Interest*, that were I in no more Danger to be misled by Inability and Ignorance, than I am to be biassed by Interest and Inclination, I might hope to give you a very perfect and clear Account of the Consequences of a Law, to reduce *Interest* to Four *per Cent.* But since you are pleased to ask my Opinion, I shall endeavour fairly to state this Matter of *Use* with the best of my Skill.

The first thing to be consider'd, is, Whether the Price of the Hire of Money can be regulated by *Law*. And to that I think, generally speaking, one may say, 'tis manifest it cannot. For since it's impossible, to make a Law that shall hinder a Man from giving away his Money or Estate to whom he pleases, it will be impossible, by any Contrivance of Law, to hinder Men, skill'd in the Power they have over their own Goods, and the ways of Conveying them to others,

to purchaſe Money to be Lent them at what Rate ſoever their Occaſions ſhall make it neceſſary for them to have it. For it is to be Remembred, That no Man borrows Money, or pays *Uſe*, out of mere Pleaſure: 'Tis the want of Money drives Men to that Trouble and Charge of Borrowing: And proportionably to this Want, ſo will every one have it, whatever Price it coſt him. Wherein the Skilful, I ſay, will always ſo manage it, as to avoid the Prohibition of your Law, and keep out of its Penalty, do what you can. What then will be the unavoidable Conſequences of ſuch a Law?

1. It will make the Difficulty of Borrowing and Lending much greater; whereby Trade (the Foundation of Riches) will be obſtructed.

2. It will be a Prejudice to none but thoſe who moſt need Aſſiſtance and Help, I mean Widows and Orphans, and others uninſtructed in the Arts and Managements of more skilful Men; whoſe Eſtates lying in Money, they will be ſure, eſpecially Orphans, to have no more Profit of their Money, than what *Intereſt* the Law barely allows.

3. It will mightily encreaſe the Advantage of Bankers and Scriveners, and other ſuch expert Brokers: Who skilled in the Arts

Arts of putting out Money according to the true and natural Value, which the present State of Trade, Money and Debts, shall always raise *Interest* to, they will infallibly get, what the true Value of *Interest* shall be, above the Legal. For Men finding the Convenience of Lodging their Money in Hands, where they can be sure of it at short Warning, the Ignorant and Lazy will be forwardest to put it into these Mens hands, who are known willingly to receive it, and where they can readily have the whole, or a part, upon any sudden Occasion, that may call for it.

4. I fear I may reckon it as one of the probable Consequences of such a Law, That it is likely to cause great Perjury in the Nation; a Crime, than which nothing is more carefully to be prevented by Lawmakers, not only by Penalties, that shall attend apparent and proved Perjury; but by avoiding and lessening, as much as may be, the Temptations to it. For where those are strong, (as they are where Men shall Swear for their own Advantage) there the fear of Penalties to follow will have little Restraint; especially if the Crime be hard to be proved. All which I suppose will happen in this Case, where ways will be found out to receive Money upon other Pretences than for *Use*, to evade the Rule

and Rigour of the Law: And there will be ſecret Truſts and Colluſions amongſt Men, that though they may be ſuſpected, can never be proved without their own Confeſſion. I have heard very ſober and obſerving Perſons complain of the Danger Mens Lives and Properties are in, by the frequency and faſhionableneſs of Perjury amongſt us. Faith and Truth, eſpecially in all Occaſions of atteſting it upon the ſolemn Appeal to Heaven by an Oath, is the great Bond of Society: This it becomes the Wiſdom of Magiſtrates carefully to ſupport, and render as ſacred and awful in the Minds of the People as they can. But if ever Frequency of Oaths ſhall make them be looked on as Formalities of Law, or the Cuſtom of ſtraining of Truth (which Mens Swearing in their own Caſes is apt to lead them to) has once dipt Men in Perjury, and the Guilt with the Temptation has ſpread it ſelf very wide, and made it almoſt faſhionable in ſome Caſes, it will be impoſſible for the Society (theſe Bonds being diſſolved) to ſubſiſt: All muſt break in Pieces, and run to Confuſion. That Swearing in their own Caſe is apt, by degrees to lead Men into as little Regard of ſuch Oaths, as they have of their ordinary Talk, I think there is reaſon to ſuſpect, from what has been obſerved in ſomething

of

of that kind. Masters of Ships are a sort of Men generally Industrious and Sober, and I suppose may be thought, for their Number and Rank, to be equally Honest to any other sort of Men: And yet, by the Discourse I have had with Merchants in other Countries, I find, That they think in those Parts, they take a great Liberty in their Custom-house Oaths, to that degree, that I remember I was once told, in a Trading Town beyond Sea, of a Master of a Vessel, there esteemed a sober and fair Man, who yet could not hold saying, *God forbid that a Custom-house Oath should be a Sin.* I say not this, to make any Reflection upon a sort of Men, that I think as uncorrupt as any other; and who, I am sure, ought in *England* to be cherished and esteem'd as the most industrious and most beneficial of any of its Subjects. But I could not forbear to give this here as an Instance, how dangerous a Temptation it is, to bring Men customarily to Swear, where they may have any Concernment of their own. And it will always be worthy the Care and Consideration of Law-makers, to keep up the Opinion of an Oath High and Sacred, as it ought to be, in the Minds of the People; which can never be done, where frequency of Oaths, biassed by Interest, has establisht a neglect of them;

and Fashion (which it seldom fails to do) has given Countenance to what Profit rewards.

But that Law cannot keep Men from taking more *Use* than you set (the want of Money being that alone which regulates its Price) will perhaps appear, if we consider how hard it is to set a Price upon Wine or Silks, or other unnecessary Commodities; but how impossible it is to set a Rate upon Victuals in a time of Famine. For Money being an universal Commodity, and as necessary to Trade, as Food is to Life, every body must have it, at what Rate they can get it; and unavoidably pay dear when it is scarce, and Debts, no less than Trade, have made Borrowing in Fashion. The Bankers are a clear Instance of this: For some Years since, the Scarcity of Money having made it in *England* worth really more than Six *per Cent.* most of those that had not the Skill to let it for more than Six *per Cent.* and secure themselves from the Penalty of the Law, put it in the Bankers Hands, where it was ready at their Call, when they had an Opportunity of greater Improvement. So that the Rate you set, profits not the Lenders, and very few of the Borrowers, who are fain to pay the Price for Money, that Commodity would bear, were it left free; and the

Gain

Gain is only to the Banker. And ſhould you leſſen the *Uſe* to Four *per Cent.* the Merchant, or Tradeſman, that Borrows, would not have it one jot cheaper, than he has now; but probably theſe two ill effects would follow. Firſt, That he would pay dearer; and Secondly, That there would be leſs Money left in the Country to drive the Trade. For the Bankers paying at moſt but Four *per Cent.* and receiving from Six to Ten *per Cent.* or more, at that low Rate could be content to have more Money lye dead by them, than now when it is higher: By which means there would be leſs Money ſtirring in Trade, and a greater Scarcity; which would raiſe it upon the Borrower by this *Monopoly*. And what a part of our Treaſure their skill and management, joined with others lazineſs or want of skill, is apt to draw into their Hands, is to be known by thoſe vaſt Sums of Money, they were found to owe at the ſhutting up of the *Exchequer*. And though it be very true, yet it is almoſt beyond Belief, That one private Goldſmith of *London* ſhould have Credit upon his ſingle Security, (being uſually nothing but a Note under one of his Servants Hands) for above Eleven hundred thouſand Pounds at once. The ſame Reaſons, I ſuppoſe, will ſtill keep on the ſame Trade:

And when you have taken it down by Law to that Rate, no body will think of having more than Four *per Cent.* of the Banker, though those who have need of Money, to employ it in Trade, will not then, any more than now, get it under Five or Six, or as some pay, Seven or Eight. And if they had then, when the Law permitted Men to make more Profit of their Money, so large a Proportion of the Cash of the Nation in their Hands, who can think, but that by this Law it should be more driven into *Lombard-street* now? there being many now who who lend them at Four or Five *per Cent.* who will not Lend to others at Six. It would therefore perhaps, bring down the Rate of Money to the Borrower, and certainly distribute it better to the Advantage of Trade in the Country, if the *legal Use* were kept pretty near to the *natural*; (by *natural Use*, I mean that Rate of Money which the present Scarcity of it makes it naturally at, upon an equal Distribution of it) for then Men being Licensed by the Law to take near the full *natural Use*, will not be forward to carry it to *London*, to put it into the Bankers Hands; but will Lend it to their Neighbours in the Country, where it is convenient for Trade it should be. But if you lessen the Rate of *Use*, the Lender, whose Interest it is to

keep

keep up the Rate of Money, will rather lend it to the Banker, at the *legal Intereſt*, than to the Tradeſman or Gentleman, who when the Law is broken, ſhall be ſure to pay the full *natural Intereſt*, or more; becauſe of the ingroſſing by the Banker, as well as the Riſque in tranſgreſſing the Law. Whereas were the *natural Uſe* ſuppoſe Seven *per Cent.* and the *legal* Six. Firſt, the Owner would not venture the Penalty of the Law for the gaining one in Seven, that being the utmoſt his Money would yield: Nor would the Banker venture to Borrow, where his Gains would be but One *per Cent.* nor the Money'd Man lend him, what he could make better Profit of legally at Home. All the Danger lies in this, That your Trade ſhould ſuffer if your being behind-hand has made the *natural Uſe* ſo high, that your Tradeſman cannot live upon his Labour, but that your Rich Neighbours will ſo underſell you, that the Return you make will not amount to pay the *Uſe* and afford a Livelihood. There is no way to recover from this, but by a general Frugality and Induſtry, or by being Maſters of the Trade of ſome Commodity, which the World muſt have from you at your Rate, becauſe it cannot be other where ſupplied.

Now I think the *Natural Intereſt* of Money

ney is raiſed two ways; Firſt, When the Money of a Country is but little in proportion to the Debts of the Inhabitants one amonſt another. For ſuppoſe Ten thouſand pounds were ſufficient to manage the Trade of *Bermudas*, and that the Ten firſt Planters carried over Twenty thouſand pound, which they Lent to the ſeveral Tradeſmen and Inhabitants of the Country, who living above their Gains had ſpent Ten thouſand pound of this Money, and it were gone out of the Iſland. 'Tis evident, that ſhould all the Creditors at once call in their Money, there would be a great ſcarcity of Money, when that employed in Trade muſt be taken out of the Tradeſmens Hands to pay Debts; or elſe the Debtors want Money, and be expoſed to their Creditors, and ſo Intereſt will be high. But this ſeldom happening, that all, or the greateſt part of the Creditors do at once call for their Money, unleſs it be in ſome great and general Danger, is leſs and ſeldomer felt, than the following, unleſs where the Debts of the People are grown to a greater proportion, for that conſtantly cauſing more Borrowers, than there can be Lenders, will make Money ſcarce, and conſequently *Intereſt* high. Secondly, That which conſtantly raiſes the *Natural Intereſt* of Money, is, when Money is little in proportion

to

to the Trade of a Country. For in Trade every Body calls for Money according as he wants it, and this disproportion is always felt. For if Englishmen owed in all but One Million, and there were a Million of Money in *England*, the Money would be well enough proportioned to the Debts; But if Two Millions were necessary to carry on the Trade, there would be a Million wanting, and the price of Money would be raised, as it is of any other Commodity in a Market, where the Merchandize will not serve half the Customers, and there are two Buyers for one Seller.

'Tis in vain therefore to go about effectually to reduce the price of Interest by a Law; and you may as rationally hope to set a fixt Rate upon the Hire of Houses, or Ships, as of Money. He that wants a Vessel, rather than lose his Market, will not stick to have it at the Market Rate, and find ways to do it, with security to the Owner, though the Rate were limited by a Law: And he that wants Money, rather than lose his Voyage, or his Trade, will pay the *Natural Interest* for it; and submit to such ways of Conveyance, as shall keep the Lender out of the reach of the Law. So that your Act, at best, will serve only to increase the Arts of Lending, but not at all lessen the Charge of the Borrower: He 'tis likely

shall

shall with more trouble, and going farther about, pay also the more for his Money; unless you intend to break in only upon Mortgages and Contracts already made, and (which is not to be supposed) by a Law, *post factum*, void Bargains lawfully made, and give to *Richard* what is *Peters* Due, for no other Reason, but because one was Borrower, and the other Lender.

But supposing the Law reach'd the intention of the Promoters of it; and that this Act be so contrived, that it forced the Natural price of Money, and hindred its being by any Body Lent at a higher *Use*, than Four Pound *per Cent.* which is plain it cannot. Let us in the next place see, what will be the Consequences of it.

1. It will be a loss to Widows, Orphans, and all those who have their Estate in Money, one third of their Estates: which will be a very hard case upon a great number of People, and it is warily to be consider'd by the Wisdom of the Nation, whether they will thus at one blow, fine and impoverish a great and innocent part of the People, who having their Estates in Money, have as much Right to make as much of their Money, as it is worth, (for more they cannot) as the Landlord has to let his Land for as much as it will yield. To Fine Men one Third of their Estates, without any Crime

Crime or Offence committed, ſeems very hard.

2. As it will be a conſiderable Loſs and Injury to the mony'd Man, ſo it will be no Advantage at all to the Kingdom. For ſo Trade be not Cramp'd, and the Exportation of our Native Commodities and Manufactures not hindred, it will be no matter to the Kingdom, who amongſt our ſelves Gets or Loſes: only common Charity teaches, that thoſe ſhould be moſt taken care of by the Law, who are leaſt capable of taking care for themſelves.

3. It will be a Gain to the Borrowing Merchant. For if he Borrow at Four *per Cent.* and his Returns be Twelve *per Cent.* he will have Eight *per Cent.* and the Lender Four: Whereas now they divide the profit equally at Six *per Cent.* But this neither Gets nor Loſes the Kingdom in your Trade, ſuppoſing the Merchant and Lender to be both Engliſhmen: only it will as I have ſaid, transfer a third part of the Mony'd Mans Eſtate, who has nothing elſe to live on, into the Merchants Pocket; and that without any Merit in the one, or Tranſgreſſion in the other. Private mens intereſts ought not thus to be neglected, nor ſacrificed to any thing but the manifeſt advantage of the Publick. But in this caſe it will be quite the contrary. This loſs to the

mony'd

mony'd Men will be a prejudice to Trade: Since it will discourage Lending at such a disproportion of Profit, to Risque; as we shall see more by and by, when we come to consider of what consequence it is to encourage Lending, that so none of the Money of the Nation may lie dead, and thereby prejudice Trade.

4. It will hinder Trade. For there being a certain proportion of Money necessary for driving such a proportion of Trade, so much Money of this as lies still, lessens so much of the Trade. Now it cannot be rationally expected, but that where the Venture is great, and the Gains small, (as it is in Lending in *England* upon low *Interest*) many will choose rather to hoard up their Money, than venture it abroad on such Terms. This will be a loss to the Kingdom, and such a loss, as here in *England* ought chiefly to be looked after: For we having no Mines, nor any other way of getting, or keeping of Riches amongst us but by Trade, so much of our Trade as is lost, so much of our Riches must necessarily go with it; and the over-ballancing of Trade between us and our Neighbours, must inevitably carry away our Money, and quickly leave us Poor, and exposed. Gold and Silver though they serve for few yet they command all the conveniencies of life; and therefore in a plenty of them consists Riches. Every

Every one knows that Mines alone furniſh theſe: But withal 'tis obſervable that moſt Countries ſtored with them by Nature are poor. The digging and refining of theſe Metals taking up the Labour, and waſting the Number of the People. For which reaſon the wiſe Policy of the *Chineſes* will not ſuffer the Mines they have to be wrought. Nor indeed, things rightly conſidered, do Gold and Silver drawn out of the Mine equally Enrich, with what is got by Trade. He that would make the lighter Scale preponderate to the oppoſite, will not ſo ſoon do it, by adding encreaſe of new Weight to the emptier, as if he took out of the heavier what he adds to the lighter, for then half ſo much will do it. Riches do not conſiſt in having more Gold and Silver, but in having more in proportion, than the reſt of the World, or than our Neighbours, whereby we are enabled to procure to our ſelves a greater Plenty of the Conveniencies of Life than comes within the reach of Neighbouring Kingdoms and States, who, ſharing the Gold and Silver of the World in a leſs proportion, want the means of Plenty and Power, and ſo are Poorer. Nor would they be one jot the Richer, if by the diſcovery of new Mines the quantity of Gold and Silver in the World becoming twice as much as it is, their ſhares of them

them should be doubled. By Gold and Silver in the World I must be understood to mean, not what lies hid in the Earth; but what is already out of the Mine in the Hands and Possessions of Men. This, if well considered, would be no small encouragement to Trade, which is a surer and shorter way to Riches than any other, where it is managed with Skill and Industry.

In a Country not furnished with Mines there are but two ways of growing Rich, either Conquest, or Commerce. By the first the *Romans* made themselves Masters of the Riches of the World; but I think that in our present circumstances, no Body is vain enough to entertain a Thought of our reaping the Profits of the World with our Swords, and making the Spoil and Tribute of Vanquished Nations, the Fund for the supply of the Charges of the Government, with an overplus for the wants, and equally craving Luxury, and fashionable Vanity of the People.

Commerce therefore is the only way left to us, either for Riches or Subsistence, for this the advantages of our Situation, as well as the Industry and Inclination of our People, bold and skilful at Sea, do Naturally fit us: By this the Nation of *England* has been hitherto Supported, and Trade left almost to it self, and assisted only by the Na-

Natural Advantages above-mentioned, brought us in Plenty and Riches, and always ſet this Kingdom in a rank equal, if not ſuperior to any of its Neighbours: And would no doubt without any difficulty have continued it ſo, if the more enlarged, and better underſtood Intereſt of Trade, ſince the Improvement of Navigation, had not raiſed us many Rivals; and the amazing Politicks of ſome late Reigns, let in other Competitors with us for the Sea, who will be ſure to ſeize to themſelves whatever parts of Trade our Miſmanagement, or want of Money, ſhall let ſlip out of our Hands: And when it is once loſt, 'twill be too late to hope, by a miſtim'd Care, eaſily to retrieve it again. For the Currents of Trade, like thoſe of Waters, make themſelves Channels, out of which they are afterwards as hard to be diverted, as Rivers that have worn themſelves deep within their Banks.

Trade then is neceſſary to the producing of Riches, and Money neceſſary to the carrying on of Trade. This is principally to be looked after and taken Care of. For if this be neglected, we ſhall in vain, by Contrivances amongſt our ſelves, and ſhuffling the little Money we have from one anothers Hands, endeavour to prevent our Wants: Decay of Trade will quickly waſte

all the Remainder; and then the Landed-Man, who thinks perhaps by the fall of *Interest* to raise the Value of his Land, will find himself cruelly mistaken, when the Money being gone, (as it will be if our Trade be not kept up) he can get neither Farmer to Rent, nor Purchaser to Buy his Land. Whatsoever therefore hinders the Lending of Money, injures Trade: And so the reducing of Money, to Four *per Cent.* which will discourage Men from Lending, will be a Loss to the Kingdom, in stopping so much of the Current of Money, which turns the Wheels of Trade. But all this upon a Supposition, that the Lender and Borrower are both *English* Men.

If the Lender be a Foreigner, by lessening *Interest* from Six to Four you get to the Kingdom one third part of the *Interest* we pay Yearly to Foreigners: Which let any one if he please think considerable. But then upon lessening *Interest* to Four *per Cent.* it is likely one of these things will happen. That either you fall the Price of your Native Commodities: Or lessen your Trade; Or else prevent not the high *Use* as you intended. For at the time of lessening your *Interest*, you want Money for your Trade, or you do not. If you do not, there is no need to prevent Borrowing at a high Rate of your Neighbours. For no Coun-

try

try borrows of its Neighbours but where there is need of Money for Trade: Nobody will borrow more of a Foreigner to let it lye ſtill. And if you do want Money, Neceſſity will ſtill make you borrow where you can, and at the Rates your Neceſſity, not your Laws, ſhall ſet: or elſe, if there be ſcarcity of Money, it muſt hinder the Merchant's Buying and Exportation, and the Artiſan's Manufacture. Now the Kingdom gets or loſes by this (for no queſtion the Merchant by low *Intereſt* gets all the while) only proportionably (allowing the Conſumption of Foreign Commodities to be ſtill the ſame) as the paying of *Uſe* to Foreigners carries away more or leſs of our Money, than want of Money and ſtopping our Trade keeps us from bringing in, by hindring our Gains, which can be only eſtimated by thoſe, who know how much Money we borrow of Foreigners, and at what Rate; and too, what Profit in Trade we make of that Money.

Borrowing of Foreigners upon *Intereſt* it's true carries away ſome of our Gain: But yet upon Examination it will be found, that our growing Rich or Poor depends not at all upon our borrowing upon *Intereſt* or not; but only which is greater or leſs, our Importation or Exportation of conſumable Commodities. For ſuppoſing two Millions

of Money will drive the Trade of *England*, and that we have Money enough of our own to do it; if we consume of our own Product and Manufacture, and what we Purchase by it of Foreign Commodities, one Million, but of the other Million consume nothing, but make a return of Ten *per Cent. per An.* we must then every Year be One hundred thousand pounds Richer, and our Stock be so much encreast: But if we Import more consumable Commodities than we Export, our Money must go out to pay for them, and we grow poorer. Suppose therefore ill Husbandry hath brought us to one Million Stock, and we borrow the other Million (as we must, or lose half our Trade) at Six *per Cent.* If we consume one moyety, and make still Ten *per Cent. per An.* Return of the other Million, the Kingdom gets Forty thousand pounds *per An.* though it pay Sixty thousand pound *per An. Use.* So that if the Merchant's Return be more than his *Use*, (which 'tis certain it is, or else he will not Trade) and all that is so Traded for on borrowed Money be but the over-ballance of our Exportation to our Importation, the Kingdom gets by this Borrowing so much as the Merchant's Gain is above his *Use.* But if we borrow only for our own Expences, we grow doubly poor, by paying Money

for

for the Commodity we consume, and *Use* for that Money; though the Merchant gets all this while, by making Returns greater than his *Use*. And therefore Borrowing of Foreigners in it self makes not the Kingdom rich or poor; for it may do either: But spending more than our Fruits or Manufactures will pay for, brings in Poverty, and Poverty Borrowing.

For Money, as necessary to Trade, may be doubly considered. First, as in his Hands that pays the Labourer and Landholder, (for here its motion terminates, and through whose Hands soever it passes between these, he is but a Broker) and if this Man want Money, (as for Example, the Clothier) the Manufacture is not made; and so the Trade stops, and is lost. Or Secondly, Money may be considered as in the Hands of the Consumer, under which Name I here reckon the Merchant who buys the Commodity when made, to Export: And if he want Money, the value of the Commodity when made is lessened, and so the Kingdom loses in the Price. If therefore *Use* be lessened, and you cannot tye Foreigners to your Terms, then the ill effects fall only upon your Landholders and Artisans: If Foreigners can be forc'd by your Law to Lend you Money only at your own Rate, or not Lend at all, is it

not more likely they will rather take it home, and think it ſafer in their own Country at Four *per Cent.* than abroad in a decaying Country? Nor can their overplus of Money bring them to Lend to you, on your Terms: For when your Merchants want of Money ſhall have ſunk the price of your Market, a Dutchman will find it more gains to buy your Commodity himſelf, than Lend his Money at Four *Per Cent.* to an Engliſh Merchant to Trade with. Nor will the Act of Navigation hinder their coming, by making them come empty, ſince even already there are thoſe who think, that many, who go for Engliſh Merchants, are but Dutch Factors, and Trade for others in their own Names. The Kingdom therefore will loſe by this lowering of *Intereſt*, if it makes Foreigners withdraw any of their Money, as well as if it hinders any of your People from Lending theirs, where Trade has need of it.

In a Treatiſe writ on purpoſe for the bringing down of *Intereſt*, I find this Argument of Foreigners calling away their Money to the prejudice of our Trade, thus Anſwer'd, *That the Money of Foreigner, is not brought into the Land by ready Coin or Bullion, but by Goods or Bills of Exchange; and when it is paid muſt be returned by Goods*

or Bills of Exchange; and there will not be the leſs Money in the Land. I could not but wonder to ſee a Man, who undertook to write of Money and Intereſt, talk ſo directly beſides the matter in the buſineſs of Trade. *Foreigners Money, he ſays, is not brought into the Land by ready Coin or Bullion, but by Goods, or Bills of Exchange.* How then do we come by Bullion or Money? For Gold grows not, that I know, in our Country, and Silver ſo little, that One hundred thouſandth part of the Silver we have now in *England*, was not drawn out of any Mines in this Iſland. If he means that the Monied Man in *Holland*, who puts out his Money at *Intereſt* here, did not ſend it over in Bullion or Specie hither: That may be true or falſe; but either way helps not that Authors purpoſe. For if he paid his Money to a Merchant his Neighbour, and took his Bills for it here in *England*, he did the ſame thing as if he had ſent over that Money, ſince he does but make that Merchant leave in *England* the Money which he has Due to him there, and otherwiſe would carry away. *No*, ſays our Author, *he cannot carry it away, for*, ſays he, *when it is paid it muſt be returned by Goods, or Bills of Exchange.* It muſt not be paid and exported in ready Money, ſo ſays our Law in-

deed, but that is a Law to hedge in the Cookoe, and ſerves to no purpoſe. For if we Export not Goods, for which our Merchants have Money due to them in *Holland*, How can it be paid by Bills of Exchange? And for *Goods*, One hundred pounds worth of *Goods* can no where pay Two hundred pounds in Money. This being that which I find many Men deceive themſelves with in Trade, it may be worth while to make it a little plainer.

Let us ſuppoſe *England* Peopled as it is now; and its Woollen Manufacture in the ſame State and Perfection, that it is at preſent; and that we, having no Money at all, trade with this our Woollen Manufacture for the value of Two hundred thouſand pounds Yearly to *Spain*, where there actually is a Million in Money: Further let us ſuppoſe that we bring back from *Spain* Yearly in Oyl, Wine, and Fruit, to the value of One hundred thouſand pounds, and continue to do this Ten Years together: 'Tis plain we have had for our two Millions value in Woollen Manufacture carried thither, one Million returned in Wine, Oyl, and Fruit: But what is become of t'other Million? Will the Merchants be content to loſe it? That you may be ſure they would not, nor have Traded on, if they had not every Year Returns made

made anſwering their Exportation. How then were the Returns made? In Money it is evident. For the Spaniards having in ſuch a Trade, no Debts, nor the poſſibility of any Debts in *England*, cannot pay one Farthing of that other Million by Bills of Exchange: And having no Commodities that we will take off above the value of One hundred thouſand pounds *per Annum*, they cannot pay us in Commodities. From whence it neceſſarily follows, that the Hundred thouſand pounds *per Ann.* wherein we over-ballance them in Trade, muſt be paid us in Money; and ſo at the Ten years end, their Million of Money, (though their Law make it Death to export it) will be all brought into *England*; as in truth, by this over-ballance of Trade, the greateſt part of our Money hath been brought into *England* out of *Spain*.

Let us ſuppoſe our ſelves now poſſeſſed of this Million of Money; and Exporting Yearly out of *England*, to the ſeveral parts of the World, conſumable Commodities to the value of a Million, but Importing Yearly in Commodities, which we conſume amongſt us to the value of Eleven hundred thouſand pounds. If ſuch a Trade as this be managed amongſt us, and continue Ten Years, it is evident, that our Million of Money will at the end of the Ten Years be

inevitably

inevitably all gone from us to them, by the same way that it came to us; that is, by their over-ballance of Trade, for we Importing every Year One hundred thousand pounds worth of Commodities more than we Export, and there being no Foreigners that will give us One hundred thousand pounds every year for nothing, it is unavoidable, that One hundred thousand Pounds of our Money must go out every Year to pay for that over-plus, which our Commodities do not pay for. 'Tis ridiculous to say, that Bills of Exchange shall pay our Debts abroad: That cannot be, till Scrips of Paper can be made current Coin. The English Merchant, who has no Money owing him abroad, cannot expect to have his Bills paid there. Or if he has Credit enough with a Correspondent, to have his Bills answered: This pays none of the Debt of *England*, but only changes the Creditor. And if upon the general ballance of Trade, English Merchants owe to Foreigners One hundred thousand pounds, or a Million, if Commodities do not, our Money must go out to pay it, or else our Credit be lost, and our Trade stop, and be lost too.

A Kingdom grows Rich, or Poor just as a Farmer doth, and no otherwise. Let us suppose the whole Isle of *Portland* one Farm; and that the Owner, besides what serves his Family,

Family, carries toMarket to *Weymouth* and *Dorcheſter*, *&c.* Cattle, Corn, Butter, Cheeſe, Wooll, or Cloth, Lead and Tin, all Commodities produced and wrought within his Farm of *Portland*, to the value of a Thouſand Pounds yearly; and for this, brings whome in Salt, Wine, Oyl, Spice, Linnen and Silks, to the value of Nine hundred Pounds, and the remaining Hundred Pounds in Money. 'Tis evident he grows every year a hundred Pounds Richer, and ſo at the end of ten years will have clearly got a Thouſand Pounds. If the Owner be a better Husband, and contenting himſelf with his Native Commodities, buy leſs Wine, Spice, and Silk, at Market, and ſo bring home Five hundred Pounds in Money yearly, inſtead of a Thouſand Pounds, at the end of ten years he will have Five thouſand pounds by him, and be ſo much Richer. He Dies, and his Son ſucceeds, a faſhionable young Gentleman, that cannot Dine without *Champane* and *Burgundy*, nor Sleep but in a Damask Bed; whoſe Wife muſt ſpread a long Train of Brocard, and his Children be always in the neweſt French cut and Stuff. He being come to the Eſtate, keeps on a very buſie Family; the Markets are weekly frequented, and the Commodities of his Farm carried out, and Sold, as formerly, but the Returns are made

made ſomething different; the faſhionable way of Eating, Drinking, Furniture and Clothing for himſelf and Family, requires more Sugar and Spice, Wine and Fruit, Silk and Ribons, than in his Fathers time; ſo that inſtead of Nine hundred Pounds *per Annum*, he now brings home of conſumable Commodities, to the value of Eleven hundred Pounds yearly. What comes of this? He lives in Splendor, 'tis true, but this unavoidably carries away the Money his Father got, and he is every year an Hundred Pounds Poorer. To his Expences, beyond his Income, add Debauchery, Idleneſs, and Quarrels amongſt his Servants, whereby his Manufactures are diſturbed, and his Buſineſs neglected, and a general Diſorder and Confuſion through his whole Family and Farm: This will tumble him down the Hill the faſter, and the Stock, which the Induſtry, Frugality, and good Order of his Father had laid up, will be quickly brought to an end, and he faſt in Priſon. A Farm and a Kingdom in this reſpect differ no more than as greater and leſs. We may Trade, and be buſie, and grow Poor by it, unleſs we regulate our Expences; If to this we are Idle, Negligent, Diſhoneſt, Malitious, and diſturb the Sober and Induſtrious in their Buſineſs, let it be upon what pretence it will, we ſhall Ruine the faſter.

So

So that whatever this Author, or any one elſe may ſay, Money is brought into *England* by nothing but ſpending here leſs of Foreign Commodities, than what we carry to Market can pay for; Nor can Debts we owe to Foreigners be paid by Bills of Exchange, till our Commodities Exported, and Sold beyond Sea, have produced Money or Debts due there, to ſome of our Merchants. For nothing will pay Debts but Money or Moneys worth, which three or four Lines writ in Paper cannot be. If ſuch Bills have an intrinſick value, and can ſerve inſtead of Money, why do we not ſend them to Market inſtead of our Cloth, Lead and Tin, and at an eaſier rate purchaſe the Commodities we want? All that a Bill of Exchange can do, is to direct to whom Money due, or taken up upon Credit in a Foreign Country, ſhall be paid: And if we trace it, we ſhall find, that what is owing already became ſo, for Commodities, or Money, carried from hence: And if it be taken up upon Credit, it muſt (let the Debt be ſhifted from one Creditor to another as often as you will) at laſt be paid by Money or Goods, carried from hence, or elſe the Merchant here muſt turn Bankrupt.

We have ſeen how Riches and Money are got, kept, or loſt, in any Country; and that

that is by consuming less of Foreign Commodities than what, by Commodities or Labour is paid for. This is in the ordinary course of things: But where great Armies and Alliances are to be maintained abroad by Supplies sent out of any Country, there often, by a shorter and more sensible way, the Treasure is diminished. But this since the holy War, or at least since the Improvement of Navigation and Trade, seldom happening to *England*, whose Princes have found the enlarging their Power by Sea, and the securing our Navigation and Trade, more the Interest of this Kingdom than Wars or Conquests on the Continent, Expences in Arms beyond Sea have had little Influence on our Riches or Poverty. The next thing to be considered, is, how Money is necessary to Trade.

The Necessity of a certain Proportion of Money to Trade, (I conceive) lyes in this, That Money in its Circulation driving the several Wheels of Trade, whilst it keeps in that Channel (for some of it will unavoidably be dreined into standing Pools) is all shared between the Landholder, whose Land affords the Materials; The Labourer, who works them; The Broker, (*i. e.*) Merchant and Shop-keeper, who distributes them to those, that want

want them; And the Consumer, who spends them. Now Money is necessary to all these sorts of Men, as serving both for Counters and for Pledges, and so carrying with it even Reckoning, and Security, that he, that receives it, shall have the same Value for it again, of other things that he wants, whenever he pleases. The one of these it does by its Stamp and Denomination; the other by its intrinsick Value, which is its *Quantity*.

For Mankind, having consented to put an imaginary Value upon Gold and Silver by reason of their Durableness, Scarcity, and not being very liable to be Counterfeited, have made them by general consent the common Pledges, whereby Men are assured, in Exchange for them to receive equally valuable things to those they parted with for any *quantity* of these Metals. By which means it comes to pass, that the intrinsick Value regarded in these Metals made the common Barter, is nothing but the *quantity* which Men give or receive of them. For they having as Money no other Value, but as Pledges to procure, what one wants or desires; and they procuring what we want or desire, only by their *quantity*, 'tis evident, that the intrinsick Value of Silver and Gold used in Commerce is nothing but their *quantity*.

The

The Neceſſity therefore of a Proportion of Money to Trade, depends on Money not as Counters, for the Reckoning may be kept, or transferred by Writing; but on Money as a Pledge, which Writing cannot ſupply the place of: Since the Bill, Bond, or other Note of Debt, I receive from one Man will not be accepted as Security by another, he not knowing that the Bill or Bond is true or legal, or that the Man bound to me is honeſt or reſponſible; and ſo is not valuable enough to become a current Pledge, nor can by publick Authority be well made ſo, as in the Caſe of Aſſigning of Bills. Becauſe a Law cannot give to Bills that intrinſick Value, which the univerſal Conſent of Mankind has annexed to Silver and Gold. And hence Foreigners can never be brought to take your Bills, or Writings for any part of Payment, though perhaps they might paſs as valuable Conſiderations among your own People, did not this very much hinder it, *viz.* That they are liable to unavoidable Doubt, Diſpute, and Counterfeiting, and require other Proofs; to aſſure us that they are true and good Security, than our Eyes or a Touchſtone. And at beſt this Courſe, if practicable, will not hinder us from being Poor; but may be ſuſpected to help to make us ſo, by keeping us from feeling

our

our Poverty, which in Diſtreſs will be ſure to find us with greater diſadvantage. Though it be certain it is better than letting any part of our Trade fall for want of current Pledges; and better too than borrowing Money of our Neighbours upon *Uſe*, if this way of Aſſigning Bills can be made ſo eaſie, ſafe and univerſal at home, as to hinder it.

To return to the buſineſs in hand, and ſhew the neceſſity of a *Proportion of Money to Trade*. Every Man muſt have at leaſt ſo much Money, or ſo timely Recruits, as may in hand, or in a ſhort diſtance of time, ſatisfie his Creditor who ſupplies him with the neceſſaries of Life, or of his Trade. For no body has any longer theſe neceſſary Supplies, than he has Money, or *Credit*, which is nothing elſe but an Aſſurance of Money in ſome ſhort time. So that it is requiſite to Trade that there ſhould be ſo much Money, as to keep up the Landholders, Labourers and Brokers Credit: And therefore ready Money muſt be conſtantly exchang'd for Wares and Labour, or follow within a ſhort time after.

This ſhews the neceſſity of ſome *Proportion of Money* to Trade: But what Proportion that is, is hard to determine; becauſe it depends not barely on the quantity of Money, but the quickneſs of its Circulation.

The very ſame Shilling may at one time pay Twenty Men in Twenty days, at another, reſt in the ſame Hands One hundred days together. This makes it impoſſible exactly to Eſtimate the quantity of Money needful in Trade: But to make ſome probable gueſs, we are to conſider, how much Money it is neceſſary to ſuppoſe muſt reſt conſtantly in each Man's Hands, as requiſite to the carrying on of Trade.

Firſt therefore the Labourers, living generally but from hand to mouth, and indeed, conſidered as Labourers in order to Trade, may well enough carry on their part, if they have but Money enough to buy Victuals, Cloaths, and Tools: All which may very well be provided, without any great Sum of Money lying ſtill in their Hands. The Labourers therefore, being uſually paid once a Week, (if the times of Payment be ſeldomer, there muſt be more Money for the carrying on this part of Trade) we may ſuppoſe there is conſtantly amongſt them. one with another, or thoſe who are to pay them, always one Weeks Wages in ready Money. For it cannot be thought, that all, or moſt of the Labourers pay away all their Wages conſtantly, as ſoon as they receive it, and live upon Truſt till next Pay Day. This the Farmer and

Tradeſ-

Tradesman could not well bear, were it every Labourer's Case, and every one to be trusted: And therefore they must of necessity keep some Money in their Hands, to go to Market for Victuals, and to other Tradesmen as poor as themselves, for Tools; and lay up Money too to buy Cloaths, or pay for those they bought upon Credit. Which Money thus necessarily resting in their Hands, we cannot imagine to be, one with another, much less than a Weeks Wages, that must be in their Pockets, or ready in the Farmer's Hands. For he who employs a Labourer at a Shilling *per* Day, and pays him on Saturday Nights, cannot be supposed constantly to receive that six Shillings just the same Saturday: It must ordinarily be in his Hands one time with another, if not a whole Week, yet several Days before.

This was the ordinary Course, whil'st we had Money running in the several Channels of Commerce: But that now very much failing, and the Farmer not having Money to pay the Labourer, supplies him with Corn, which in this great Plenty the Labourer will have at his one Rate, or else not take it off his Hands for Wages. And as for the Workmen, who are employed in our Manufactures, especially the Woollen one, these the Clothier, not ha-

ving ready Money to pay, furniſhes with the neceſſaries of Life, and ſo trucks Commodities for Work, which, ſuch as they are, good or bad, the Workman muſt take at his Maſter's Rate, or ſit ſtill and ſtarve: Whil'ſt by this means, this new ſort of Ingroſſers or Foreſtallers, having the feeding and ſupplying this numerous Body of Workmen out of their Warehouſes, (for they have now Magazines of all ſorts of Wares) ſet the Price upon the poor Landholder. So that the Markets now being deſtroyed, and the Farmer not finding vent there for his Butter, Cheeſe, Bacon, and Corn, *&c.* for which he was wont to bring home ready Money, muſt ſell it to theſe Ingroſſers, on their own Terms of Time and Rate; and allow it to their own Day-Labourers under the true Market-price. What kind of Influence this is like to have upon Land, and how this way Rents are like to be paid at Quarter-day, is eaſie to apprehend: And 'tis no wonder to hear every day of Farmers breaking, and running away. For if they cannot receive Money for their Goods at Market, 'twill be impoſſible for them, to pay their Landlord's Rent. If any one doubt whether this be ſo, I deſire him to enquire, how many Farmers in the *Weſt* are broke and gone ſince *Michaelmaſs* laſt.

Want

Want of Money being to this degree, works both ways upon the Landholder. For first, the ingrossing Foreſtaller lets not the Money come to Market; but ſupplying the Workman, who is employed by him in Manufacture, with Neceſſaries, impoſes his Price, and Forbearance on the Farmer, who cannot ſell to the others. And the Labourer, who is employed by the Landholder in Husbandry, impoſes alſo his Rate on him, for the Commodities he takes. For there being a want of Day-Labourers in the Country, they muſt be humoured, or elſe they will neither work for you, nor take your Commodities for their Labour.

Secondly, as for the Landholder, ſince his Tenants cannot Coin their Rent juſt at Quarter-day, but muſt gather it up by degrees, and lodge it with them till Pay-day; or borrow it of thoſe, who have it lying by them, or do gather it up by degrees, which is the ſame thing, and muſt be neceſſarily ſo much Money for ſome time lying ſtill. For all, that is paid in great Sums, muſt ſomewhere be gathered up by the Retail Incomes of a Trade, or elſe lie ſtill too in great Sums, which is the ſame ſtop of Money, or a greater. Add to this, That to pay the Creditor, that lent him his Rent, he muſt gather up Money by degrees, as the Sale of his

Commodities ſhall bring it in, and ſo makes a greater ſtop, and greater want of Money: Since the borowed Money that paid the Landholder the 25th of *March*, muſt be ſuppoſed to lye ſtill ſome time in the Creditor's hand, before he lent it the Tenant; and the Money, that pays the Creditor three Months after, muſt lye ſtill ſome time in the Tenant's. Nor does the Landlord pay away his Rent uſually, as ſoon as he receives it, but by degrees, as his occaſions call for it. All this conſider'd we cannot but ſuppoſe, that between the Landlord and Tenant there muſt neceſſarily be at leaſt a quarter of the Yearly Revenue of the Land conſtantly in their hands. Indeed conſidering, that moſt part of the Rents of *England* are paid at our *Lady-day* and *Michaelmas*, and that the ſame Money, which pays me my Rent from my Tenant the 25th of *March*, or thereabouts, cannot pay my next Neighbour his Rent from his Tenant at the ſame time, much leſs one more remote in another Country, it might ſeem requiſite to ſuppoſe half the yearly Revenue of the Land to be neceſſarily employed in paying of Rent. For to ſay that ſome Tenants break and pay not their Rent at all, and others pay not till two, three, four, five, ſix, *&c.* Months after Quarter-day, and ſo the Rent is not

all

all paid at one time, is no more than to ſay, That there is Money wanting to the Trade. For if the Tenant fail the Landlord, he muſt fail his Creditor, and he his, and ſo on, till ſomebody break, and ſo Trade decay for want of Money. But ſince a conſiderable part of the Land of *England* is in the Owners Hands, who neither pay nor receive great Sums for it at a certain Day; and becauſe too, (which is the chief Reaſon) we are not to conſider here how much Money is in any one man's, or any one ſort of mens hands at one time; for that at other times may be diſtributed into other hands, and ſerve other parts of Trade; but how much Money is neceſſary to be in each man's hands all the Year round, taking one time with another, (*i. e.*) having Three hundred pounds in his Hand one month, is to be reckoned as One hundred pound in his Hand three months, (and ſo proportionably) I think we may well ſuppoſe a quarter of the Yearly Revenue to be conſtantly in the Landlords or Tenants Hands.

Here, by the by, we may obſerve, That it were better for Trade, and conſequently for every body, (for more Money would be ſtirring, and leſs would do the buſineſs) if Rents were paid by ſhorter Intervals than ſix months. For ſuppoſing I let a Farm at

Fifty two pounds *per An.* if my Rent be paid half Yearly, there is required Twenty six pounds to be employed in the Payment of it in one entire Sum, (if it be paid well, and if it be not paid well, for want of so much Money to be spared to that purpose, there is so much want of Money, and Trade is still endamag'd by it) a great part whereof must necessarily lie still before it come out of my Tenants Chest to my Hands: If it be paid once a Quarter Thirteen pound alone will do it, and less Money is laid up for it, and stop'd a less while in its course: But should it be paid every Week, one single twenty Shillings will pay the Rent of Fifty two pounds *per Annum*, whence would follow this double benefit. First, That a great deal less Money would serve for the Trade of a Country. And Secondly, That less of the Money would lie still, the contrary whereof must needs happen, where growing Debts are to be paid at larger distances, and in greater Sums.

Thirdly, As for the Brokers, since they too must lay up the Money coming in by Retail, either to go to Market, and buy Wares, or to pay at the day appointed, which is often six Months, for those Wares which they have already, we cannot suppose them to have less by them, one with another, than One twentieth part of their year-

yearly Returns. Whether the Money be their own, or they be Indebted ſo much or more, it matters not, if it be neceſſary they ſhould have conſtantly by them, comparing one time with another, at leaſt One twentieth part of their yearly Return.

Indeed in ſome great Towns, where the Bankers are ready at hand to buy Bills. or any other way to lend Money, for ſhort time at great *Intereſt*, there perhaps the Merchant is not forced to keep ſo much Money by him, as in other places, where they have not ſuch a Supply: But if you conſider, what Money to do this muſt neceſſarily be conſtantly lodged in the Bankers Hands the caſe will be much the ſame.

To theſe Sums, if you add, what part of the Money of a Country Scholars of all ſorts, Women, Gameſters, and great Mens menial Servants, and all ſuch that do not contribute at all to Trade, either as Landholders, Labourers, or Brokers, will unavoidably have conſtantly in their Hands, it cannot well be thought, that leſs than One Fiftieth part of the Labourers Wages, One Fourth part of the Landholders yearly Revenue, and one Twentieth part of the Brokers yearly Returns in ready Money, will be enough to drive the Trade of any Country. At leaſt, to put it beyond exception low enough, it cannot be imagin'd

gin'd that leſs than one moiety of this, *i.e.* leſs than One hundredth part of the Labourers yearly Wages, One Eighth part of the Landholders yearly Revenue, and One Fortieth part of the Brokers yearly Returns, in ready Money, can be enough to move the ſeveral Wheels of Trade, and keep up Commerce in that Life and Thriving poſture it ſhould be; and how much the ready Caſh of any Country is ſhort of this proportion, ſo much muſt the Trade be impair'd and hindred for want of Money.

But however theſe meaſures may be miſtaken, this is evident, that the multiplying of Brokers hinders the Trade of any Country, by making the Circuit, which the Money goes, larger, and in that Circuit more ſtops, ſo that the Returns muſt neceſſarily be ſlower and ſcantier, to the prejudice of Trade: Beſides that, they Eat up too great a ſhare of the Gains of Trade, by that means Starving the Labourer, and impoveriſhing the Landholder, whoſe Intereſt is chiefly to be taken care of, it being a ſettled unmoveable Concernment in the Commonwealth.

If this be ſo, it is paſt queſtion, that all Encouragement ſhould be given to Artificers; and things ſo order'd, as much as might be, that thoſe who make, ſhould al-

ſo

ſo Vend and Retail out their own Commodities, and they be hindred as much as poſſible from paſſing here at home, through divers Hands to the laſt Buyer. Lazy and Unworking Shopkeepers in this being worſe than Gameſters, that they do not only keep ſo much of the Money of a Country conſtantly in their Hands, but alſo make the publick pay them for their keeping of it. Though Gaming too, upon the account of Trade (as well as other Reaſons) may well deſerve to be reſtrain'd: Since Gameſters, in order to their Play, keep great Sums of Money by them, which there lies Dead. For though Gameſters Money ſhift Maſters oftener than any, and is tumbled up and down with every caſt of a Die, yet as to the publick it lies perfectly ſtill, and no more of it comes into Trade, than they ſpend in Eating or Wearing.

Here too we may obſerve, how much Manufacture deſerves to be incourag'd: Since that part of Trade, though the moſt conſiderable, is driven with the leaſt Money, eſpecially if the Workmanſhip be more worth than the Materials. For to the Trade that is driven by Labour, and Handicrafts Men, One two and fiftieth part of the yearly Money paid them will be ſufficient: But to a Trade of Commodities of our bare Native growth, much greater proportion of Money is requir'd. Per-

Perhaps it will be wondred, why having given ſome eſtimate (how wide I know not) of the Money neceſſary in the Hands of the Landholder, Labourer, and Broker, to carry on Trade, I have ſaid nothing of the Conſumer, whom I had mentioned before. To this I Anſwer. There are ſo few Conſumers, who are not either Labourers, Brokers, or Landholders, that they make a very inconſiderable part in the account. For thoſe who immediately depend on the Landholder, as his Children and Servants, come in under that title, being maintain'd by the Rent of his Lands; and ſo of the reſt.

By what has been ſaid, we may ſee what Injury the Lowering of *Intereſt* is like to do us by hindering Trade, when it ſhall either make the Foreigner call home his Money, or your own People backward to Lend, the Reward not being judged proportionable to the riſque.

There is another ſeeming Conſequence, of the reducing of Money to a low Price, which at firſt ſight has ſuch an appearance of truth in it, that I have known it impoſe upon very able Men, and I gueſs it has no ſmall Influence, at this time, in the promoting this alteration, and that is, That the lowering of *Intereſt* will raiſe the value of all other Things in proportion. For

Money

Money being the *Counter-ballance* to all other Things purchaſable by it, and lying, as it were, in the oppoſite Scale of Commerce, it looks like a natural Conſequence, that as much as you take off from the value of Money, ſo much you add to the price of other Things, which are exchang'd for it; the raiſing of the price of any thing being no more but the addition to its value in reſpect of Money, or, which is all one, leſſening the value of Money. For Example: Should the value of Gold be brought down to that of Silver, One hundred Guineas would purchaſe little more Corn, Wool, or Land, than One hundred ſhillings, and ſo the *Value of Money* being brought lower, ſay they, the price of other Things will riſe; and the falling of *Intereſt* from Six pound to Four pound *per Cent.* is taking away ſo much of the price of Money, and ſo conſequently the leſſening its value.

The miſtake of this plauſible way of Reaſoning will be eaſily diſcovered, when we conſider that the *meaſure* of the value of Money, in proportion to any thing purchaſable by it, is the quantity of the ready Money we have, in Compariſon with the *quantity* of that thing and its *Vent*; or which amounts to the ſame things, The price of any Commodity riſes or falls, by the proportion of the number of *Buyers* and *Sellers*;

This

This rule holds Universally in all Things that are to be bought and Sold, bateing now and then an extravagant Phancy of some particular Person, which never amounts to so considerable a part of Trade as to make any thing in the account worthy to be thought an Exception to this Rule.

The Vent of any Thing depends upon its Necessity or Usefulness, as Convenience, or Opinion guided by Phancy or fashion shall determine.

The Vent of any Commodity comes to be increased or decreased as a greater part of the Running Cash of the Nation is designed to be laid out by several People at the same time rather in that, than another, as we see in the change of Fashions.

I shall begin first with the Necessaries or Conveniencies of Life, and the Consumable Commodities subservient thereunto; and shew, That the *Value of Money* in respect of those depends only on the Plenty or Scarcity of Money in proportion to the Plenty and Scarcity of those things, and not on what *Interest* shall by Necessity, Law, or Contract be at that time laid on the borrowing of Money: and then afterwards I shall shew that the same holds in Land.

There is nothing more confirmed by daily Experience, than that Men give any Portion of Money for whatsoever is absolutely

lutely neceſſary, rather than go without it. And in ſuch things, the Scarcity of them alone makes their Prices. As for Example. Let us ſuppoſe half an Ounce of Silver, or half a Crown now in *England*, is worth a Buſhel of Wheat: But ſhould there be next Year a great ſcarcity of Wheat in *England*, and a proportionable want of all other Food, five Ounces of Silver would perhaps in Exchange purchaſe but one Buſhel of Wheat: So that Money would be then nine Tenths leſs worth in reſpect of Food, though at the ſame value it was before, in reſpect of other Things, that kept their former proportion, in their Quantity and Conſumption.

By the like proportions of Increaſe and Decreaſe, does the value of Things, more or-leſs convenient, riſe and fall in reſpect of Money, only with this difference, that things abſolutely *neceſſary* for Life muſt be had at any Rate; but Things *convenient* will be had only as they ſtand in preference with other Conveniencies: And therefore in any one of theſe Commodities, the value riſes only as its quantity is leſs, and vent greater, which depends upon its being preferr'd to other Things in its Conſumption. For ſuppoſing that at the ſame time that there is a great ſcarcity of *Wheat*, and other Grain, there were a conſiderable quantity

tity of *Oats*, Men no queſtion would give far more for Wheat than Oats, as being the healthier, pleaſanter, and more convenient Food: But ſince Oats would ſerve to ſupply that abſolute neceſſity of ſuſtaining Life, Men would not rob themſelves of all other Conveniencies of Life, by paying all their Money for Wheat, when Oats, that are cheaper, though with ſome inconvenience, would ſupply that Defect. It may then ſo happen at the ſame time, that half an Ounce of Silver, that the Year before would buy one Buſhel of Wheat, will this Year buy but one Tenth of a Buſhel: Half an Ounce of Silver, that the Year before would have bought three Buſhels of Oats, will this Year ſtill buy one Buſhel: And at the ſame time half an Ounce of Silver, that would the Year before have bought Fifteen pounds of Lead, will ſtill buy the ſame quantity. So that at the ſame time *Silver*, in reſpect of *Wheat*, is nine Tenths leſs worth than it was, in reſpect of *Oats* two Thirds leſs worth, and in reſpect of *Lead*, as much worth as before.

The fall therefore or riſe of *Intereſt*, making immediately by its change neither more nor leſs Land, Money; or any ſort of Commodity in *England*, than there was before, alters not at all the Value of Money, in reference to Commodities. Becauſe the mea-

measure of that is only the *Quantity* and *Vent*, which are not immediately chang'd by the Change of *Intereſt*. So far as the Change of *Intereſt* conduces in Trade to the bringing in or carrying out Money or Commodities and ſo in time to the varying their Proportions here in *England* from what it was before, ſo far the change of Intereſt as all other things that promote or hinder Trade may alter the Value of Money in reference to Commodities. But that is not in this place to be conſidered.

This is perfectly the *Value of Money in reſpect of Conſumable Commodities*: But the better to underſtand it in its full latitude, in reſpect both of conſumable Commodities, and Land too, we muſt conſider, Firſt, That the *Value of Land* conſiſts in this, That by its conſtant production of ſaleable Commodities it brings in a certain yearly Income. Secondly, the *Value of Commodities* conſiſts in this, That as portable and uſeful things, they by their Exchange or Conſumption, ſupply the Neceſſaries or Conveniencies of Life. Thirdly, In *Money* there is a double Value, anſwering to both of theſe, firſt as it is capable by its *Intereſt* to yield us ſuch a yearly Income: and in this it has the Nature of Land, (the Income of one being called *Rent*, of the other *Uſe*) only with this difference, That

the Land in its Soil being different, as ſome fertile, ſome barren; and the Products of it very various, both in their Sorts, goodneſs and vent, is not capable of any fixed eſtimate by its quantity: But Money, being conſtantly the ſame, and by its *Intereſt* giving the ſame ſort of Product through the whole Country, is capable of having a fixed yearly Rate ſet upon it by the Magiſtrate; but Land is not. But though in the Uniformity of its legal Worth, One hundred pound of lawful Money being all through *England* equal in its current Value to any other One hundred pounds of lawful Money, (becauſe by vertue of the Law it will every where paſs for as much Ware or Debt, as any other Hundred pounds) is capable to have its yearly Hire valued better than Land: Yet in reſpect of the varying need, and neceſſity of Money, (which changes with the increaſe or decay of Money or Trade in a Country) it is as little capable to have its yearly Hire fixed by Law, as Land it ſelf. For were all the Land in *Rumney-Marſh*, Acre for Acre, equally good, that is, did conſtantly produce the ſame quantity of equally good Hay or Graſs, one as another, the Rent of it, under that Conſideration of every Acre being of an equal Worth, would be capable of being regulated by Law;

Law; and one might as well Enact, That no Acre of Land in *Rumney-Marsh* shall be let for above Forty Shillings *per An.* as that no Hundred pound, shall be let for above Four pounds *per An.* But no body can think it fit (since by reason of the equal Value of that Land it can) that therefore the Rent of the Land in *Rumney-Marsh* should be Regulated by Law. For supposing all the Land in *Rumney-Marsh*, or in *England*, were all of so equal a Worth, that any one Acre, compared at the same time to any one other, were equally good in respect of its Product, yet the same Acre, compar'd with it self in different times, would not in respect of Rent be of equal Value. And therefore it would have been an unreasonable thing, if in the time of *Henry* 7. the Rent of Land in *Rumney-Marsh* had been settled by a Law, according to the judg'd Value of it at that time, and the same Law, limiting the Rent perhaps to 5 *s. per* Acre, have continued still. The Absurdity and Impracticableness of this every one sees at the first Proposal, and readily concludes within himself, that things must be left to find their own Price; and it is impossible in this their constant mutability for Human Foresight to set Rules and Bounds to their constantly-varying *Proportion* and Use, which will always regulate their Value.

They who consider things beyond their Names, will find, That *Money*, as well as all other Commodities, is liable to the same Changes and Inequalities: Nay in this respect of the Variety of its *Value*, brought in by time in the Succession of Affairs, the Rate of Money is less capable of being regulated by a Law in any Country than the Rent of Land. Because to the quick Changes, that happen in Trade, this too must be added, That Money may be brought in, or carried out of the Kingdom, which Land cannot; and so that be truly worth 6 or 8 *per Cent.* this Year, which would yield but 4 the last.

2. *Money* has a *Value*, as it is capable by Exchange to procure us the Necessaries or Conveniencies of Life, and in this it has the Nature of a *Commodity*; only with this difference, That it serves us commonly by its Exchange, never almost by its Consumption. But though the use Men make of Money be not in its Consumption, yet it has not at all a more standing settled Value in Exchange with any other thing, than any other Commodity has, but a more known one, and better fixed by Name, Number, and Weight, to enable us, to reckon, what the Proportion of Scarcity and Vent of one Commodity is to another. For supposing, as before, that half an

Ounce

Ounce of Silver would laſt Year exchange for one Buſhel of Wheat, or for 15 *l.* weight of Lead; if this Year Wheat be Ten times ſcarcer, and Lead in the ſame quantity to its Vent as it was, is it not evident that half an Ounce of Silver will ſtill exchange for 15 *l.* of Lead, though it will exchange but for One Tenth of a Buſhel of Wheat; and he that has uſe of Lead will as ſoon take 15 *l.* weight of Lead, as half an Ounce of Silver, for One Tenth of a Buſhel of Wheat, and no more. So that if you ſay, that Money now is Nine Tenths leſs worth, than it was the former Year, you muſt ſay ſo of Lead too, and all other things, that keep the ſame Proportion to Money which they had before. The variation indeed is firſt and moſt taken notice in Money: Becauſe that is the univerſal meaſure by which People reckon, and uſed by every body in the valuing of all Things. For calling that half Ounce of Silver Half a Crown, they ſpeak properly, and are readily underſtood when they ſay, Half a Crown, or two Shillings and ſix Pence, will now buy One Tenth of a Buſhel of Wheat, but do not ſay, That 15 *l.* of Lead will now buy One Tenth of a Buſhel of Wheat, becauſe it is not generally uſed to this ſort of Reckoning: nor do they ſay Lead is leſs worth than it was, though in reſpect of Wheat

Lead as well as Silver be Nine Tenths worſe than it was, as well as Silver; only by the Tale of Shillings we are better enabled to judge of it: Becauſe theſe are meaſures whoſe Ideas by conſtant uſe are ſetled in every Engliſh Man's mind.

This I ſuppoſe is the true *Value of Money* when it paſſes from one to another in Buying and Selling; where it runs the ſame Changes of higher and lower, as any other Commodity doth: For one equal quantity whereof you ſhall receive in Exchange more, or leſs of another Commodity at one time, than you do at another For a Farmer that carries a Buſhel of Wheat to Market, and a Labourer that carries Half a Crown, ſhall find that the Money of one, as well as Corn of the other, ſhall at ſome times purchaſe him more or leſs Leather or Salt, according as they are in greater Plenty and Scarcity one to another. So that in Exchanging Coin'd Silver for any other Commodity, (which is buying and ſelling) the ſame meaſure governs the Proportion you receive, as if you exchang'd Lead, or Wheat, or any other Commodity. That which regulates the Price, *i. e.* the quantity given for Money (which is called buying and ſelling) for an other Commodity, (which is called Bartring) is nothing elſe but their

Quan-

Quantity in Proportion to their vent. If then lowering of *Use* makes not your Silver more *in Specie*, or your Wheat or other Commodities less, it will not have any Influence at all to make it exchange for less of Wheat, or any other Commodity, than it will have have on Lead, to make it exchange for less Wheat, or any other Commodity.

Money therefore in buying and selling being perfectly in the same Condition with other Commodities, and subject to all the same Laws of Value, let us next see *how* it comes to be *of the same Nature with Land*, by yielding a certain yearly Income, which we call *Use* or *Interest*. For Land produces naturally something new and profitable, and of Value to Mankind; but Money is a barren thing, and produces nothing, but by Compact transfers that Profit that was the Reward of one Man's Labour into another Man's Pocket. That which occasions this, is the *unequal Distribution* of Money; which Inequality has the same effect too upon Land, that it has upon Money. For my having more Money in my Hand than I can, or am disposed to use in buying and selling, makes me able to lend: And another's want of so much Money as he could employ in Trade, makes him willing to borrow. But why

then, and for what Consideration doth he pay *Use*? For the same Reason, and upon as good Consideration, as the Tenant pays Rent for your Land. For as the unqual Distribution of Land, (you having more than you can or will manure, and another less) brings you a Tenant for your Land; and the same unequal Distribution of Money, (I having more than I can or will employ, and another less) brings me a Tenant for my Money: So my Money is apt in Trade, by the Industry of the Borrower, to produce more than Six *per Cent.* to the Borrower, as well as your Land, by the Labour of the Tenant, is apt to produce more Fruits, than his Rent comes to; and therefore deserves to be paid for, as well as Land, by a Yearly Rent. For though the Usurer's Money would bring him in no Yearly profit, if he did not lend it, (supposing he employs it not himself) and so his Six *per Cent.* may seem to be the Fruit of another Man's Labour, yet he shares not near so much of the profit of another Man's Labour, as he that lets Land to a Tenant. For without the Tenants Industry (supposing as before, the owner would not manage it himself) his Land would yield him little or no Profit. So that the Rent he receives is a greater Portion of the Fruit of his

his Tenants Labour, than the *Use* is at Six *per Cent.* For generally he that borrows One thousand pounds at Six *per Cent.* and so pays Sixty pounds *per Annum Use*, gets more above his *Use* in one Year, by his Industry, than he that Rents a Farm of Sixty pounds *per Annum* gets in two, above his Rent, though his Labour be harder.

It being evident therefore, that he that has skill in Traffick, but has not Money enough to Exercise it, has not only reason to borrow Money to drive his Trade, and get a livelihood; but as much Reason to pay *Use* for that Money; as he, who having skill in Husbandry but no Land of his own to employ it in, has not only reason to Rent Land, but to pay Money for the *Use* of it; It follows, that Borrowing Money upon *Use* is not only by the necessity of Affairs, and the Constitution of Humane Society, unavoidable to some Men, but that also to receive Profit for the Loan of Money, is as equitable and lawful, as receiving Rent for Land, and more tolerable to the Borrower, notwithstanding the Opinion of some over-scrupulous Men.

This being so, one would expect, that the rate of *Interest* should be the Measure of the value of Land in number of Years Purchase, for which the Fee is sold; For 100 *l. per Annum* being equal to 100 *l. per Annum*, and so to perpetuity.

and

and 100 *l. per Annum* being the Product
of 1000 *l.* when *Interest* is at 10 *per Cent.*
of 1250 *l.* when *Interest* is at 8 *per Cent.*
of 1666 *l.* or thereabouts, when *Interest* is at 6 *per Cent.*
of 2000 *l.* when Money is at 5 *per Cent.*
of 2500 *l.* when Money is at 4 *per Cent.*

One would conclude, I say, that Land should Sell in proportion to Use, according to these following Rates, *viz.*

When Money is at	*per Cent.* for	years purchase.
10		10
8		12½
6		16⅔
5		20
4		25

But Experience tells us, that neither in Queen *Elizabeth*, nor King *James* the First Reigns, when *Interest* was at Ten *per Cent.* was Land Sold for Ten; or when it was at Eight *per Cent.* for twelve and an half half years purchase, or any thing near the low rate that high Use required (if it were true, that the rate of *Interest* govern'd the price of Land) any more than Land, now yields Twenty Five Years Purchase, because a great part of the Monied Men will now let their Money upon good Security at Four *per Cent.* Thus we see in fact how little this Rule has held at home: And he that will look into *Holland*, will find, that the Purchase of Land was not raised there, when their Interest fell. This is certain,

and

and paſt doubt, that the legal *Intereſt* can never regulate the price of Land, ſince it is plain, that the price of Land has never changed with it in the ſeveral Changes have been made in the rate of *Intereſt* by Law: Nor now that the rate of *Intereſt* is by Law the ſame through all *England*, is the price of Land every where the ſame, it being in ſome parts conſtantly ſold for four or five Years Purchaſe more than in others. Whether you or I can tell the Reaſon of this, it maters not to the Queſtion in hand: but it being really ſo, this is plain Demonſtration againſt thoſe, who pretend to advance and regulate the price of Land by a Law, concerning the *Intereſt* of Money.

But yet I will give you ſome of my Gueſſes, why the price of Land is not regulated (as at firſt ſight it ſeems it ſhould be) by the *Intereſt* of Money. Why it is not regulated by the *legal Uſe* is manifeſt, Becauſe the rate of Money does not follow the Standard of the Law, but the price of the Market; and Men not obſerving the legal and forced, but the Natural and Current *Intereſt* of Money, regulate their Affairs by that. But why the rate of Land does not follow the Current *Intereſt* of Money requires a farther Conſideration.

All Things that are Bought and Sold, raiſe and fall their price in proportion, as there are more Buyers or Sellers. Where there

there are a great many Sellers to a few Buyers, there use what Art you will, the thing to be Sold will be cheap. On the other side turn the Tables, and raise up a great many Buyers for a few Sellers, and the same thing will immediately grow dear. This Rule holds in Land as well as all other Commodities, and is the Reason, why in *England* at the same time, that Land in some places is at seventeen or eighteen Years Purchase, it is about others, where there are profitable Manufactures, at two or three and twenty Years Purchase: Because there (Men thriving and getting Money by their Industry, and willing to leave their Estates to their Children in Land, as the surest, and most lasting Provision, and not so liable to Casualties as Money in untrading or unskilful Hands) there are many Buyers ready always to Purchase, but few Sellers. For the Land thereabout being already possessed by that sort of Industrious and Thriving Men, they have neither need, nor will, to Sell. In such places of Manufacture, the Riches of the one not arising from the squandring and waste of another, (as it doth in other places where Men live lazily upon the product of the Land) the Industry of the People bringing in increase of Wealth from remote Parts, makes plenty of Money there without the impoverishing of their Neighbours.

And

And when the thriving Tradesman has got more, than he can well employ in Trade, his next Thoughts are to look out for a Purchase, but it must be a Purchase in the Neighbourhood, where the Estate may be under his Eye, and within convenient distance, that the Care and Pleasure of his Farm may not take him off from the Engagements of his Calling, nor remove his Children too far from him, or the Trade he breeds them up in. This seems to me the Reason, why in places, wherein thriving Manufactures have erected themselves, Land has been observed to Sell quicker, and for more Years Purchase than in other places, as about *Hallifax* in the North, *Taunton* and *Exeter* in the West,

This is that then, which makes *Land*, as well as other Things *dear*; plenty of Buyers, and but few Sellers: And so by the Rule of Contraries, plenty of Sellers and few Buyers makes *Land cheap*.

He that will justly estimate the value of any thing, must consider its quantity in proportion to its vent, for this alone regulates the Price. The value of any thing, compar'd with its self, or with a standing Measure, is greater, as its quantity is less in proportion to its vent: But in comparing it, or exchanging it with any other thing, the quantity and vent of that thing too must be allowed for in the computation

of

of their Value. But becauſe the deſire of Money is conſtantly, almoſt every where the ſame, its vent varies very little, but as its greater ſcarcity enhanſes its Price, and increaſes the ſcramble, there being nothing elſe that does eaſily ſupply the want of it. The leſſening its quantity, therefore, always increaſes its Price, and makes an equal *portion* of it exchange for a greater of any other thing. Thus it comes to paſs, that there is no manner of ſettled proportion between the value of an Ounce of Silver, and any other Commodity: For either varying its quantity in that Country, or the Commodity changing its quantity in proportion to its vent, their reſpective values change, *i. e.* leſs of one will barter for more of the other: Though in the ordinary way of ſpeaking, 'tis only ſaid, that the price of the Commodity, not of the Money is changed. For example, half an Ounce of Silver in *England*, will exchange ſometimes for a whole Buſhel of Wheat, ſometimes for half, ſometimes but a quarter, and this it does equally, whether by *Uſe* it be apt to bring in to to the Owner Six in the Hundred of its own Weight *per Annum*, or nothing at all: It being only the change of the quantity of Wheat to its Vent, ſuppoſing we have ſtill the ſame Summ of Money in the Kingdom; or elſe the change of the quantity

of

of our Money in the Kingdom, ſuppoſing the quantity of Wheat, in reſpect to its Vent be the ſame too, that makes the change in the Price of Wheat. For if you alter the quantity or vent on either ſide, you preſently alter the Price, but no other way in the World.

For it is not the Being, Adding, Increaſing or Diminiſhing of any good quality in any Commodity, that makes its Price greater or leſs, but only as it makes its quantity or vent greater or leſs, in proportion one to another. This will eaſily appear by Two or Three Inſtances.

1. The Being of any *good*, and uſeful *quality* in any thing neither increaſes its *Price*, nor indeed makes it have any Price at all, but only as it leſſens its quantity or increaſes its vent, each of theſe in proportion to one another. What more uſeful or neceſſary things are there to the Being or Well-being of Men, than Air and Water, and yet theſe have generally no Price at all, nor yield any Money: Becauſe their quantity is immenſly greater than their vent in moſt places of the World. But, as ſoon as ever Water (for Air ſtill offers it ſelf every where, without reſtraint or incloſure, and therefore is no where of any Price) comes any where to be reduced into any proportion to its conſumption, it begins preſently to have a

Price,

Price, and is sometimes sold dearer than Wine. Hence it is, that the best, and most useful things are commonly the cheapest; because, though their Consumption be great, yet the Bounty of Providence has made their production large, and suitable to it.

2. Nor does the Adding an excellency to any Commodity, raise its Price, unless it increase its Consumption. For suppose there should be taught a way (which should be published to the knowledge of every one) to make a Medicine of Wheat alone, that should infallibly Cure the *Stone*: 'Tis certain the discovery of this quality in that Grain, would give it an excellency very considerable: And yet this would not increase the Price of it one Farthing in Twenty Bushels, because its quantity or vent would not hereby, to any sensible degree, be alter'd.

3. Neither does the Increasing of any good quality, in any sort of things make it yield more. For though Teasels be much better this Year, than they were last, they are not one jot dearer, unless they be fewer too, or the consumption of them greater.

4. Nor does the lessening the good qualities of any sort of Commodity lessen its Price; which is evident in Hops, that are usually dearest those Years they are worst.

worſt. But if it happen to be a Species of Commodity, whoſe defects may be ſupplyed by ſome other, the making of it worſe does leſſen its Price; becauſe it hinders its Vent. For if Rye ſhould any Year prove generally ſmutty or grown, no queſtion it would yield leſs Money than otherwiſe, becauſe the deficiency of that might be, in ſome meaſure, made up by Wheat, and other Grain. But if it be a ſort of Commodity whoſe uſe no other known thing can ſupply, 'tis not its being better or worſe, but its quantity and vent is that alone which regulates, and determines its value.

To apply this now to Money, as capable of different Rates of *Intereſt*. To Money conſidered in its proper uſe, as a Commodity paſſing in exchange from one to another, all that is done by *Intereſt*, is but the adding to it by agreement or publick Authority, a faculty, which naturally it has not, of increaſing every Year Six *per Cent*. Now if publick Authority ſink *Uſe* to Four *per Cent*. 'tis certain it diminiſhes this good quality in Money one Third. But yet this making the Money of *England* not one Farthing more than it was, it alters not the Meaſures upon which all changeable Commodities increaſe or ſink their price, and ſo makes not Money Ex-

change for less of any Commodity, than it would without this alteration of its *Interest*. If lessening *Use* to Four *per Cent.* should at all alter the quantity of Money, and make it less, it would make Money, as it has the Nature of a Commodity, dearer, *i. e.* a less quantity of Money would Exchange for a greater quantity of another Commodity, than it would before. This perhaps will appear a little plainer by these following particulars.

1. That the Intrinsick Natural worth of any Thing, consists in its fitness to supply the Necessities or serve the Conveniencies of human Life; and the more necessary it is to our Being, or the more it contributes to our Well-being the greater is its worth: But yet,

2. That there is no such Intrinsick Natural settled value in any Thing, as to make any assign'd quantity of it, constantly worth any assigned quantity of another.

3. The Marketable value of any assign'd quantities of two or more Commodities, are *pro hic & nunc*, equal, when they will Exchange one for another. As supposing one Bushel of Wheat, two Bushels of Barley, Thirty pound of Lead, and one Ounce of Silver, will now in the Market be taken one for another, they are then of equal worth: And our Coin being that

which

which Englishmen reckon by, an Englishman would say, that now one Bushel of Wheat, two Bushels of Barley, thirty Pound of Lead, and one Ounce of Silver, were equally worth five Shillings.

4. The change of this Marketable value of any Commodity in respect of an other Commodity or in respect of a standing common Measure, is not the altering of any Intrinsick value or quality in the Commodity; (for musty and smutty Corn will Sell dearer at one time than the clean and sweet at another) but the alteration of some proportion, which that Commodity bears to something else.

5. This proportion in all Commodities, whereof Money is one, is the proportion of their quantity to the vent. The Vent is nothing else, but the passing of Commodities from one owner to another in Exchange; and is then call'd quicker, when a greater quantity of any species of Commodity, is taken off from the Owners of it, in an equal space of time.

6. This Vent is regulated, *i. e.* made quicker or slower, as greater or less quantities of any Saleable Commodity are remov'd out of the way, and course of Trade; separated from publick Commerce; and no longer lie within the reach of Exchange. For though any Commodity should shift

Hands never ſo faſt, and be Exchanged from one Man to another; yet if they were not thereby exempted from Trade and Sale, and did not ceaſe to be any longer Traffick, this would not at all make, or quicken their Vent. But this ſeldom or never happening, makes very little or no alteration.

7. Things are removed out of the Market or Hands of Commerce, and ſo their Vent altered three ways; 1. By Conſumption, when the Commodity in its Uſe is deſtroy'd, as Meat, Drink, and Cloths, *&c.* all that is ſo conſumed is quite gone out of the Trade of the World. 2. By Exportation; and all that is ſo carried away, is gone out of the Trade of *England*, and concerns Engliſhmen no more in the price of their Commodities among themſelves for their own uſe, than if it were out of the World. 3. By buying and laying up for a Man's private Uſe. For what is by any of theſe ways ſhut out of the Market, and no longer moveable by the Hand of Commerce, makes no longer any part of Merchantable Ware, and ſo in reſpect of Trade, and the quantity of any Commodity, is not more conſiderable than if it were not in being. All theſe three terminating at laſt in Conſumption of all Commodities, (excepting only Jewels and Plate, and ſome few others which wear

out

out but insensibly) may properly enough pass under that Name. Ingrossing too has some influence on the present Vent: But this inclosing some considerable part of any Commodity, (for if the ingrossing be of all the Commodity, and it be of general Use, the price is at the will of the Ingrosser) out of the free common of Trade only for some time, and afterwards returning again to Sale, makes not usually so sensible and general an alteration in the Vent as the others do: But yet influences the price, and the Vent more, according as it extends its self to a larger portion of the Commodity, and Hoards it up longer.

8. Most other portable Commodities (excepting Jewels, Plate, *&c.*) decaying quickly in their Use, but Money being less consumed or increased, *i. e.* by slower Degrees removed from, or brought into the free Commerce of any Country, than the greatest part of other Merchandize; and so the proportion between its quantity and Vent, altering slower than in most other Commodities, it is commonly look'd on as a standing measure to judge of the value of all Things, especially being adapted to it by its Weight and Denomination in Coinage.

9. Money, whilst the same quantity of

it is passing up and down the Kingdom in Trade, is really a standing measure of the falling and rising value of other Things in Reference to one another: and the alteration of price is truly in them only. But if you increase or lessen the quantity of Money current in Traffick in any place, then the alteration of value is in the Money: And if at the same time Wheat keep its proportion of Vent to quantity, Money to speak truly alters its worth, and Wheat does not, though it Sell for a greater or less price than it did before. For Money being look'd upon as the standing measure of other Commodities, Men consider and speak of it still, as if it were a standing measure, though when it has varied its quantity, 'tis plain it is not.

10. But the value or price of all Commodities, amongst which Money passing in Trade is truly one, consisting in proportion, you alter this, as you do all other proportions, whether you increase one, or lessen the other.

11. In all other Commodities, the Owners when they design them for Traffick, endeavour as much as they can to have them vented and gone, *i. e.* removed out of the reach of Commerce, by Consumption, Exportation, or laying up: But Money never lying upon Peoples Hands, or want-

wanting Vent, (for any one may part with it in Exchange when he pleaſes;) the provident publick, and private care, is to keep it from Venting or Conſuming, *i. e.* from Exportation which is its proper Conſumption; and from Hoarding up by others, which is a ſort of Ingroſſing. Hence it is that other Commodities have ſometimes a quicker, ſometimes a ſlower Vent: For no body lays out his Money in them but according to the uſe he has of them, and that has bounds. But every body being ready to receive Money without bounds, and keep it by him, becauſe it anſwers all things: Therefore the Vent of Money is always ſufficient, or more than enough. This being ſo, its quantity alone is enough to regulate and determine its value, without conſidering any Proportion between its quantity and vent, as in other Commodities.

12. Therefore the leſſening of *Uſe*, not bringing one Penny of Money more into the Trade or Exchange of any Country, but rather drawing it away from Trade, and ſo making it leſs, does not at all ſink its Value, and make it buy leſs of any Commodity, but rather more.

13. That which raiſes the natural *Intereſt* of Money, is the ſame that raiſes the Rent of Land, (*i. e.*) its aptneſs to bring

in Yearly to him that manages it, a greater Overplus of Income above his Rent, as a Reward to his Labour. That which causes this in Land is the greater quantity of its Product, in proportion to the same Vent of that particular Fruit, or the same quantity of Product, in proportion to a greater Vent of that single Commodity: but that which causes increase of Profit to the Borrower of Money, is the less quantity of Money, in proportion to Trade, or to the Vent of all Commodities, taken together, *& vice versa.*

14. The natural Value of Money, as it is apt to yield such an yearly Income by *Interest*, depends on the whole quantity of the then passing Money of the Kingdom, in proportion to the whole Trade of the Kingdom, (*i. e.*) the general Vent of all the Commodities. But the natural Value of Money, in exchanging for any one Commodity, is the quantity of the Trading Money of the Kingdom, design'd for that Commodity, in proportion to that single Commodity and its Vent. For though any single Man's Necessity and Want either of Money, or any *species* of Commodity, being known, may make him pay dearer for Money, or that Commodity: Yet this is but a particular Case, that does not at the same time alter this constant and general Rule. 15.

15. That ſuppoſing Wheat a ſtanding Meaſure, that is, That there is conſtantly the ſame quantity of it in proportion to its Vent, we ſhall find Money to run the ſame variety of Changes in its Value, as all other Commodities do. Now that Wheat in *England* does come neareſt to a ſtanding Meaſure, is evident, by comparing Wheat with other Commodities, Money, and the Yearly Income of Land in *Hen.* 7. time and now. For ſuppoſing that *primo Hen.* 7. *N.* let 100 Acres of Land to *A.* for 6 *d. per An. per* Acre, Rack-rent; and to *B.* another 100 Acres of Land, of the ſame Soil and yearly worth with the former, for a Buſhel of Wheat *per* Acre, Rack-rent, (a Buſhel of Wheat about that time being probably ſold for about 6 *d.*) it was then an equal Rent. If therefore theſe Leaſes were for Years yet to come, 'tis certain that he that paid 6 *d. per* Acre, would pay now 50 *s. per An.* and he that paid a Buſhel of Wheat *per* Acre, would pay about 25 *l. per An.* which would be near about the yearly Value of the Land, were it to be let now. The reaſon whereof is this, That there being ten times as much Silver now in the World, (the Diſcovery of the *Weſt-Indies* having made the Plenty) as there was then, it is Nine Tenths leſs worth now than it was at that time;

time; that is, it will exchange for Nine Tenths leſs of any Commodity now, which bears the ſame proportion to its Vent as it did 200 Years ſince; which, of all other Commodities, Wheat is likelieſt to do. For in *England*, and this part of the World, Wheat being the conſtant and moſt general Food, not altering with the Faſhion, not growing by chance; but as the Farmers ſow more or leſs of it, which they endeavour to proportion, as near as can be gueſſed, to the Conſumption, abſtracting the Over-plus of the precedent Year in their Proviſion for the next; and *vice verſa*, it muſt needs fall out, that it keeps the neareſt Proportion to its Conſumption, (which is more ſtudied and deſigned in this than other Commodities) of any thing, if you take it for 7 or 20 Years together: Tho' perhaps the Plenty or Scarcity of one Year, cauſed by the Accidents of the Seaſon, may very much vary it from the immediately precedent, or following. Wheat therefore, in this part of the World, (and that Grain which is the conſtant general Food of any other Country) is the fitteſt Meaſure to judge of the altered Value of things in any long tract of Time: And therefore Wheat here, Rice in *Turkey*, *&c.* is the fitteſt thing to reſerve a Rent in, which is deſigned to be conſtantly the ſame

for

for all future Ages. But Money is the beſt Meaſure of the alter'd Value of things in a few Years: Becauſe its Vent is the ſame, and its quantity alters ſlowly. But Wheat, or any other Grain, cannot ſerve inſtead of Money: Becauſe of its Bulkineſs and too quick Change of its quantity. For had I a Bond, to pay me 100 Buſhels of Wheat next Year, it might be a Fourth part Loſs or Gain to me; too great an Inequality and Uncertainty to be ventured in Trade. Beſides the different Goodneſs of ſeveral Parcels of Wheat in the ſame Year.

16. That ſuppoſing any Iſland ſeparate from the Commerce of the reſt of Mankind, if Gold and Silver, or whatever elſe, (ſo it be laſting) be their Money, if they have but a certain quantity of it, and can get no more, that will be a ſteady ſtanding Meaſure of the Value of all other things.

17. That if in any Country they uſe for Money any laſting Material, whereof there is not any more to be got, and ſo cannot be increas'd; or being of no other uſe, the reſt of the World does not value it, and ſo it is not like to be diminiſhed; this alſo would be a ſteady ſtanding Meaſure of the Value of other Commodties.

18. That in a Country where they had ſuch a ſtanding Meaſure, any quantity of that Money (if it were but ſo much that every

every body might have some) would serve to drive any proportion of Trade, whether more or less, there being Counters enough to reckon by, and the value of the Pledges being still sufficient, as constantly encreasing with the Plenty of the Commodity. But these three last, being built on Suppositions that are not like to be found in the Practice of Mankind, since Navigation and Commerce have brought all parts acquainted with one another, and introduced the use of Gold and Silver Money into all Trading parts of the World; they serve rather to give us some light into the nature of Money, than to teach here a new Measure of Traffick. Though it be certain, that that part of the World, which bred most of our Gold and Silver, used least of it in exchange, and used it not for Money at all.

19. That therefore in any Country that hath Commerce with the rest of the World, it is almost impossible now to be without the use of Silver Coin; and having Money of that, and Accounts kept in such Money, it is impossible to have any standing, unalterable measure of the value of things. For whil'st the Mines supply to Mankind more than wastes and consumes in its use, the quantity of it will daily grow greater in respect of other Commodities, and its value less. 20. That

20. That in a Country that hath open Commerce with the reſt of the World, and uſes Money made of the ſame Materials with their Neighbours, any quantity of that Money will not ſerve to drive any quantity of Trade; but there muſt be a certain proportion between their *Money* and *Trade*. The reaſon whereof is this, becauſe to keep your *Trade* going without loſs, your Commodities amongſt you, muſt keep an equal, or, at leaſt, near the Price of the ſame Species of Commodities in the Neighbour Countries: Which they cannot do, if your *Money* be far leſs than in other Countries; for then, either your Commodities muſt be ſold very cheap, or a great part of your *Trade* muſt ſtand ſtill; there not being Money enough in the Country to pay for them (in their ſhifting of hands) at that high price, which the Plenty, and conſequently low Value of Money makes them at in another Country. For the Value of Money in general is the quantity of all the Money in the World, in proportion to all the Trade: But the value of Money in any one Country, is the preſent quantity of the Current Money in that Country. in proportion to the preſent Trade. Suppoſing then, that we had now in *England* but half as much Money, as we had ſeven Years ago, and yet had

had ſtill as much yearly Product of Commodities, as many Hands to work them, and as many Brokers to diſperſe them, as before; and that the reſt of the World we Trade with, had as much Money, as they had before, (for 'tis likely they ſhould have more by our Moiety ſhared amongſt them) 'tis certain, that either half our *Rents* ſhould not be paid, half our *Commodities* not vented, and half our *Labourers* not imployed, and ſo half the *Trade* be clearly loſt; or elſe, that every one of theſe muſt receive but half the Money, for their Commodities and Labour, they did before, and but half ſo much as our Neighbours do receive for the ſame Labour and the ſame natural Product, at the ſame time. Such a ſtate of Poverty as this, though it will make no ſcarcity of our Native Commodities amongſt us, yet it will have theſe ill conſequences.

1. It will make our Native Commodities vent very cheap.

2. It will make all Foreign Commodities very dear, both which will keep us Poor. For the Merchant making Silver and Gold his Meaſure, and conſidering what the Foreign Commodity coſts him (*i. e.* how many Ounces of Silver) in the Country where Money is more Plenty, *i. e.* Cheaper; and conſidering too, how many Ounces of Silver

ver it will yield him in another Country, will not part with it here, but for the same quantity of Silver, or as much as that Silver will buy here of our Commodity, which will be a great deal more than in another place. So that in all our exchange of Native for Foreign Commodities, we shall pay double the Value that any other Country does, where Money is in greater Plenty. This indeed will make a dearness, and, in time, a scarcity of Foreign Commodities; which is not the worst inconveniency that it brings upon us, supposing them not absolutely necessary. But,

3. It endangers the drawing away our People, both Handicrafts, Mariners, and Soldiers, who are apt to go where their Pay is best, which will always be where there is greatest plenty of Money; and in time of War, must needs bring great distress.

21. Upon this Measure too it is, That the variation of exchange of Money, between several Countries, does somewhat depend. For it is certain, that one Ounce of Silver is always of equal value to another Ounce of Silver considered in its Intrinsick worth, or in reference to the universal Trade of the World: But 'tis not of the same value at the same time, in several parts of the World, but is of most

worth

worth in that Country where there is the least Money, in proportion to its Trade: And therefore Men may afford to give 20 Ounces of Silver in one place, to receive 18 or 19 Ounces of Silver in another. But this is not all: To this then, (to find out the alteration of the exchange) the overballance of the Trade must be taken into consideration. These two together regulate the exchange in all the Commerce of the World, and in both the higher rate of exchange depends upon one and the same thing, *viz.* the greater plenty of Money in one Country, than in the other; Only with this difference, that where the overballance of Trade raises the exchange above the *Par*, there it is the plenty of Money, which private Merchants have in one Country, which they desire to remove into another: But where the Riches of the Country raises the exchange above the *Par*, there it is the plenty of the Money in the whole Country. In one the *Merchant* has more Money (or Debts, which is all one) in a Foreign Country than his Trade there will employ, and so is willing to allow upon exchange to him abroad, that shall pay him ready Money at home, 1, 2, 3, *&c. per Cent.* more or less, proportionably as his or his Countrymens plenty of ready Money abroad, the danger of leaving it there,

there, or the difficulty of bringing it home in Specie, and his present need of Money at home is greater or less: In the other, the whole *Country* has more Money, than can well be imploy'd in the Trade thereof, or at least, the proportion of the Money to the Trade is greater than in the Neighbouring Country, where the exchange is below the *Par*.

For, supposing the ballance of Trade to be equal between *England* and *Holland*, but that there is in *Holland* a greater plenty of Money, than in *England*, (which will appear by the lowness of the Natural *Use* in *Holland*, and the heighth of the Natural *Use* in *England*; and also by the dearness of Food and Labour in general in *Holland*, and the cheapness of it in *England*.) If *N.* has Ten thousand pounds in *Holland*, which the greater Advantage he could make of it in *England*, either by *Use*, or *Purchase*, tempts him to transfer into *England*, 'tis probable he will give as much to a Merchant in *Holland* to pay him Ten thousand pounds in *England*, as the ensurance at that time between *Holland* and *England* is worth. If this happen to be in a Country, where the Exportation of *Bullion* is Prohibited, he must pay the more: Because his Venture, if he carry it in Specie, will be greater. And, upon this ground, perhaps, the Pro-

hibiting the Exportation of Money out of *England*, under Penalties, may be of some use, by making the rate of the exchange greater to those Countries, which Import upon us more, than they Export in Commodities; and so retain some part of the Money which their over-ballance of Trade would carry away from us, though after all, if we are over-ballanc'd in Trade it must go.

But, since the *Holland* Merchant cannot receive *N*'s Ten thousand pounds in Money in *Holland*, and pay him Ten thousand pounds in *England*, unless his over-ballance of Trade make *English*-Men indebted to him Ten thousand pounds in Money, which he is not like to take in Commodities. I think the over-ballance of Trade is that which chiefly raises the exchange in any Country, and that plenty of Money in any Country does it only for so much of the Money as is transfer'd either to be let out to *Use*, or to be spent there. And though Lending to Foreigners, upon *Use*, doth not at all alter the ballance of Trade between those Countries, yet it does alter the exchange between those Countries for so much as is lent upon *Use*, by not calling away the Money, that should follow the over-ballance of Trade, but letting

ting it reſt there, as if it were accounted for; all one as if the ballance of Trade were for ſo much altered. But this being not much in compariſon of the general Traffick between two Nations, or at leaſt varying ſlower, the Merchant too regulating the exchange, and not the Uſurer. I ſuppoſe it is the preſent ballance of Trade, on which the exchange immediately and chiefly depends, unleſs ſome accident ſhall make a great deal of Money be remitted at the ſame time, from one place to another, which will for that time raiſe the exchange all one as an over-ballance of Trade; and indeed, when examin'd is generally very little *different* from it.

To be able to eſtimate the *Par* with the riſe and fall of the exchange, it is neceſſary to know the intrinſick value, *i. e.* how much Silver is in the Coins of the two Countries, by which you reckon and charge the Bill of Exchange.

Sir, *If I have been led a little too far from one thing to another, in the conſideration of Money, I beg your Pardon, hoping that theſe Particulars will afford ſome light to our preſent Subject.*

To return to the Price of Land, 'Tis evident by what has been above-ſaid, That the Years Purchaſe of Land do not increaſe with the fall of *Intereſt*, and the abating

that good quality in Money of yielding Yearly Six *per Cent.* to Four, does not presently so sink its Value, in respect of Land, that One Third more is required in exchange: Falling of *Interest* from Six to Four, will not raise Land from Twenty to Thirty years Purchase. The rising and falling of the Price of Land, as of other things, depends much on the quantity of Land, set to Sale, compar'd with the quantity of Money design'd for that Traffick, or which amounts to the same thing, upon the number of Buyers and Sellers. For where there are many Sellers and few Purchasers, though Interest be lessened, Land will be cheap, as I have already shew'd. At least, this is certain, That making a Law to reduce *Interest*, will not raise the Price of Lands: It will only, by driving it more into the Bankers Hands, leave the Country barer of Money, whereby, if the price of Land about *London*, should be accidentally raised, that of remoter Countries would thereby have fewer Purchasers, and at lower Rates.

This being so, that the low rate of Land depends much on the great number of Sellers in proportion to Purchasers, the next thing to be inquir'd into, is, What makes plenty of Sellers? and to that the Answer is obvious, general *ill Husbandry*, and

and the consequence of it, *Debts*. If a neglect of Government and Religion, ill Examples, and depraved Education, have introduc'd Debauchery; and Art or Chance has made it fashionable for Men to live beyond their Estates, Debts will increase and multiply, and draw with them a necessity on Men, first of Incumbring, and then Selling their Estates. This is generally the cause why Men part with their Land: And I think there is scarce one of an hundred, that thinks of Selling his Patrimony, till Mortgages have pretty well Eat into the Freehold; and the weight of growing Debts force a Man, whether he will or no, out of his Possessions. When almost is there ever a clear and unincumbred Estate set to Sale? 'Tis seldom a thriving Man turns his Land into Money to make the greater advantage: The Examples of it are so rare, that they are scarce of any Consideration in the number of Sellers.

This I think may be the Reason, why in Queen *Elizabeth*'s days (when Sobriety, Frugality, and Industry, brought in daily Increase, to the growing Wealth of the Kingdom) Land kept up its Price, and Sold for more Years Purchase, than corresponded to the *Interest* of Money, then busily imploy'd in a thriving Trade, which

made the natural *Interest* much higher than it is now, as well as the Parliament then set it higher by Law.

On the contrary side, what makes scarcity of Purchasers?

1. The same Reason, *Ill Husbandry*. When the Tradesman lives up to the heighth of his Income, and the vanity of Expences either drains the Merchants Coffers, or keeps them from over-flowing, he seldom thinks of Purchasing. Buying of Land is the result of a full and satiated Gain: And Men in Trade seldom think of laying out their Money upon Land, till their Profit has brought them in more, than their Trade can well employ; and their idle Bags cumbring their Counting Houses, put them upon emptying them on a Purchase.

2. Another thing that makes a scarcity of Buyers of Land, are doubtful and ill Titles: Where these are frequent and fatal, one can no more expect, that Men, who have Money, should be forward to Purchase, than Ships richly laden to venture themselves amongst Rocks and Quicksands. 'Tis no wonder such Seas should not be much frequented, where the Examples, and remains of daily Wrecks, shew the folly, and hazard of the Venture, in the number of those who have Miscarried.

3. A

3. A general decay of Trade diſcourages Men from Purchaſing: For this threatens an Univerſal Poverty, which is ſure to fall firſt and heavieſt upon Land. The Merchant who furniſhes the improvident Landholder, will not fail to have Money for his Wares with Gain, whether the Kingdom get by his Trade or no; and he will keep his Money rather employed in Trade, which brings him in profit, (for the Merchant, may get by a Trade that makes the Kingdom Poor) than lay it out in Land, whoſe Rents he ſees ſinking, and foreſees by the courſe of Trade, is likely to continue on to do ſo. When a Nation is running to decay and ruin, the Merchant, and Monied Man, do what you can, will be ſure to ſtarve laſt: Obſerve it where you will, the decays that come upon, and bring to Ruin any Country, do conſtantly firſt fall upon the Land: And though the Country Gentleman, (who uſually ſecurely relies upon ſo much a Year as was given in at his Marriage Settlement, and thinks his Land an unmoveable Fund for ſuch an Income) be not very forward to think ſo: Yet this nevertheleſs is an undoubted truth, that he is more concern'd in Trade, and ought to take a greater care, that it be well manag'd, and preſerv'd, than even the Merchant himſelf. For he will cer-

tainly find, when a decay of Trade has carried away one part of our Money out of the Kingdom, and the other is kept in the Merchant and Tradeſman's Hands, that no Laws he can make, nor any little Arts of Shifting Property amongſt our ſelves, will bring it back to him again; but his Rents will fall, and his Income every day leſſen, till general Induſtry, and Frugality join'd to a well order'd Trade, ſhall reſtore to the Kingdom the Riches and Wealth it had formerly.

This by the way, if well conſider'd might let us ſee, that *Taxes*, however contriv'd, and out of whoſe Hand ſoever immediately taken, do in a Country, where their great Fund is in Land, for the moſt part terminate upon Land. Whatſoever the People is chiefly maintained by, that the Government ſupports it ſelf on: Nay, perhaps it will be found, that thoſe *Taxes* which ſeem leaſt to affect Land, will moſt ſurely of all other, fall the Rents. This would deſerve to be well conſidered in the raiſing of *Taxes*, leſt the neglect of it bring upon the Country Gentleman an Evil which he will be ſure quickly to feel, but not be able very quickly to remedy. For Rents once fallen are not eaſily raiſed again. A *Tax* laid upon Land ſeems hard to the Landholder, becauſe it is ſo much Money

ney going visibly out of his Pocket: And therefore as an ease to himself, the Landholder is always forward to lay it upon Commodities. But if he will throughly consider it, and examine the Effects, he will find he Buys this seeming Ease at a very dear rate: And though he pays not this Tax immediately out of his own Purse, yet his Purse will find it by a greater want of Money there at the end of the year, than that comes to, with the lessening of his Rents to boot; which is a settled and lasting evil, that will stick upon him beyond the present Payment.

To make this clear, let us suppose in the present State of Affairs in *England*, that the Rents of *England* are Twelve Millions, and that the Charge and Necessities of the Government requires a supply of Three Millions from the Parliament, which is laid on Land. Here is one fourth part of his Yearly Income goes immediately out of the Landlords and Landholders Pocket. This is a Burthen very apt to be felt. The Country Gentleman, who actually pays the Money out of his Pocket, or finds it deducted out of his Rent at Quarter-day for *Taxes*, sees and very sensibly observes what goes thus out of his Estate. But though this be a Quarter of his yearly Income, and out of an Estate of Four hundred

dred pounds a Year, the publick *Tax* now openly takes away One hundred: Yet this influences not at all the yearly Rent of the Land, which the Rack-renter, or under Tenant pays: It being the same thing to him, whether he pays all his Rent to the King, or his Landlord, or half, or a quarter, or none at all to the King; the Case is all one to him, what Hand receives his Rent, when due: So Trade flourishes, and his Commodities go off well, he will be able to pay his Rent on. This lessens not any more the Value of his Farm, than an high or a low chief Rent does paid out of it to the Lord of the Fee: The Tenant's Bargain and Profit is the same, whether the Land be charg'd, or not charg'd with an Annuity payable to another Man. We see this in College Leases, where though the College Tenant pays for it to the College some years five times as much as he does others, upon the varying Rate of Corn: Yet the Under Tenant feels not this Alteration in the least, nor finds a Reason to have his Rent abated, because a greater part of it is diverted from his Landlord. All this is but changing the Hand, that receives the Rent, without any influence at all upon the yearly Value of the Estate; which will not be let for one Penny more or less to the Renter, however,

ever, or amongſt whomſoever, the Rent he pays, be divided. From hence it is evident, That *Taxes* laid on Land do not in the leaſt make Rents fall.

But ſuppoſe, to ſhift off the Burthen from the Land, ſome Country Gentlemen ſhould think fit to raiſe theſe three Millions upon Commodities, to let the Land go free. Firſt, it is to be conſider'd, That ſince the publick Wants require three Millions, (for that we ſupos'd for Argument ſake; let it be three Millions, or one Million, that's all one;) and ſo much muſt go into the King's Coffers; or elſe the Neceſſities of the Government will not be ſupplied; That for raiſing theſe three Millions on Commodities, and bringing ſo much into the *Exchequer*, there muſt go a great deal more than three Millions out of the Subjects Pockets. For a *Tax* of that nature cannot be levied by Officers, to watch every little Rivulet of Trade, without a great Charge, eſpecially at firſt trial. But ſuppoſing no more Charge in raiſing it, than of a Land *Tax*, and that there are only three Millions to be paid, 'tis evident that to do this out of Commodities, they muſt to the Conſumer be raiſed a quarter in their Price; ſo that every thing, to him that uſes it, muſt be a quarter dearer. Let us ſee now who at long run muſt pay this

this quarter, and where it will light. 'Tis plain, the Merchant and Broker, neither will nor can; for if he pays a quarter more for Commodities than he did, he will sell them at a Price proportionably raised. The poor Labourer and Handicraftsman cannot: For he just lives from hand to mouth already, and all his Food, Clothing and Utensils, costing a quarter more than they did before, either his Wages must rise with the Price of things, to make him live; or else, not being able to maintain himself and Family by his Labour, he comes to the Parish; and then the Land bears the Burthen a heavier way. If the Labourer's Wages be rais'd in proportion to the encreas'd Rates of things, the Farmer, who pays a quarter more for Wages, as well as all other things, whilst he sells his Corn and Wool, either at the same rate, or lower, at the Market, (since the Tax laid upon it makes People less forward to buy) must either have his Rent abated, or else break and run away in his Landlord's Debt: And so the yearly Value of the Land is brought down. And who then pays the Tax at the Years end, but the Landlord: When the Tenant, not able to raise his Rent by his Commodities, either runs away in his Landlord's Debt, or cannot be continued in the Farm without abatement

ment of Rent? For when the yearly charge in his Farm is greater by the increase of the Labourers Wages, and yet his product Sells cheaper by reason of the Tax laid on his Commodities; how will the Farmer be able to make up his Rent at Quarter-Day? For this may be worth our Notice, that any *Tax* laid on Foreign Commodities in *England*, raises its price, and makes the Importer get more for his Commodity; But on the contrary a *Tax* laid on your Native Product, and home-made Commodities, lessens their price, and makes them yield less to the first Seller.

The Reason whereof is plain. For the Merchant Importing no Commodity but what the necessity, or fashionable Wantonness of your People gives him *Vent* for, will not only proportion his Gain, to the Cost and Risque which he has been at before Landing; but will expect profit of his Money paid here, for any Tax laid on it; and take advantage from thence to raise his price above what his *Tax* comes to; and if he cannot do that, he will Trade no more in that Commodity. For it being not the Product of his Farm, he is not tied to bring it to Market, if he finds its price not answer his Expectation there, but turns himself to other Wares, which he finds your Markets take off better,

ter. A Merchant will never continue to Trare in Wares, which the change of Fashion, or Humour, amongst your People, has made less vendible, though he may be sometimes caught by a sudden alteration. But that seldom happens in the course of Trade, so as to influence the great bulk of it. For things of Necessity must still be had, and things of Fashion will be had as long as Men have Money or Credit, whatever Rates they cost, and the rather because they are dear. For it being Vanity not Use that makes the Expensive Fashion of your People, the Emulation is, who shall have the finest, that is, the dearest things, not the most convenient or useful. How many things do we value or buy, because they come at dear rates from *Japan* and *China*, which if they were our own Manufacture or Product, common to be had, and for a little Money, would be contemned and neglected? Have not several of our own Commodities offered to Sale at reasonable Rates been despised, and the very same eagerly bought and brag'd of, when sold for *French* at a double Price? You must not think therefore that the raising their Price will lessen the *Vent* of Fashionable Foreign Commodities amongst you, as long as Men have any way to purchase them, but rather increase

creaſe it. *French Wine* is become a Modiſh Drink amongſt us, and a Man is aſham'd to Entertain his Friend, or almoſt to Dine himſelf without it. The Price is in the Memory of Man rais'd from 6 *d.* to 2 *s.* and does this hinder the Drinking of it? No, the quite contrary, a Man's way of Living is commended, becauſe he will give any Rate for it: And a Man will give any Rate rather than paſs for a poor Wretch, or Penurious Curmudgeon, that is not able or knows not how to live well, nor uſe his Friends civilly. *Faſhion* is for the moſt part nothing but the Oſtentation of Riches, and therefore the high price of what ſerves to that, rather increaſes than leſſens its *Vent*. The conteſt and glory is in the Expence, not the Uſefulneſs of it; and People are then thought, and ſaid to live well, when they can make a ſhew of rare and foreign things, and ſuch as their Neighbours cannot go to the Price of.

Thus we ſee how Foreign Commodities fall not in their Price by *Taxes* laid on them, becauſe the Merchant is not neceſſitated to bring to your Market any but Faſhionable Commodities, and thoſe go off the better for their high rate. But on the contrary your Landholder being forced to bring his Commodities to Market, ſuch as his Land and Induſtry affords them,

them, common and known things, must sell them there at such price as he can get. This the buyer knows; and these home-bred Commodities being seldom, the Favourites of your People, or any farther acceptable, than as great conveniency recommends them to the Vulgar, or downright necessity to all, as soon as a *Tax* is laid on them, every one makes as sparing a use of them as he can, that he may save his Money for other necessary, or credible Expences, whereby the price they yield the first Seller is mightily abated, and so the yearly value of the Land, which produces them, lessen'd too.

If therefore the laying of *Taxes* upon Commodities does, as it is evident, affect the Land, that is out at Rack-rent, it is plain it does equally affect all the other Land in *England* too, and the Gent. will, but the worst way, increase their own Charges, that is by lessening the Yearly Value of their Estates, if they hope to ease their Land, by charging Commodities. It is in vain in a Country whose great Fund is Land, to hope to lay the publick charge of the Government on any thing else; there at last it will terminate. The Merchant (do what you can) will not bear it, the Labourer cannot, and therefore the Landholder must: And whether he were

best

beſt do it, by laying it directly, where it will at laſt ſettle, or by letting it come to him by the ſinking of his Rents, which when they are once fallen every one knows are not eaſily raiſed again, let him conſider.

Holland is brought as an inſtance of laying the Charge of the publique upon Trade, and 'tis poſſible (excepting ſome few ſmall Free Towns) the only place in the World that could be brought to favour this way. But yet when examin'd will be found to ſhew the quite contrary, and be a clear Proof, that lay the *Taxes* how you will, Land every where, in proportion, bears the greater ſhare of the burthen. The publick Charge of the Government, 'tis ſaid, is, in the *United Provinces*, laid on Trade. I grant it is, the greateſt part of it; But is the Land Excus'd or Eas'd by it? By no means, but on the contrary ſo loaded, that in many places half, in others a quarter, in others one eighth of the Yearly value does not come into the owners Pocket: And if I have not been miſinformed, the Land in ſome places will not pay the *Taxes*: So that we may ſay, that the Charge of the Government came not upon Commodities till the Land could not bear it. The burthen unavoidably ſettles upon the Land firſt, and when it has preſſed it ſo, that it can yield no more, Trade muſt be

brought in aid to help to support the Government rather than let all sink: But the first stress is always upon Land, and as far as that will reach, it is unavoidably carried, lay your *Taxes* how you will. 'Tis known what a share of the publick charges of the Government is supported by the Trade of *Amsterdam* alone, as I remember that one Town pays Thirty-six in the Hundred of all the publick *Taxes* raised in the United Provinces. But are the Lands of *Guelderland* eas'd by it? Let any one see in that Country of Land more than Trade, what they make clear of their Revenues, and whether the Country Gentleman there grow rich on their Land, whilst the Merchant having the *Taxes* laid on his Commerce is impoverish'd? On the contrary *Guelderland* is so low and out of Cash, that *Amsterdam* has been fain for many Years to lay down the *Taxes* for them, which is, in effect, to pay the *Taxes* of *Guelderland* too.

Struggle and contrive as you will, lay your *Taxes* as you please, the Traders will shift it off from their own Gain; the Merchants will bear the least part of it, and grow poor last. In *Holland* it self, where Trade is so loaded, who, I pray, grows richest, the Land-holder or the Trader? Which of them is pinch'd, and wants Money

ney moſt? A Country may thrive, the Country Gentleman grow rich, and his Rents encreaſe (for ſo it has been here) whilſt the Land is *Taxed*: But I challenge any one to ſhew me a Country, wherein there is any conſiderable publick Charge raiſed, where the Land does not moſt ſenſibly feel it, and in proportion bear much the greater part of it.

We muſt not therefore impute the falling of the Rents, or of the price of Land, to high *Intereſt*; Nor, if ill Husbandry has waſted our Riches, hope by ſuch kind of Laws to raiſe them to their former value. I humbly conceive we ſhall in vain endeavour it by the fall of *Intereſt*: The number of Buyers muſt be increaſed, and Sellers leſſen'd, which muſt be done by other ways, than regulating of *Intereſt*, or elſe the Landed-man will neither find Chapmen for his Land, nor for the Corn that grows on it, at the rate he deſires.

But could an Act of Parliament, bring down *Intereſt* to Four *per Cent.* and the lowering of that immediately raiſe the Purchaſers Fine from 20 to 25 Years Purchaſe; yet it may be doubted, whether this be fit to be made into a Law, becauſe it would be of no advantage to the Kingdom. For what profit would it be to the Nation to make a Law, that he who

ſells Land ſhould inſtead of Four have Five hundred pounds of the Purchaſer? This indeed a little alters the diſtribution of the Money, we have amongſt us Engliſhmen here at home, but neither helps to continue what we have, nor brings in more from abroad: Which being the only concernment of the Kingdom, in reference to its Wealth, is apt to be ſuppoſed by us without doors to be the only care of a Parliament. For it matters not, ſo it be here amongſt us, whether the Money be in *Thomas* or *Richards* Hands, provided it be ſo order'd, that, whoever has it, may be encouraged to let it go into the current of Trade, for the improvement of the general ſtock, and wealth of the Nation.

As this Increaſe of the Fine in the purchaſe of Land is not an advantage to the Kingdom, ſo neither is it to the Landholder, who is the perſon, that bearing the greateſt part of the burthens of the Kingdom, ought, I think, to have the greateſt care taken of him, and enjoy as many Privileges, and as much Wealth, as the favour of the Law can (with regard to the Publick-weal) confer upon him. But pray conſider: The raiſing the Price of Land in Sale by increaſing the number of Years Purchaſe to be paid for it, gives the advantage not to the Landholder, but to him that

that ceaſes to be ſo. He that has no longer the Land has the more Money, and he who has the Land is the poorer. The true advantage of the Landholder is, that his Corn, Fleſh, and Wool, ſell better, and yield a greater price; this indeed is a profit, that benefits the owner of the Land, and goes along with it: It is this alone raiſes the Rent, and makes the Poſſeſſor richer: and this can only be done by increaſing our Wealth, and drawing more Money into *England*, which the falling of *Intereſt*, and thereby (if it could effect it) raiſing the Purchaſe of Land is ſo far from doing, that it does viſibly and directly one way hinder our increaſe of Wealth, that is, by hindring Foreigners to come here, and buy Land, and ſettle amongſt us. Whereby we have this double loſs; Firſt we loſe their Perſons, increaſe of People being the increaſe both of Strength and Riches. Secondly we loſe ſo much Money. For tho' whatever an Engliſhman gives to another for Land, though raiſed to Forty Years Purchaſe, be not one Farthing advantage to the Kingdom; yet whatever a Foreigner, who purchaſes Land here, gives for it, is ſo much every Farthing clear gainto the Nation: For that Money comes clear in, without carrying out any thing for it, and is every Farthing of it as perfect Gain

to the Nation as if it drop'd down from the Clouds.

But farther, if consideration be to be had only of Sellers of Land, the lowering of *Interest* to Four *per Cent.* will not be in their favour, unless, by it, you can raise Land to Thirty Years Purchase, which is not at all likely: And I think no Body by falling of *Interest* to Four *per Cent.* hopes to get Chapmen for their Land at that Rate. Whatsoever they have less, if Law can regulate *Interest*, they lose of their value of Land, Money being thus abased. So that the Landedman will scarce find his account neither by this Law, when it comes to trial. And at last, I imagine, this will be the result of all such Attempts, that Experience will shew, that the price of Things will not be regulated by Laws, though the endeavours after it will be sure to prejudice and inconvenience Trade, and put your Affairs out of Order.

If this be so, that *Interest* cannot be regulated by Law, or that if it could, yet the reducing of it to Four *per Cent.* would do more harm than good: What then should there (will you say) be no Law at all to regulate *Interest*? I say not so. For,

1. It is necessary that there should be a stated Rate of *Interest*, that in Debts and Forbearances, where Contract has not set-

led

led it between the Parties, the Law might give a Rule, and Courts of Judicature might know what Damages to allow. This may, and therefore ſhould, be Regulated

2. That in the preſent current of running Caſh, which now takes its courſe almoſt all to *London*, and is Ingroſſed by a very few Hands in Compariſon, young Men, and thoſe in Want, might not too eaſily be expoſed to Extortion and Oppreſſion; and the dextrous and combining Money Jobbers not have too great and unbounded a Power, to Prey upon the Ignorance or Neceſſity of Borrowers. There would not be much danger of this, if Money were more equally diſtributed into the ſeveral quarters of *England*, and into a greater number of Hands, according to the Exigences of Trade.

If Money were to be hired, as Land is; or to be had as Corn, or Wool, from the Owner himſelf; and known good ſecurity be given for it, it might then probably be had at the Market (which is the true) Rate, and that rate of *Intereſt* would be a conſtant gauge of your Trade and Wealth. But when a kind of Monopoly, by conſent, has put this general Commodity into a few Hands, it may need Regulation, though what the ſtated Rate of *Intereſt* ſhould be in the conſtant change of Affairs,

fairs, and flux of Money, is hard to determine. Possibly it may be allowed as a reasonable Proposal, that it should be within such Bounds, as should not on the one side quite Eat up the Merchants, and Tradesman's Profit, and discourage their Industry; nor on the other hand so low, as should hinder Men from Risquing their Money in other Mens Hands, and so rather chuse to keep it out of Trade, than venture it upon so small profit. When it is too high, it so hinders the Merchants gain, that he will not Borrow; when too low, it so hinders the Monied Man's profit, that he will not Lend; and both these ways it is a hinderance to Trade.

But this being perhaps too general, and loose a Rule, let me add, that if one would consider Money and Land alone, in relation one to another, perhaps it is now at Six *per Cent.* in as good a proportion as is possible, Six *per Cent.* being a little higer than Land, at Twenty Years Purchase, which is the Rate pretty near, that Land has generally carried in *England*, it never being much over nor under. For supposing 100 *l.* in Money, and Land of 5 *l. per Annum*, be of equal value, which is Land at Twenty Years Purchase: 'Tis necessary for the making their value truly equal, that they should produce an equal Income, which

which the 100 *l.* at 5 *l. per Cent* Intereſt is not likely to do.

1. Becauſe of the many, and ſometimes long intervals of Barrenneſs, which happen to Money, more than Land. Money at *Uſe*, when return'd into the Hands of the Owner, uſually lies dead there, till he gets a new Tenant for it, and can put it out again; and all this time it produces nothing. But this happens not to Land, the growing product whereof turns to account to the Owner, even when it is in his Hands, or is allow'd for by the Tenant, antecedently to his entring upon the Farm. For though a Man that Borrows Money at *Midſummer*, never begins to pay his *Intereſt* from our *Lady-Day*, or one moment backwards, yet he who Rents a Farm at *Midſummer*, may have as much reaſon to begin his Rent from our *Lady-Day*, as if he had then entred upon it.

2. Beſides the dead intervals of ceaſing Profit, which happen to Money more than Land, there is another Reaſon, why the Profit and Income of Money let out, ſhould be a little higher than that of Land; and that is, becauſe Money out at *Intereſt* runs a greater Riſque, than Land does. The Borrower may break, and run away with the Money, and then not only the *Intereſt* due, but all the future Profit, with the

the Principal, is loſt for ever. But in Land a Man can loſe but the Rent due, for which uſually too the Stock upon the Land is ſufficient ſecurity: And if a Tenant run away in Arrear of ſome Rent, the Land remains, that cannot be carried away, or loſt. Should a Man Purchaſe good Land in *Middleſex* of 5 *l. per Annum*, at Twenty Years Purchaſe, and other Land in *Rumney-marſh*, or elſewhere of the ſame Yearly value, but ſo ſituated, that it were in danger to be ſwallowed of the Sea, and be utterly loſt, it would not be unreaſonable, that he ſhould expect to have it under Twenty Years Purchaſe; ſuppoſe Sixteen and an half. This is to bring it to juſt the caſe of Land at Twenty Years Purchaſe, and Money at Six *per Cent.* where the uncertainty of ſecuring ones Money may well be allowed that advantage of greater Profit; and therefore perhaps the legal *Intereſt* now in *England* at Six *per Cent.* is as reaſonable and convenient a Rate as can well be ſet by a ſtanding Rule, eſpecially if we conſider that the Law requires not a Man to pay Six *per Cent.* but ties up the Lender from taking more. So that if ever it falls of it ſelf, the Monied-man is ſure to find it, and his *Intereſt* will be brought down to it.

High *Intereſt* is thought by ſome a Prejudice to Trade: But if we look back,

we

we ſhall find, that *England* never throve ſo well, nor was there ever brought into *England* ſo great an increaſe of Wealth ſince, as in Queen *Elizabeth*'s and King *James* I. and King *Charles* I. time, when Money was at Ten and Eight *per Cent.* I will not ſay high *Intereſt* was the cauſe of it. For I rather think that our thriving Trade was the Cauſe of high *Intereſt*, every one craving Money to employ in a profitable Commerce. But this I think I may reaſonably infer from it, That lowering of *Intereſt* is not a ſure way to improve either our Trade or Wealth.

To this I hear ſome ſay. That the *Dutch*, Skilful in all Arts of promoting Trade, to out-do us in this, as well as all other Advancements of it, have obſerved this Rule, *viz.* That when we fell *Intereſt* in *England* from Ten to Eight, they preſently ſunk *Intereſt* in *Holland* to Four *per Cent.* and again, when we lower'd it to Six they fell it to Three *per Cent.* thereby to keep the Advantage which the lowneſs of *Intereſt* gives to Trade. From whence theſe Men readily conclude, That the falling of *Intereſt* will advance Trade in *England*. To which I anſwer.

1. That this looks like an Argument, rather made for the preſent Occaſion, to miſlead thoſe who are credulous enough to

to ſwallow it, than ariſing from true Reaſon, and matter of Fact. For if lowering of *Intereſt* were ſo advantageous to Trade, why did the *Dutch* ſo conſtantly take their meaſures only by us, and not as well by ſome other of their Neighbours, with whom they have as great or greater Commerce than with us? This is enough at firſt ſight to make one ſuſpect this, to be Duſt only raiſed, to throw in Peoples eyes, and a Suggeſtion made to ſerve a Purpoſe. For,

2. It will not be found true, That when we abat'd *Intereſt* here in *England* to Eight, the *Dutch* ſunk it in *Holland* to Four *per Cent.* by Law; or that there was any Law made in *Holland* to limit the Rate of *Intereſt* to Three *per Cent.* when we reduced it in *England* to Six. It is true, *John de Witt*, when he managed the Affairs of *Holland*, ſetting himſelf to leſſen the publick Debt, and having actually paid ſome, and getting Money in a readineſs to Pay others, ſent notice to all the Creditors, That thoſe who would not take Four *per Cent.* ſhould come and receive their Money. The Creditors finding him in earneſt, and knowing not how otherwiſe to employ their Money, accepted his Terms, and changed their Obligations into Four *per Cent.* whereas before they were at Five, and ſo (the great

Loans

Loans of the Country being to the State) it might be ſaid in this ſenſe, That the Rate of *Intereſt* was reduced lower at that time: But that it was done by a Law, forbidding to take higher *Intereſt* than Four *per Cent.* that I deny, and require any one to ſhew. Indeed upon good Security one might lately have borrowed Money in *Holland* at Three, and Three and an half *per Cent.* but not by vertue of any Law, but the natural Rate of *Intereſt*. And I appeal to the Men learned in the Law of *Holland*, whether laſt Year (and I doubt not but it is ſo ſtill) a Man might not lawfully lend his Money for what *Intereſt* he could get, and whether in the Courts he ſhould not recover the *Intereſt* he contracted for, if it were Ten *per Cent.* So that if Money be to be borrowed by honeſt and reſponſible Men, at Three, or Three and an half *per Cent.* it is not by the force of Statutes and Edicts; but by the natural Courſe of things, which will always bring *Intereſt* upon good Security low, where there is a great deal of Money to be lent, and little good Security, in proportion, to be had. *Holland* is a Country where the Land makes a very little part of the Stock of the Country. Trade is their great Fund; and their Eſtates lie generally in Money: So that all, who are not Traders, generally ſpeaking, are Lenders:

Of

Of which there are so many whose Income depends upon *Interest*, that if the States were not mightily in Debt, but paid every one their Principal, instead of the Four *per Cent. Use*, which they give, there would be so much more Money than could be used, or would be ventured in Trade, that Money there would be at Two *per Cent.* or under, unless they found a way to put it out in Foreign Countries.

Interest, I grant these Men, is low in *Holland*: But it is so not as an effect of Law, or the politick Contrivance of the Government, to promote Trade; but as the Consequence of great Plenty of ready Money, when their *Interest* first fell. I say when it first fell: For being once brought low, and the Publick having borrowed a great part of private Mens Money, and continuing in Debt, it must contine so though the Plenty of Money, which first brought *Interest* low, were very much decay'd, and a great part of their Wealth were really gone. For the Debt of the State affording to the Creditors a constant Yearly Income, that is look'd on as a safe Revenue, and accounted as valuable as if it were in Land; and accordingly they buy it one of another; and whether there be any Money in the publick Coffers or no, he, who has to the value of Ten thousand pounds owing him

from

from the States, may ſell it every day in the Week, and have ready Money for it. This Credit is ſo great an advantage to private Men, who know not elſe what to do with their Stocks, that were the Sates now in a condition to begin to pay their Debts, the Creditors, rather than take their Money out to lie dead by them, would let it ſtay in, at lower *Intereſt*, as they did ſome Years ſince, when they were call'd on to come and receive their Money. This is the ſtate of *Intereſt* in *Holland*: Their plenty of Money, and paying their publique Debts, ſome time ſince lowered their *Intereſt*. But it was not done by the command and limitation of a Law, nor in conſequence of our reducing it here by Law to Six *per Cent.* For I deny, that there is any Law there yet, to forbid lending of Money for above Three, or Six, or Ten *per Cent.* Whatever ſome here ſuggeſt, every one there may hire out his Money as freely as he does any thing elſe, for what rate he can get; and the Bargain being made, the Law will inforce the Borrower to pay it.

I grant low *Intereſt*, where all Men conſent to it, is an advantage to Trade, if Merchants will regulate their Gains accordingly, and Men be perſwaded to lend to them: But can it be expected, when the Publique gives Seven, or Eight, or Ten

per

per Cent. that private Men, whose Security is certainly no better, shall have for Four? And can there be any thing stranger, than that the same Men who look on, and therefore allow high *Use* as an encouragement to lending to the *Chequer*, should think low *Use* should bring Money into Trade? The States of *Holland* some few Years since, paid but Four *per Cent.* for the Money they owed: If you propose them for an example, and *Interest* be to be regulated by a Law, try whether you can do so here, and bring Men to lend it to the Publique at that Rate. This would be a benefit to the Kingdom, and abate a great part of our publique Charge. If you cannot do that, confess, that 'tis not the Law in *Holland* has brought the *Interest* there so low, but something else, and that which will make the States, or any body else pay dearer now, if either their Credit be less, or Money there scarcer.

An infallible sign of your decay of Wealth is the falling of Rents, and the raising of them would be worth the Nations Care: For in that, and not in the falling of *Interst* lies the true advantage of the Landed-man, and with him of the Publick. It may be therefore not besides our present business, to enquire into the cause of the falling of Rents in *England*.

1. Either

1. Either the Land is grown Barrener, and ſo the Product is leſs, and conſequently the Money to be received for that Product is leſs. For it is evident that he whoſe Land was wont to produce 100 Buſhels of Wheat *communibus annis*, if by long Tillage, and Husbandry it will now produce but 50 Buſhels, the Rent will be abated half. But this cannot be ſuppos'd general.

2. Or the Rent of that Land is leſſen'd. 1. Becauſe the uſe of the Commodity ceaſes: As the Rents muſt fall in *Virginia*, were taking of Tobacco forbid in *England*. 2. Or becauſe ſomething elſe ſupplies the room of that Product: As the rate of Copis-lands will fall upon the diſcovery of Coal Mines. 3. Or, becauſe the Markets are ſupplied with the ſame Commodity, cheaper from another place. As the breeding Countries of *England* muſt needs fall their Rents, by the importation of *Iriſh* Cattle. 4. Or, becauſe a Tax laid on your Native Commodities, makes what the Farmer ſells, cheaper; and Labour, and what he buys dearer,

3. Or, the Money in the Country is leſs. For the exigencies and uſes of Money not leſſening with its quantity, and it being in the ſame proportion to be imploy'd and diſtributed ſtill in all the parts of its circulation, ſo much as its quantity is leſ-

ſen'd, ſo much muſt the ſhare of every one, that has a right to this Money, be the leſs; whether he be Landholder, for his Goods; or Labourer, for his Hire; or Merchant, for his Brokage. Though the Landholder uſually finds it firſt. Becauſe Money failing, and falling ſhort, People have not ſo much Money as formerly to lay out, and ſo leſs Money is brought to Market, by which the price of things muſt neceſſarily fall. The Labourer feels it next. For when the Landholder's Rent falls, he muſt either bate the Labourer's Wages, or not imploy, or not pay him; which either way makes him feel the want of Money. The Merchant feels it laſt. For though he ſell leſs, and at a lower rate, he buys alſo our Native Commodities, which he Exports, at a lower rate too: and will be ſure to leave our Native Commodities unbought, upon the hands of the Farmer, or Manufacturer, rather than Export them to a Market, which will not afford him Returns with Profit.

If one Third of the Money imployed in Trade were lock'd up, or gone out of *England*, muſt not the Landholders neceſſarily receive one Third leſs for their Goods, and conſequently Rents fall; A leſs quantity of Money by one Third being to be diſtributed amongſt an equal number of

Re-

Receivers? Indeed, People not perceving the Money to be gone, are apt to be jealous one of another; and each ſuſpecting anothers inequality of Gain to rob him of his ſhare, every one will be imploying his skill, and power, the beſt he can, to retrieve it again, and to bring Money into his Pocket in the ſame plenty as formerly. But this is but ſcrambling amongſt our ſelves, and helps no more againſt our want, than the pulling off a ſhort Coverlet will, amongſt Children, that lye together, preſerve them all from the Cold. Some will ſtarve, unleſs the Father of the Family provide better, and enlarge the ſcanty Covering. This pulling and conteſt is uſually between the Landed-man and the Merchant. For the Labourer's ſhare, being ſeldom more than a bare ſubſiſtence, never allows that body of Men time or opportunity to raiſe their Thoughts above that, or ſtruggle with the Richer for theirs, (as one common *Intereſt*,) unleſs when ſome common and great Diſtreſs, uniting them in one univerſal Ferment, makes them forget Reſpect, and emboldens them to carve to their Wants with armed force: And then ſometimes they break in upon the Rich, and ſweep all like a deluge. But this rarely happens but in the mal-adminiſtration of neglect'd or miſ-manag'd Government.

The usual struggle and contest, as I said before, in the decays of Wealth and Riches, is between the *Landed Man* and the *Merchant*, with whom I may here join the *Monied Man*. The *Landed Man* finds himself aggrieved, by the falling of his Rents, and the streightning of his Fortune; whilst the Monied Man keeps up his Gain, and the Merchant thrives and grows rich by Trade. These he thinks steal his Income into their Pockets, build their Fortunes upon his Ruin, and Ingross more of the Riches of the Nation than comes to their share. He therefore endeavours, by Laws, to keep up the value of *Lands*, which he suspects lessened by the others excess of Profit: But all in vain. The cause is mistaken, and the remedy too. 'Tis not the *Merchant's* nor *Monied Man's* Gains that makes Land fall: But the want of Money and lessening of our Treasure wasted by extravagant Expences, and a mis-manag'd Trade, which the Land always first feels. If the *Landed Gentleman* will have, and by his example make it fashionable to have, more *Claret*, *Spice*, *Silk*, and other Foreign Consumable Wares, than our Exportation of Commodities does exchange for; Money must unavoidably follow to ballance the Account, and pay the Debt. And therefore I fear that another

other Propoſal, I hear talked of, to hinder the Exportation of *Money* and *Bullion*, will ſhew more our need of care to keep our Money from going from us, than a way and method, how to preſerve it here.

'Tis Death in *Spain* to export Money: And yet they, who furniſh all the World with Gold and Silver, have leaſt of it amongſt themſelves. *Trade* fetches it away from that lazy and indigent People, notwithſtanding all their artificial and forced contrivances to keep it there. It follows *Trade* againſt the rigour of their Laws; and their want of Foreign Commodities makes it openly be carried out at Noon-Day. Nature has beſtowed Mines on ſeveral parts of the World: But their Riches are only for the Induſtrious and Frugal. Whomever elſe they viſit, 'tis with the Diligent and Sober only they ſtay. And if the Vertue, and provident way of Living of our Anceſtors (content with our Native conveniences of Life, without the coſtly Itch after the Materials of Pride and Luxury from abroad) were brought in faſhion and countenance again amongſt us; this alone would do more to keep, and increaſe our Wealth, and inrich our Land, than all our Paper helps about *Intereſt*, *Money*, *Bullion*, *&c.* which however eagerly we

may catch at, will not, I fear, without better Husbandry, keep us from ſinking, whatever contrivances we may have recourſe to. 'Tis with a *Kingdom*, as with a *Family*. Spending leſs than our own Commodities will pay for, is the ſure and only way for the Nation to grow Rich. And when that begins once ſeriouſly to be conſider'd, and our faces and ſteps are in earneſt turn'd that way, we may hope to have our Rents riſe, and the publick Stock thrive again. Till then, we in vain, I fear, endeavour with noiſe, and weapons of Law, to drive the Wolf from our one, to one anothers Doors: The Breed ought to be extirpated out of the Iſland. For Want, brought in by ill management, and nurſed up by expenſive Vanity, will make the Nation Poor, and ſpare no body.

If Three Millions were neceſſary for the carrying on the Trade of *England*, whereof One Million were for the Landholder, to maintain him; another were for the payment of the Labourer and Handicraftſman; and the Third were the ſhare of the Brokers, coming to them for their care and pains in diſtributing; If One Million of this Money were gone out of the Kingdom, muſt not there be One Third leſs to be ſhared amongſt them

for

for the product of their Land, their Labour and their Distribution? I do not say they will feel it at the same time. But the Landholder having nothing, but what the Product of his Land will yield; and the Buyer according to the Plenty or Scarcity of Money he has, always setting the Price upon what is offered to Sale; The Landholder must be content to take the Market-Rate, for what he brings thither, which always following the scarcity or plenty of Money. If any part of our Money be gone, he is sure first to find it in the price of his Commodities. For the Broker and Merchant, though he Sell cheaper, yet he Buys cheaper too: And he will be sure to get by his Returns, or let alone a Commodity, which will not produce him Gain: And whatsoever is so alone, and left upon hands, always turns to the Landholders loss.

Supposing that of our Woollen Manufacture, Foreign Markets took off one half, and the other half were consumed amongst our selves: If a sensible part, (as One Third) of our Coin were gone, and so Men had equally One Third less Money than they had (for, 'tis certain, it must be *tantamount*, and what I 'scape of One Third less, another must make up) it would follow, That they would have less to lay out in Cloaths, as

well as other things, and so would either wear them longer, or pay less for them. If a Clothier finds a want of Vent, he must either Sell cheaper or not at all: If he Sells cheaper, he must also pay less, both for Wool and Labour: And if the Labourer hath less Wages, he must also pay less for *Corn*, *Butter*, *Cheese* *Flesh*, or else forbear some of these quite. In all which cases, the Price of *Wool*, *Corn*, *Flesh*, and the other Products of Land are brought down, and the Land bears the greatest part of the loss. For where-ever the Consumption or Vent of any Commodity is stopt, there the Stop continues on till it comes to the Landholder. And where-ever the Price of any Commodity begins to fall, how many Hands soever there be between that and the Landholder, they all take reprisals one upon another, till at last it comes to the Landholder; and there the abatement of Price, of any of his Commodities, lessens his Income, and is a clear loss. The Owner of Land, which produces the Commodity, and the last Buyer, who consumes it, are the two extreams in Commerce. And though the falling of any sort of Commodity in the Landholder's Hand, does not prove so to the last consumer, the Arts of intervening Brokers and Ingrossers keeping up the Price to their own advantage:

Yet

Yet whenever want of Money, or want of desire in the consumer, make the Price low, that immediately reaches the first Producer: No body between having any Interest to keep it up.

Now, as to the two first causes of falling of *Rents*, falling of *Interest* has no Influence at all. In the latter, it has a great part: Because it makes the Money of *England* less, by making both *English*-Men and Foreigners withdraw or with-hold their Money. For that which is not let loose into *Trade*, is all one whil'st Hoarded up, as if it were not in Being.

I have heard it brought for a reason, why *Interest* should be reduced to Four *per Cent. That thereby the Landholder, who bears the burthen of the Publick Charge, may be, in some degree eased by falling of* Interest.

This Argument will be put right, if you say it will ease the Borrower, and lay the loss on the Lender: But it concerns not the Land in general, unless you will suppose all Landholders in Debt. But I hope, we may yet think that Men in *England*, who have Land, have Money too; and that Landed Men, as well as others, by their providence and good Husbandry, accommodating their Expences to their Income, keep themselves from going backwards in the World.

That

That which is urged, as most deserving consideration and remedy in the case, is, *That it is hard and unreasonable, that one, who has Mortgaged half his Land, should yet pay* Taxes *for the whole, whilst the Mortgagee goes away with the clear profit of an high* Interest. To this I answer,

1. That if any Man has run himself in Debt, for the Service of his Country, 'tis fit the Publick should reimburse him, and set him free. This is a care, that becomes the Publick Justice; That Men, if they receive no Rewards, should, at least, be kept from Suffering, in having Served their Country. But I do not remember the Polity of any Nation, who altered their Constitution, in favour of those, whose mismanagement had brought them behind-hand; possibly as thinking the Publick little beholding to those, who had misemployed the Stock of their Country, in the excess of their private Expences, and, by their Example, spread a fashion that carries ruin with it. Mens paying Taxes of Mortgaged Lands, is a punishment for ill-husbandry, which ought to be discouraged: But it concerns very little the Frugal and the Thrifty.

2. Another thing to be said in reply to this, is, That it is with Gentlemen in the Country, as with Tradesmen in the City,

City. If they will own Titles to greater Estates than really they have, it is their own faults, and there is no way left to help them from Paying for them. The Remedy is in their own hands, to discharge themselves when they please. And when they have once Sold their Land, and paid their Debts, they will no longer pay Taxes, for what they own, without being really theirs. There is another way also, whereby they may be relieved, as well as a great many other inconveniencies remedied; and that is by a *Registry*: For if Mortgages were Registred, Land Taxes might reach them, and order the Lender to pay his proportion.

I have met with Patrons of Four *per Cent.* who (amongst many other fine things they tell us of) affirm, *That if* Interest *were reduced to Four* per Cent. *then some Men would, borrow Money at this low Rate, and pay their Debts; Others would borrow more than they now do, and improve their Land; Others would borrow more, and imploy it in Trade and Manufacture.* Gilded words indeed, were there any thing substantial in them! These Men talk, as if they meant to shew us, not only the Wisdom, but Riches of *Solomon*, and would make Gold and Silver as common, as the Stones in the Street: But at last, I fear, 'twill be but Wit without Money

ney; and, I wish it amount to that. 'Tis without question, That could the Countryman, and the Tradesman take up Money cheaper, than now they do, every Man would be forward to Borrow, and desire, that he might have other Mens Money to imploy to his advantage. I confess, those who contend for Four *per Cent.* have found out a way, to set Mens Mouths a watering for Money at that Rate, and to increase the number of the Borrowers in *England*; if any body can imagine it would be an advantage to increase them. But to answer all their fine Projects, I have but this one short question to ask them: Will Four *per Cent.* increase the number of the Lenders? If it will not, as any Man at the very first hearing, will shrewdly suspect it will not, then all the plenty of Money these Conjurers bestow upon us, for *Improvement of Land*, *Paying of Debts*, and *Advancement of Trade*, is but like the Gold and Silver, which Old Women believe, other Conjurers bestow sometimes, by whole Lapfuls, on poor credulous Girls, which, when they bring to the light, is found to be nothing but wither'd Leaves; and the Possessors of it are still as much in want of Money as ever.

Indeed I grant it would be well for *England*, and I wish it were so, that the plenty of

of Money were so great amongst us, that every Man could borrow as much as he could use in Trade, for Four *per Cent.* nay, that Men could borrow as much as they could imploy for Six *per Cent.* But even at that Rate, the Borrowers already are far more than the Lenders. Why else doth the Merchant upon occasion, pay Six *per Cent.* and often above that rate for Brokage? And why doth the Country Gentleman of One thousand pounds *per Annum* find it so difficult, with all the security he can bring, to take up a Thousand pound? All which proceeds from the scarcity of Money, and bad Security; two Causes, which will not be less powerful to hinder Borrowing, after the lowering of *Interest*: and I do not see, how any one can imagine that reducing *Use* to Four *Per Cent.* should abate their force; or how lessening the Reward of the Lender, without diminishing his Risque, should make him more forward and ready to Lend. So that these Men, whilst they talk, that at Four *per Cent.* Men would take up, and imploy more Money to the Publick advantage, do but pretend to multiply the number of Borrowers among us, of which it is certain we have too many already. Whilst they thus set Men a longing for the Golden days of Four *per Cent.* methinks they use the

poor

poor indigent Debtor, and needy Tradesman, as I have seen pratling Jack-Daws do sometimes their young, who kawing and fluttering about the Nest, set all their young ones a gaping, but having nothing in their empty Mouths but Noise and Air, leave them as hungry as before.

'Tis true these Men have found out by a cunning project, how, by the restraint of Law, to make the price of Money One Third cheaper, and then they tell *John a Nokes*, that he shall have Ten thousand pounds of it to employ in Merchandise, or Cloathing; and *John a Stiles* shall have Twenty thousand pounds more to pay his Debts; and so distribute this Money as freely as *Dego* did his Legacies, which they are to have, *even where they can get it.* But till these Men can instruct the forward Borrowers where they shall be furnished, they have perhaps done something to increase Mens desire, but not made Money one jot easier to come by. And till they do that, all this sweet gingling of Money in their Discourses goes just to the Tune of, *If all the World were Oatmeal.* Methinks these Undertakers, whil'st they have put Men in hopes of Borrowing more plentifully at easier Rates, for the supply of their Wants and Trades, had done better to have bethought themselves of a way, how

Men

Men need not Borrow upon *Use* at all: For this would be much more advantageous, and altogether as Feisible. It is as eaſie to diſtribute Twenty pair of Shooes amongſt Thirty Men, if they pay nothing for them at all, as if they paid 4 s. a pair. Ten of them (notwithſtanding the Statute Rate ſhould be reduced from 6 s. to 4 s. a pair) will be neceſſitated to ſit ſtill Barefoot, as much, as if they were to pay nothing for Shooes at all. Juſt ſo it is in a Country, that wants Money in proportion to Trade. Is is as eaſie to contrive how every Man ſhall be ſupplied with what Money he needs (*i. e.* can imploy in *improvement of Land, paying his Debts, and Returns of his Trade*) for nothing, as for Four *per Cent.* Either we have already more Money than the Owners will Lend, or we have not. If part of the Money which is now in *England*, will not be Lent at the rate *Intereſt* is at preſent at, will Men be more ready to Lend, and Borrowers be furniſhed for all thoſe brave Purpoſes more plentifully, when Money is brought to Four *per Cent.*? If People do already lend all the Money they have, above their own occaſions, whence are thoſe, who will borrow more at Four *per Cent.* to to be ſupplied? Or is there ſuch plenty of Money, and ſcarcity of Borrowers, that there needs the reducing of *Intereſt* to Four *per Cent.* to bring Men to take it? All

All the imaginable ways of increasing Money in any Country, are these two: Either to dig it in Mines of our own, or get it from our Neighbours. That Four *per Cent.* is not of the nature of the *Dousing-rod*, or *Virgula Divina*, able to discover Mines of Gold and Silver, I believe will easily be granted me. The way of getting from Foreigners, is either by force, borrowing, or trade. And whatever ways besides these, Men may fansie, or propose, for increasing of Money, (except they intend to set up for the Philosophers Stone) would be much the same with a Distracted Man's device that I knew, who, in the beginning of his Distemper first discover'd himself to be out of his Wits, by getting together, and boiling a great number of Groats, with a design, as he said, to make them *plim*, *i. e.* grow thicker. That Four *per Cent.* will Raise Armies, Discipline Soldiers, and make Men Valiant, and fitter to conquer Countries, and inrich themselves with the Spoils, I think was never pretended. And that it will not bring in more of our Neighbours Money upon Loan, than we have at present among us, is so visible in its self, that it will not need any Proof; the contenders for Four *per Cent.* looking upon it as an undeniable Truth, and making use of it as an Argument

ment to shew the advantage it will be to the Nation, by lessening the *Use* paid to Foreigners, who upon falling of *Use* will take home their Money. And for the last way of increasing our Money, by promoting of Trade, how much lowering of *Interest* is the way to that, I have, I suppose, shew'd you already.

Having lately met with a little Tract, Intituled A Letter to a Friend concerning Usury, *Printed this present year* 1690; *which gives in short, the Arguments of some Treatises Printed many years since, for the lowering of* Interest; *It may not be amiss, briefly to consider them.*

1. A *High* Interest *decays Trade. The advantage from* Interest *is greater than the Profit from Trade, which makes the rich Merchants give over, and put out their Stock to* Interest, *and the lesser Merchants Break.*

Answ. This was Printed in 1621, when *Interest* was at 10 *per Cent.* And whether *England* had ever a more flourishing Trade, than at that time, must be left to the judgment of those, who have consider'd the growing Strength and Riches of this Kingdom in Q. *E.* and King *J.* the 1st Reigns. Not that I impute it to high *Interest*, but to other Causes I have mention'd, wherein Usury had nothing to do. But if this be thought an Argument now in 1690, when the legal *Interest* is 6 *per Cent.* I desire those, who think fit to make use of it, to name

name those *rich Merchants*, who have *given over and put out their Stocks* to Intereſt.

2. Intereſt *being at* 10 per Cent. *and in* Holland *at* 6; *our Neighbour Merchants underſel us.*

Anſw. The legal *Intereſt* being here now at 6 *per Cent.* and in *Holland* not limited by Law, our Neighbour Merchans underſel us, becauſe they live more frugally, and are content with leſs profit.

3. *Intereſt being lower in* Holland *than in* England, *their Contributions to War, works of Piety, and all Charges of the State, are cheaper to them than to us.*

Anſw. This needs a little Explication. *Contributions* greater or leſs, I underſtand: but *Contributions cheaper or dearer*, I confeſs I do not. If they manage their Wars and Charges cheaper than we, the blame is not to be laid on high, or low *Intereſt.*

4. Intereſt *being ſo high, prevents the building of Shipping, which is the ſtrength and ſafety of our Iſland, moſt Merchant Ships being built in* Holland.

Anſw. Though this Argument be now gone, ſuch Ships being Prohibited by a Law, I will help the Author to one as good. The *Dutch* buy our Rape-ſeed, make it into Oil, bring it back to us, and ſell it with advantage. This may be as well ſaid to be from high *Intereſt* here, and

low there. But the Truth is, the Industry and Frugality of that People, makes them content to work cheaper, and sell at less profit than their Neighbours, and so get the Trade from them.

5. *The high Rate of Usury makes Land sell so cheap, being not worth more than* 14 *or* 15 *Years Purchase; whereas in* Holland, *where* Interest *is at* 6, *it is worth above* 25. *So that a low* Interest *raises the Price of Land. Where Money is dear Land is cheap.*

Answ. This Argument plainly confesses, That there is something else regulates the Price of Land, besides the Rate of *Interest*; else when Money was at 10 *per Cent.* here, Land should have been at 10 Years Purchase, whereas he confesses it then to have been at 14 or 15. One may suppose, to favour his *Hypothesis*, he was not forward to speak the most of it. And *Interest*, as he says, being at 6 *per Cent.* in *Holland*, Land there should have Sold by that Rule for Sixteen and an half Years Purchase, whereas he says it was worth about Twenty five. And Mr. *Manly* says, (*p.* 33.) *That Money in* France *being at* 7 per Cent. *Noble Land sells for* 34 *and* 35 *Years Purchase, and ordinary Land for* 25. So that the true Conclusion from hence is, not what our Author makes, but this; That 'tis not the legal *Interest*, but something else, that governs

verns the Rate of Land. I grant his Position, That *where Money is dear, Land is cheap*, and *vice versâ*. But it must be so by the natural, not legal *Interest*. For where Money will be lent on good Security at 4 or 5 *per Cent.* 'tis a Demonstration, that there is more than will be ventured on ordinary Credit in Trade. And when this Plenty becomes general, 'tis a sign, there is more Money, than can be imployed in Trade; which cannot but put many upon seeking Purchases, to lay it out in Land, and so raise the Price of Land, by making more Buyers, than Sellers.

6. *'Tis not probable Lenders will call in their Money, when they cannot make greater* Interest *any where. Besides, their Security upon Land will be better.*

Answ. Some unskilful and timorous Men will call in their Money; others put it into the Banker's Hands. But the Bankers and Skilful will keep it up, and not lend it, but at the natural *Use*, as we have shewn. But how Securities will be mended by lowering of *Interest*, is, I confess, beyond my Comprehension.

Of *Raising our* Coin.

BEing now upon the Consideration of *Interest* and *Money*, give me leave to say one Word more on this occasion, which may not be wholly unseasonable at this time. I hear a Talk up and down of *raising our Money*, as a means to retain our Wealth, and keep our Money from being carried away. I wish those that use the Phrase of *raising our Money*, had some clear Notion annexed to it; and that then they would examine, Whether, that being true, it would at all serve to those Ends, for which it is propos'd.

The *raising of Money* then signifies one of these two things; either *raising the Value* of our Money, or *raising the Denomination* of our Coin.

The *raising of the Value* of Money, or any thing else, is nothing, but the making a less quantity of it exchange for any other thing, than would have been taken for it before. *v. g.* If 5 *s.* will exchange for, or, (as we call it) buy a Bushel of Wheat; if you can make 4 *s.* buy another Bushel of the same Wheat, it is plain the *Value* of your Money is *raised*, in respect of Wheat

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One Fifth. But thus nothing can *raiſe* or *fall the value* of your Money, but the proportion of its Plenty, or Scarcity, in proportion to the Plenty, Scarcity, or Vent of any other Commodity, with which you compare it, or for which you would exchange it. And thus Silver, which makes the Intrinſick Value of Money, compar'd with it ſelf, under any Stamp or Denomination of the ſame or different Countries, cannot be *raiſed*. For an Ounce of Silver, whether in *Pence*, *Groats*, or *Crown* Pieces, *Stivers* or *Ducatoons*, or in Bullion, is and always eternally will be of equal Value to any other Ounce of Silver, under what Stamp or Denomination ſoever; unleſs it can be ſhewn that any Stamp can add any new and better qualities to one parcel of Silver, which another parcel of Silver wants.

Silver therefore being always of equal Value to *Silver*, the *value of Coin*, compar'd with Coin, is greater, leſs, or equal, only as it has more, leſs or equal *Silver* in it: And in this reſpect, you can by no manner of way raiſe or fall your Money. Indeed moſt of the Silver of the World, both in Money and Veſſels being alloy'd, (*i. e.* mixed with ſome baſer Metals) *fine Silver* (*i. e.* Silver ſeparated from all *Alloy*) is uſually dearer than ſo much Silver

alloy'd, or mixed with baſer Metals. Becauſe, beſides the Weight of the Silver, thoſe who have need of fine (*i. e.* unmix'd Silver; as Gilders, Wyre-drawers, *&c.*) muſt according to their need, beſides an equal Weight of Silver mixed with other Metals, give an Overplus to reward the Refiner's Skill and Pains. And in this Caſe, *fine Silver*, and *alloy'd* or mixed Silver are conſidered as two diſtinct Commodities. But no Money being Coin'd of pure fine Silver, this concerns not the Value of Money at all; wherein an equal quantity of Silver is always of the ſame Value with an equal quantity of Silver, let the Stamp, or Denomination be what it will.

All then that can be done in this great myſtery of *Raiſing Money*, is only to *alter the Denomination*, and call that a Crown now, which before by the Law was but a part of a Crown. For Example: Suppoſing, according to the Standard of our Law, 5 *s.* or a Crown, were to weigh an Ounce, (as it does now, wanting about 16 Grains) whereof one twelfth were Copper, and eleven twelfths Silver, (for there-abouts it is) 'tis plain here 'tis the quantity of Silver gives the Value to it. For let another Piece be Coin'd of the ſame Weight, wherein half the Silver is taken out, and Copper or other Alloy put into the place,

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every one knows it will be worth but half as much. For the Value of the Alloy is so inconsiderable as not to be reckoned. This Crown now must be rais'd, and from henceforth our Crown Pieces Coin'd one Twentieth lighter; which is nothing but changing the Denomination, calling that a Crown now, which yesterday was but a part, *viz.* Nineteen twentieths of a Crown; whereby you have only raised 19 parts to the Denomination formerly given to 20. For I think no body can be so senseless, as to imagine, that, 19 Grains or Ounces of Silver can be raised to the Value of 20; or that 19 Grains or Ounces of Silver shall at the same time exchange for, or buy as much Corn, Oyl, or Wine, as 20; which is to raise it to the *Value* of 20. For if 19 Ounces of Silver can be worth 20 Ounces of Silver, or pay for as much of any other Commodity, then 18, 10, or 1 Ounce may do the same. For if the abating One twentieth of the quantity of the Silver of any Coin, does not lessen its Value, the abating Nineteen twentieths of the quantity of the Silver of any Coin, will not abate its Value. And so a single Threepence, or a single Penny, being call'd a Crown, will buy as much Spice, or Silk, or any other Commodity, as a Crown-piece, which contains 20 or 60 times as much Silver; which

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is an Absurdity so great, That I think no body will want Eyes to see, and Sense to disown.

Now, this *raising your Money*, or giving a less quantity of Silver the Stamp and Denomination of a greater, may be done two ways.

1. By raising *one Species* of your Money.

2. By raising *all your Silver Coin* at once, proportionably; which is the thing I suppos'd, now propos'd.

1. The raising of *one Species* of your Coin, beyond its intrinsick Value, is done by Coining any one Species, (which in account bears such a proportion to the other *Species* of your Coin) with less Silver in it, than is required by that value it bears in your Money.

For Example, A *Crown* with us goes for 60 Pence, a *Shilling* for 12 Pence, a *Tester* for 6 Pence, and a *Groat* for 4 Pence: And accordingly, the proportion of Silver in each of them, ought to be at 60. 12. 6. and 4. Now, if in the Mint there should be Coin'd *Groats*, or *Testers*, that being of the same Alloy with our other Money, had but Two thirds of the Weight, that those Species are Coin'd at now; or else, being of the same Weight, were so alloy'd as to have

have One third of the Silver required by the present Standard chang'd into Copper; and should thus, by Law, be made Current; (the rest of your Silver Money being kept to the present Standard in Weight and Fineness) 'tis plain, those Species would be raising One third part; that passing for 6*d* which had but the Silver of 4*d* in it; and would be all one as if a *Groat* should by Law be made Current for 6*d*; and every 6*d* in payment pass for 9*d*. This is truly raising these Species: But is no more in effect, than if the Mint should Coin clip'd Money. And has, besides the Cheat that is put, by such base or light Money, on every particular Man, that receives it, that he wants One third of that real value which the Publick ought to secure him, in the Money, it obliges him to receive as Lawful and Current; It has, I say, this great and unavoidable inconvenience to the Publick, That, besides the opportunities it gives to Domestick Coiners to Cheat you with lawful Money, it puts it into the Hands of Foreigners to fetch away your Money without any Commodities for it. For if they find that Two-Penny weight of Silver, marked with a certain Impression, shall here in *England* be equivalent to 3*d* weight mark'd with another Impression; they will not fail to stamp Pieces of that

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Fashion; and so Importing that base and low Coin, will, here in *England*, receive 3 *d* for 2 *d*, and quickly carry away your Silver in exchange for Copper, or barely the charge of Coynage.

This is unavoidable in all Countries where any one *Species* of their Money is disproportionate in its intrinsick Value, (*i. e.* in its due proportion of Silver to the rest of the Money of that Country) an inconvenience so certainly attending the allowance of any base Species of Money to be Current, that the King of *France* could not avoid it, with all his watchfulness. For though, by Edict, he made his 4 *Sols* Pieces, (whereof 15 were to pass for a *French* Crown, though 20 of them had not so much Silver in them, as was in a *French* Crown Piece) pass in the Inland parts of his Kingdom, 15 for a Crown in all Payments; yet he durst not make them Current in his Sea-port Towns, for fear, that should give an opportunity to their Importation. But yet this Caution served not the turn. They were still Imported; and, by this means, a great loss and damage brought upon his Country. So that he was forced to cry them down, and sink them to near their intrinsick Value. Whereby a great many particular Men, who had quantities of that Species in their Hands, lost a great part of

of their Eſtates; and every one that had any, loſt proportionably by it.

If we had *Groats* or *Six-Pences* Current by Law, amongſt us, that wanted One third of the Silver which they now have by the Standard, to make them of equal Value to our other Species of Money; who can imagine, that our Neigbours would not preſently pour in quantities of ſuch Money upon us, to the great loſs and prejudice of the Kingdom? The *quantity* of Silver that is in each Piece or Species of Coin, being that, which makes it real and intrinſick Value, the due proportions of Silver ought to be kept in each Species, according to the reſpective Rate ſet on each of them by Law. And when this is ever varied from, it is but a Trick to ſerve ſome preſent occaſion; but is always with loſs to the Country where the Trick is play'd.

2. The other way of *raiſing Money* is by *raiſing all your Silver Coin at once*, the proportion of a *Crown*, a *Shilling*, and a *Penny*, in reference to one another, being ſtill kept, (*viz.* That a *Shilling* ſhall weigh One fifth of a *Crown* Piece, and a *Penny* weigh One twelfth of a *Shilling*, in Standard Silver) But out of every one of theſe, you abate One twentieth of the Silver, they were wont to have in them.

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If *all the Species* of Money, be, as 'tis call'd *raiſed* by making each of them to have One twentieth leſs of Silver in them than formerly; and ſo your whole Money be lighter than it was: Theſe following will be ſome of the conſequences of it.

8. It will *rob* all *Creditors* of One twentieth (or 5 *per Cent.*) of their Debts, and all Landlords One twentieth of their quit Rents for ever; and in all other Rents as far as their former Contracts reach, of 5 *per Cent.* of their yearly Income; and this without any advantage to the Debtor, or Farmer. For he receiving no more pounds Sterling for his Land or Commodities, in this new lighter Coin, than he ſhould have done of your old and weightier Money, gets nothing by it. If you ſay yes, he will receive more *Crown*, *Half-Crown*, and *Shilling* Pieces, for what he now Sells for new Money, than he ſhould have done if the Money of the old Standard had continued; you confeſs your Money is not *raiſed* in Value, but in Denomination; ſince what your new Pieces want in Weight, muſt now be made up in their number. But which way ſoever this falls, 'tis certain, the Publick (which moſt Men think, ought to be the only reaſon of changing a ſettled Law, and diſturbing the

the common current courſe of things) receives not the leaſt Profit by it: Nay, as we ſhall ſee by and by, it will be a great Charge and Loſs to the Kingdom. But this, at firſt ſight, is viſible; That in all Payments to be received upon precedent Contracts, if your Money be in effect raiſed, the Receiver will loſe 5 *per Cent.* For Money having been Lent, and Leaſes and other Bargains made, when Money was of the ſame Weight and Fineneſs that it is now, upon Confidence that under the ſame names of *Pounds*, *Shillings* and *Pence*, they ſhould receive the ſame *value*, *i. e.* the ſame *quantity* of Silver) by giving the denomination now to leſs quantities of Silver by One twentieth, you take from them 5 *per Cent.* of their due.

When Men go to Market to buy any other Commodities with their new, but lighter Money, they will find 20*s.* of their new Money will buy no more of any Commodity than 19 would before. For it not being the denomination but the *quantity* of Silver, that gives the value to any Coin, 19 Grains or parts of Silver, however denominated or marked, will no more be worth, or paſs for, or buy ſo much of any other Commodity as 20 Grains of Silver will, than 19*s.* will paſs for 20*s.* If any one thinks a Shilling or a Crown

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in name has its value from the *denomination*, and not from the *quantity of Silver* in it, let it be tried; and hereafter let a *Penny* be called a *Shilling*, or a *Shilling* be called a *Crown*. I believe no body would be content to receive his Debts or Rents in such Money: Which though the Law should raise thus, yet he foresees he should lose Eleven twelfths by the one, and by the other Four fifths of the value he received; and would find his new Shilling, which had no more Silver in it than One twelfth of what a Shilling had before, would buy him of Corn, Cloth, or Wine but One twelfth of what an old Shilling would. This is as plainly so in the *raising*, as you call it, your Crown to 5 *s.* and 3 *d.* or (which is the same thing) making your Crown One twentieth lighter in Silver. The only difference is, that the loss is so great, (it being Eleven twelfths) that every body sees, and abhors it at first proposal; but in the other (it being but One twentieth, and covered with the deceitful name of *raising* our Money) People do not so readily observe it. If it be good to *raise* the Crown Piece this way One twentieth this Week, I suppose it will be as good and profitable to raise it as much again the next Week. For there is no reason, why it will not be as good to *raise* it again another One twenti-

twentieth the next Week, and so on; wherein, if you proceed but 10 Weeks successively, you will by New-Years-Day next have every Half-Crown raised to a Crown, to the loss of one half of Peoples Debts and Rents, and the King's Revenue, besides the Confusion of all your affairs: And if you please to go on in this beneficial way of *raising* your Money, you may by the same Art bring a Penny-weight of Silver to be a Crown.

Silver, i. e. the *quantity* of pure Silver separable from the Alloy, makes the real *value* of Money. If it does not, Coin Copper with the same Stamp and denomination, and see whether it will be of the same value. I suspect your Stamp will make it of no more worth, than the Copper-Money of *Ireland* is, which is its weight in Copper, and no more. That Money lost so much to *Ireland*, as it passed for above the rate of Copper. But yet I think no body suffered so much by it as he, by whose Authority it was made current.

If Silver give the value, you will say what *need* is there then *of* the charge of *Coinage?* May not Men Exchange Silver by Weight, for other things; make their Bargains, and keep their Accounts in Silver by weight? This might be done, but it has these inconveniencies.

1. The *weighing of Silver* to every one we had occasion to pay it to, would be very troublesome, for every one must carry about Scales in his Pocket.

2. Scales would not do the business. For, in the next place, every one cannot distinguish between *fine* and *mix'd Silver*: So that though he received the full weight, he was not sure he received the full weight of Silver; since there might be a mixture of some of the baser Metals, which he was not able to discern. Those who have had the care, and government of Politick Societies, introduced Coinage, as a remedy to those two inconveniencies. The *Stamp* was a *Warranty* of the publick, that under such a denomination they should receive a piece of such a weight, and such a fineness; that is, they should receive so much Silver. And this is the reason why the counterfeiting the Stamp is made the highest Crime, and has the weight of Treason laid upon it: Because *the Stamp is the publick voucher* of the intrinsick value. The Royal Authority gives the stamp; the Law allows and confirms the denomination: And both together give, as it were, the publick faith, as a security, that Sums of Money contracted for under such denominations, shall be of such a value, that is, shall have in them so much Silver. For 'tis Silver and not Names that pay

pay Debts and purchaſe Commodities. If therefore I have contracted for Twenty Crowns, and the Law then has required, that each of thoſe Crowns ſhould have an Ounce of Silver; 'tis certain my Bargain is not made good, I am defrauded (and whether the publick faith be not broken with me, I leave to be conſidered) if, paying me Twenty Crowns, the Law allows them to be ſuch as have but Nineteen twentieths of the Silver, they ought to have, and really had in them, when I made my Contract.

2. It diminiſhes all the King's Revenue 5 *per Cent.* For though the ſame number of Pounds, Shillings, and Pence are paid into the Exchequer as were wont, yet theſe Names being given to Coin that have each of them One twentieth leſs of Silver in them; and that being not a ſecret concealed from Strangers, no more than from his own Subjects, they will ſell the King no more Pitch, Tarr, or Hemp, for 20 Shillings, after the *raiſing* your Money, than they would before for 19: or, to ſpeak in the ordinary phraſe, they will raiſe their Commodities 5 *per Cent.* as you have rais'd your Money 5 *per Cent:* And 'tis well if they ſtop there. For uſually in ſuch changes, an out-cry being made of your leſſening your Coin, thoſe who have to deal with

you, taking the advantage of the allarm, to ſecure themſelves from any loſs by your new Trick, raiſe their price even beyond the *Par* of your leſſening your Coin.

I hear of two inconveniencies complained of, which 'tis propoſed by this project to Remedy.

The one is, The *melting down of our Coin*: The other, The *carrying away of our Bullion*. Theſe are both inconveniencies which, I fear, we lie under: But neither of them will be in the leaſt removed or prevented by the propoſed alteration of our Money.

1. It is paſt doubt that our *Money is melted down*. The Reaſon whereof is evidently the cheapneſs of Coinage. For a Tax on Wine paying the Coinage, the particular Owners pay nothing for it. So that 100 Ounces of *Silver Coin'd*, comes to the Owner at the ſame Rate, as 100 Ounces of Standard Silver in *Bullion*. For delivering into the Mint his Silver in Bars, he has the ſame quantity of Silver delivered out to him again in Coin, without any Charges to him. Whereby, if at any time he has occaſion for Bullion, 'tis the ſame thing to melt down our mill'd Money, as to buy *Bullion* from abroad, or take it in Exchange for other Commodities. Thus our *Mint* to the only advantage of our Officers, but at the publick coſt, *La-*

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bours in Vain, as will be found. But yet this makes you not have one jot leſs Money in *England*, than you would have otherwiſe; but only makes you Coin that, which otherwiſe would not have been Coin'd, nor perhaps been brought hither: And being not brought hither by an over-ballance of your Exportation, cannot ſtay when it is here. It is not any ſort of Coinage, does, or can keep your Money here: That wholly and only depends upon the Ballance of your Trade. And had all the Money in King *Charles* the II. and King *James* the II. time, been Minted according to this new propoſal, this rais'd Money would have been gone as well as the other, and the remainder been no more, nor no leſs than it is now. Though I doubt not but the Mint would have Coin'd as much of it as it has of our preſent mill'd Money. The ſhort is this. An over-ballance of Trade with *Spain* brings you in Bullion; cheap Coinage, when it is here, carries it into the Mint, and Money is made of it; but if your Exportation will not Ballance your Importation in the other parts of your Trade, away muſt your Silver go again, whether Monied or not Monied. For where Goods do not, Silver muſt pay for the Commodities you ſpend.

That this is so will appear by the Books of the Mint, where may be seen how much mill'd Money has been Coin'd in the two last Reigns. And in a Paper I have now in my Hands, (supposed written by a Man not wholly ignorant in the Mint) 'tis confessed, That whereas One third of the Current Payments were some time since of mill'd Money, there is not now One twentieth. Gone then it is. But let not any one mistake and think it gone, because in our present Coinage, an Ounce wanting about 16 Grains is denominated a Crown: Or that (as is now proposed) an Ounce wanting about 40 Grains, being Coin'd in one piece, and denominated a Crown, would have stop'd it, or will (if our Money be so alter'd) for the future fix it here. Coin what quantity of Silver you please, in one piece, and give it the denomination of a Crown; when your Money is to go, to pay your Foreign Debts, (or else it will not go out at all) your heavy Money, (*i. e.* that which is weight according to its Denomination, by the Standard of the Mint) will be that, which will be melted down, or carried away in Coin by the Exporter, whether the pieces of each Species be by the Law bigger or less. For whilst Coinage is wholly paid for by a Tax, whatever your size of Money be,

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he that has need of Bullion to send beyond Sea, or of Silver to make Plate, need but take mill'd Money, and melt it down, and he has it as cheap, as if it were in pieces of Eight, or other Silver coming from abroad; the Stamp, which so well secures the weight and fineness of the mill'd Money, costing nothing at all.

To this perhaps will be said, That if this be the effect of mill'd Money, that it is so apt to be melted down, it were better to return to the old way of *Coining by the Hammer*. To which I Answer by no means. For,

1. Coinage by the Hammer less secures you from having a great part of your Money melted down. For in that way there being a greater inequality in the weight of the Pieces, some being too heavy, and some too light, those who know how to make their advantage of it, *cull* out the heavy pieces, melt them down, and make a benefit of the over-weight.

2. Coinage by the *Hammer* exposes you much more to the danger of *false Coin*. Because the Tools are easily made and concealed, and the work carried on with fewer Hands, and less noise than a Mill; whereby false Coiners are less liable to discovery.

3. The pieces not being ſo round, even, and fairly Stamp'd, nor Mark'd on the Edges, are expos'd to *Clipping*, which mill'd Money is not.

Mill'd Money is therefore certainly beſt for the Publique, But whatever be the cauſe of melting down our Mill'd-money, I do not ſee how raiſing our Money (as they call it) will at all hinder its being melted down. For if our Crown-pieces ſhould be Coin'd One twentieth lighter. Why ſhould that hinder them from being melted down more than now? The intrinſique value of the Silver is not alter'd, as we have ſhewn already: Therefore that temptation to melt them down remains the ſame as before.

But they are lighter by One twentieth. That cannot hinder them from being melted down. For Half Crowns are lighter by half, and yet that preſerves them not.

But they are of leſs weight, under the ſame denomination, and therefore they will not be melted down. That is true, if any of theſe preſent Crowns that are One twentieth heavier, are current for Crowns at the ſame time. For then they will no more melt down the new light Crowns, than they will the old Clip'd ones, which are more worth in Coin, and Tale, than in Weight and Bullion. But it cannot be

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ſuppos'd that Men will part with their old and heavier Money, at the ſame Rate that the lighter new Coin goes at; and pay away their old Crowns for 5 *s.* in Tale, when at the Mint they will yield them 5 *s.* 3 *d.* And then if an old Mill'd Crown goes for 5 *s.* 3 *d.* and a new Mill'd Crown (being ſo much lighter) go for a Crown, What I pray will be the odds of melting down the one or the other? The one has One twentieth leſs Silver in it, and goes for One twentieth leſs; and ſo being weight, they are melted down upon equal terms. If it be a convenience to melt one, it will, be as much a convenience to melt the other: Juſt as it is the ſame convenience, to melt Mill'd Half Crowns as Mill'd Crowns; the one having with half the quantity of Silver, half the value. When the Money is all brought to the new rate, *i. e.* to be One twentieth lighter, and Commodities raiſed as they will proportionably, What ſhall hinder the melting down of your Money then, more than now, I would fain know? If it be Coin'd then as it is now *Gratis*, a Crown-piece, (let it be of what weight ſoever) will be as it is now, juſt worth its own weight in Bullion, of the ſame fineneſs for the Coinage, which is the manufactury about it, and makes all the difference, coſting nothing, what can

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make the difference of value? And therefore, whoever wants Bullion, will as cheaply melt down these new Crowns, as buy Bullion with them. The raising of your Money cannot then (the Act for free Coinage standing) hinder its being melted down.

Nor, in the next place, much less can it, as it is pretended, hinder the Exportation of our Bullion. Any denomination or stamp we shall give to Silver here, will neither give Silver a higher value in *England*, nor make it less prized abroad. So much Silver will always be worth (as we have already shew'd) so much Silver given in exchange one for another. Nor will it, when in your Mint a less quantity of it is raised to a higher denomination (as when Nineteen twentieths of an Ounce has the denomination of a Crown, which formerly belong'd only to the whole 20) be one jot rais'd, in respect of any other Commodity.

You have *rais'd the denomination* of your stamp'd Silver One twentieth, or which is all one 5 *per Cent.* And Men will presently *raise their Commodities* 5 *per Cent.* So that if yesterday 20 Crowns would exchange for 20 Bushels of Wheat, or 20 Yards of a certain sort of Cloth, if you will to day Coin current Crowns One twentieth lighter

er, and make them the Standard, you will find 20 Crowns will exchange for but 19 Bushels of Wheat, or 19 Yards of that Cloth, which will be just as much Silver for a Bushel, as yesterday. So that Silver being of no more real value, by your changing your denomination, and giving it to a less quantity; this will no more bring in, or keep your Bullion here, than if you had done nothing. If this were otherwise, you would be beholden (as some People foolishly imagine) to the *Clippers* for keeping your Money. For if keeping the old denomination to a less quantity of Silver, be raising your Money (as in effect it is all that is, or can be done in it by this project of making your Coin lighter) the *Clippers* have sufficiently done that: And if their Trade go on a little while longer, at the rate it has of late, and your Mill'd-money be melted down and carried away, and no more Coin'd; your Money will, without the charge of new Coinage, be, by that sort of Artificers, raised above 5 *per Cent.* when all your current Money shall be Clipped, and made above One twentieth lighter than the Standard, preserving still its former denomination.

It will possibly be here objected to me, That we see 100 *l.* of *Clip'd Money*, above 5 *per Cent.* lighter than the Standard, will buy

buy as much Corn, Cloth, or Wine, as 100 *l.* in *Mill'd-money*, which is above One twentieth heavier: Whereby it is evident, that my Rule fails, and that it is not the quantity of Silver, that gives the value to Money, but its Stamp and Denomination. To which I Answer, That *Men make their Estimate and Contracts according to the Standard*, upon Supposition they shall receive good and lawful Money, which is that of full Weight: And so in effect they do, whil'st they receive the current Money of the Country. For since 100 *l.* of *Clip'd Money* will pay a Debt of 100 *l.* as well as the weightiest *Mill'd-money*, and a new Crown out of the Mint will pay for no more Flesh, Fruit, or Cloth, than five clip'd Shillings; 'tis evident that they are equivalent as to the Purchase of any thing here at home, whil'st no body scruples to take Five clip'd Shillings in exchange for a weighty Mill'd Crown. But this will be quite otherwise as soon as you change your Coin, and (to raise it as you call it) make your Money One twentieth lighter in the Mint; for then no body will any more give an old Crown of the former Standard for one of the new, than he will now give you 5 *s.* and 3 *d.* for a Crown: for so much then his old Crown will yield him at the Mint.

Clip'd and *unclip'd Money* will always buy

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an equal quantity of any thing else, as long as they will without scruple change one for another. And this makes, that the Foreign Merchant, who comes to sell his Goods to you, always counts upon the value of your Money by the Silver that is in it, and estimates the quantity of Silver by the Standard of your Mint; though perhaps by reason of clip'd or worn Money amongst it, any sum that is ordinarily received is much lighter than the Standard, and so has less Silver in it than what is in a like Sum new Coin'd in the Mint. But whilst *clip'd* and *weighty* Money will equally change one for another, it is all one to him whether he receive his Money in clip'd Money or no, so it be but current. For if he buy other Commodities here with his Money, whatever Sum he contracts for, *clip'd* as well as *weighty* Money equally pays for it. If he would carry away the Price of his Commodity in ready Cash, 'tis easily changed into weighty Money: And then he has not only the Sum in tale, that he contracted for, but the quantity of Silver he expected for his Commodities, according to the Standard of our Mint. If the *quantity of your clip'd Money* be once grown so great, that the Foreign Merchant cannot (if he has a mind to it) easily get *Weighty* Money for it, but having sold his Mer-

Merchandiſe, and received *Clip'd* Money finds a difficulty to procure what is weight for it; he will, in ſelling his Goods, either contract to be paid in *weighty* Money, or elſe raiſe the Price of his Commodities, according to the diminiſh'd quantity of Silver in your Current Coin.

In *Holland*, (*Ducatoons* being the beſt Money of the Country, as well as the largeſt Coin) Men in Payments, received and paid thoſe indifferently, with the other Money of the Country, till of late the Coining of other *Species* of Money, of *baſer Alloy*, and in greater quantities, having made the *Ducatoons*, either by melting down, or Exportation, ſcarcer than formerly, it became difficult to change the baſer Money into *Ducatoons*; and ſince that, no body will pay a Debt in *Ducatoons*, unleſs he be allowed Half *per Cent.* or more, above the value they were Coin'd for.

To underſtand this, we muſt take notice, That *Guilders* is the denomination, that in *Holland* they uſually compute by, and make their Contracts in. A *Ducatoon* formely paſſed at Three *Guilders*, and Three *Stuyvers*, or Sixty-three *Stuyvers*. There were then (ſome Years ſince) began to be Coin'd another Piece, which was call'd a *Three Guilders Piece*, and was order'd to paſs for Three *Guilders* or Sixty

Stuyvers.

Stuyers. But 21 *Three Guilders Pieces*, which were to pass for 63 *Guilders*, not having so much Silver in them as 20 *Ducatoons*, which passed for the same Sum of 63 *Guilders*; the *Ducatoons* were either melted down in their Mints, (for the making of these *Three Guilder Pieces*, or yet baser Money, with Profit) or were carried away by Foreign Merchants; who when they carried back the Product of their Sale in Money, would be sure to receive their Payment of the number of *Guilders* they contracted for in *Ducatoons*, or change the Money they received, into *Ducatoons*; Whereby they carried home more Silver, than if they had taken their Payment in *Three Guilder Pieces*, or any other *Species*. Thus *Ducatoons* became scarce. So that now he that will be paid in *Ducatoons* must allow Half *per Cent.* for them. And therefore the Merchants, when they Sell any thing now, either make their Bargain to be paid in *Ducatoons*, or if they contract for *Guilders* in general, (which will be sure to be paid them in the baser Money of the Country,) they raise the Price of their Commodities accordingly.

By this example in a Neighbour Country we may see, how our new Mill'd Money goes away. When Foreign Trade Imports more than our Commodities will

pay

pay for, 'tis certain, we must contract Debts beyond Sea, and those must be paid with Money, when either we cannot furnish, or they will not take our Goods to discharge them. To have Money beyond Sea to pay our Debts, when our Commodities do not raise it, there is no other way but to send it thither. And since a weighty *Crown* costs no more here than a light one; and our Coin beyond Sea, is valued no otherwise than according to the quantity of Silver it has in it, whether we send it in Specie, or whether we melt it down here, to send it in Bullion (which is the safest way as being not Prohibited) *the weightiest is sure to go.* But when so great a quantity of your Money is *Clip'd*, or so great a part of your weighty Money is carried away, that the Foreign Merchant, or his Factor here cannot have his Price paid in weighty Money, or such as will easily be changed into it, then every one will see, (*when Men will no longer take Five clip'd Shillings for a Mill'd or weighty Crown*) that it is the quantity of Silver that buys Commodities and Pays Debts, and not the Stamp and Denomination which is put upon it. And then too it will be seen, what a Robbery is committ'd on the Publick by Clipping. Every Grain diminished from the just weight of our Money, is so much loss

to

to the Nation; which will, one time or other, be ſenſibly felt: And which, if it be not taken care of, and ſpeedily ſtopt will, in that enormous courſe it is now in, quickly, I fear, break out into open ill effects; and at one blow, deprive us of a great part, (perhaps, near One fourth) of our Money. For that will be really the caſe, when the increaſe of *Clip'd* Money makes it hard to get weighty; when Men begin to put a difference of value between that which is weighty, and light Money; and will not Sell their Commodities, but for Mony that is Weight; and will make their Bargains accordingly.

Let the Country Gentleman, when it comes to that paſs, conſider, what the decay of his Eſtate will be, when receiving his Rent in the Tale of *Clip'd* Shillings, according to his Bargain, he cannot get them to paſs at Market for more than their Weight. And he that Sells him *Salt* or *Silk*, will bargain for 5 *s.* ſuch a quantity, if he pays him in fair weighty Coin, but in *Clip'd* Money he will not take under 5*s.* 3*d.* Here you ſee you have your Money without this new trick of Coinage, raiſed 5 *per Cent.* But whether to any advantage of the Kingdom, I leave every one to judge.

Hitherto we have only conſidered the *raiſing of Silver Coin*, and that has been

only by Coining it with leſs Silver in it, under the ſame Denomination. There is another way yet of raiſing Money which has ſomething more of reality, though as little good as the former in it. This too, now that we are upon the Chapter of *Raiſing of Money*, it may not be unſeaſonable to open a little. The *raiſing* I mean is, when either of the two richer Metals, (which Money is uſually made of) is by Law raiſed above its natural value, in reſpect of the other. *Gold* and *Silver*, have, in almoſt all Ages, and parts of the World (where Money was uſed) generally been thought the fitteſt Materials to make it of. But there being a great diſproportion in the Plenty of theſe Metals in the World, one has always been valued much higher than the other; ſo that one Ounce of *Gold* has exchanged for ſeveral Ounces of *Silver*: As at preſent, our *Guinea* paſſing for 21 *s.* 6 *d.* in Silver, Gold is now about Fifteen and an half times more worth than Silver; there being about Fifteen and an half times more Silver in 21 *s.* 6*d.* than there is Gold in a *Guinea*. This being now the Market Rate of *Gold* to *Silver*; if by an eſtabliſhed Law the Rate of *Guinea's* ſhould be ſet higher, (as to 22 *s.* 6 *d.*) they would be raiſed indeed, but to the loſs of the Kingdom. For by

by this Law *Gold being rais'd 5 per Cent.* above its natural true value, Foreigners would find it worth while to ſend their Gold hither, and ſo fetch away our Silver at 5 *per Cent.* profit, and ſo much loſs to us. For when ſo much Gold as would purchaſe but 100 Ounces of Silver any where elſe, will in *England* purchaſe the Merchant 105 Ounces, what ſhall hinder him from bringing his Gold to ſo good a Market; And either Selling it at the Mint, where it will yield ſo much, or having it Coin'd into *Guinea's*: And then (going to Market with his *Guinea's*) he may buy our Commodities at the advantage of 5 *per Cent.* in the very ſort of his Money; or change them into Silver, and carry that away with him?

On the other ſide, if by a Law you would *raiſe your Silver Money* and make 4 Crowns or 20 *s.* in Silver, equal to a Guinea, at which rate I ſuppoſe it was firſt Coin'd; ſo that by your Law a *Guinea* ſhould paſs but for 20 *s.* the ſame inconvenincy would follow. For then ſtrangers would bring in Silver, and carry away your Gold, which was to be had here at a lower rate than any where elſe.

If you ſay, that this inconvenience is not to be fear'd; for that as ſoon as People found, that Gold began to grow ſcarce, or that it was more worth than the Law

ſet upon it, they would not then part with it at the Statute-rate; as we ſee, the broad pieces that were Coined in K. *James* I. time for 20 *s.* no body will now part with under 23 *s.* or more, according to the Market value. This I grant is true; and it does plainly confeſs the fooliſhneſs of making a Law, which cannot produce the effect, it is made for: As indeed it will not, when you would raiſe the price of Silver in reſpect of Gold, above its natural Market value: For then, as we ſee in our Gold, the price of it will raiſe it ſelf. But on the other ſide, if you ſhould by a Law ſet the value of Gold above its *Par*, then People would be bound to receive it at that high rate, and ſo part with their Silver at an under value. But ſuppoſing that having a mind to *raiſe your Silver in reſpect of Gold*, you make a Law to do it; what comes of that? If your Law prevail, only this; that as much as you raiſe Silver, you debaſe Gold (for they are in the condition of two things put in oppoſite Scales, as much as the one riſes the other falls) and then your *Gold will be carried away*, with ſo much clear loſs to the Kingdom as you raiſe Silver and debaſe Gold by your Law, below their natural value. If you *raiſe Gold in proportion to Silver* the ſame effect follows.

I ſay,

I say, *Raise Silver in respect of Gold; and Gold in proportion to Silver.* For when you would raise the value of Money, phansie what you will, 'tis but in respect of something you would change it for, and is done only when you can make a less *quantity* of the Metal, which your Money is made of, change for a greater quantity of that thing which you would raise it to.

The effect indeed and ill consequence of raising either of these two Metals, in respect of the other is more easily observed and sooner found in rasing *Gold* than *Silver* Coin: Because your accounts being kept, and your reckonings all made in Pounds, Shillings, and Pence, which are denominations of Silver Coins, or numbers of them; if Gold be made current at a rate above the free and Market value of those two Metals, every one will easily perceive the inconvenience. But there being a Law for it, you cannot refuse the Gold in Payment for so much. And all the Money or Bullion People will carry beyond Sea from you, will be in Silver, and the Money or Bullion brought in, will be in Gold. And the same just will happen when your *Silver* is *raised* and *Gold debased* in respect of one another, beyond their true and natural proportion: (*Natural proportion or value* I call that respective rate they find any

where without the preſcription of Law) For then Silver will be that which is brought in, and Gold will be carried out; and that ſtill with loſs to the Kingdom, anſwerable to the over-value, ſet by the Law. Only as ſoon as the miſchief is felt, people will (do what you can) *raiſe their Gold* to its natural value. For your accounts and bargains being made in the denomination of Silver-money; if, when Gold is *raiſed* above its proportion, by the Law, you can not refuſe it in Payment (as if the Law ſhould make a *Guinea* current at 22 *s.* and 6 *d.*) you are bound to take it at that rate in Payment. But if the Law ſhould make *Guinea's* current at 20 *s.* he that has them is not bound to Pay them away at that rate, but may keep them if he pleaſes, or get more for them if he can: Yet from ſuch a Law, one of theſe three things will follow. Either 1ſt, the Law forces them to go at 20 *s.* and then being found paſſing at that rate, Foreigners make their advantage of it: Or 2*ly*, People keep them up and will not part with them at the legal rate, underſtanding them really to be worth more, and then all your Gold lies dead, and is of no more uſe to Trade, than if it were all gone out of the Kingdom: Or 3*dly*, It paſſes for more than the Law allows, and then your Law ſignifies nothing,

and

and had been better let alone. Which way ever it ſucceeds it proves either prejudicial or ineffectual. If the deſign of your Law take place, the Kingdom loſes by it: If the inconvenience be felt and avoided, your Law is eluded.

Money is the *meaſure* of Commerce, and of the rate of every thing, and therefore *ought to be kept (as all other meaſures) as ſteady and invariable as may be.* But this cannot be, if your *Money* be made *of two Metals*, whoſe proportion, and conſequently whoſe price, conſtantly varies in reſpect of one another. *Silver*, for many Reaſons, is the *fitteſt* of all Metals to be this meaſure, and therefore generally made uſe of for Money. But then it is very unfit and inconvenient, that *Gold*, or any other Metal, ſhould be made current Legal Money, at a ſtanding ſettled Rate. This is to ſet a Rate upon the varying value of Things by Law, which juſtly cannot be done; and is, as I have ſhewed, as far as it prevails, a conſtant damage and prejudice to the Country, where it is practiſed. Suppoſe Fifteen to one be now the exact *Par* between *Gold* and *Silver*; What Law can make it laſting; and eſtabliſh it ſo, that next Year, or twenty Years hence, this ſhall be the juſt value of *Gold* to *Silver*, and that one Ounce of Gold ſhall be juſt

worth fifteen Ounces of Silver, neither more nor less? 'Tis possible, the *East-India* Trade sweeping away great Sums of Gold, may make it scarcer in *Europe*. Perhaps the *Guinea* Trade, and Mines of *Peru*, affording it in greater abundance, may make it more plentiful; and so its value in respect of Silver, come on the one side to be as sixteen, or on the other as fourteen to one. And can any Law you shall make alter this proportion here, when it is so every where else round about you? If your Law set it at fifteen, when it is at the free Market Rate, in the Neighbouring Countries, as sixteen to one; Will they not send hither their Silver to fetch away your Gold at One sixteen loss to you? Or if you will keep its Rate to Silver, as fifteen to one, when in *Holland*, *France*, and *Spain*, its Market value is but fourteen; Will they not send hither their Gold, and fetch away your Silver at One fifteen loss to you? This is unavoidable, if you will make Money of both Gold and Silver at the same time, and set Rates upon them by Law in respect of one another.

What then? (Will you be ready to say) would you have Gold kept out of *England*? Or being here, would you have it useless to Trade; and must there be no Money made of it? I answer, Quite the contrary.

'Tis

'Tis fit the Kingdom ſhould make uſe of the Treaſure it has. 'Tis neceſſary your *Gold ſhould be Coin'd*, and have the King's Stamp upon it to ſecure Men, in receiveing it, that there is ſo much Gold in each piece. But 'tis not neceſſary that it ſhould have a fixed value ſet on it by publick Authority: 'Tis not convenient that it ſhould in its varying proportion have a ſettled price. *Let Gold*, as other Commodities, *find its own Rate.* And when, by the King's Image and Inſcription, it carries with it a publick Aſſurance of its weight and fineneſs; the Gold Money ſo Coin'd will never fail to paſs, at the known Market Rates, as readily, as any other Species of your Money. Twenty Guineas, though deſigned at firſt for 20 *l.* go now as current for 21 *l.* 10 *s.* as any other Money, and ſometimes for more, as the Rate varies. The *value* or *price* of any thing, being only the reſpective eſtimate it bears to ſome other, which it comes in Competition with, can only be known by the quantity of the one, which will exchange for a certain quantity of the other. There being no two things in Nature, whoſe proportion, and uſe does not vary, 'tis impoſſible to ſet a ſtanding regular price between them. The growing plenty or ſcarcity of either in the Market; (whereby I mean

mean the ordinary places, where they are to be had in Traffick) or the real Uſe, or changing faſhion of the place bringing either of them more into demand than formerly, preſently varies the reſpective value of any two Things. You will as fruitleſly endeavour to keep two different Things ſteadily at the ſame price one with another, as to keep two Things in an *Æquilibrium*, where their varying weights, depend on different Cauſes. Put a piece of Spunge in one Scale, and an exact counterpoiſe of Silver in the other, you will be mightily miſtaken if you imagine, that becauſe they are to day equal, they ſhall always remain ſo. The weight of the Spunge varying with every change of moiſture in the Air, the Silver in the oppoſite Scale will ſometimes Riſe and ſometimes Fall. This is juſt the ſtate of *Silver and Gold* in regard of their mutual value. Their proportion, or uſe, may, nay conſtantly does vary, and with it their price. For being eſtimated one in Reference to the other, they are as it were put in oppoſite Scales, and as the one riſes the other falls, and ſo on the contrary.

Farthings made of a baſer Metal, may on this account too deſerve your Conſideration. For whatſoever Coin you make current, above the Intrinſick value, will always

always be dammage to the Publick, whoever get by it. But of this I shall not at present enter into a more particular Enquiry. Only this I will confidently affirm, *That it is the Interest of every Country, that all the current Money of it should be of one and the same Metal; That the several Species should be all of the same Alloy, and none of a baser mixture: And that the Standard once thus settled, should be Inviolably and Immutably kept to perpetuity.* For whenever that is alter'd, upon what pretence soever, the Publick will lose by it.

Since then it will neither bring us in more Money, Bullion, nor Trade; nor keep that we have here; nor hinder our weighty Money, of what Denomination soever, from being melted, to what purpose should the Kingdom be at the charge of Coining all our Money a-new? For I do not suppose any Body can propose, that we should have two sorts of Money at the same time, one heavier, and the other lighter, as it comes from the Mint. That is very absurd to imagine. So that if all your old Money must be Coin'd over again, it will indeed be some advantage, and that a very considerable one, to the Officers of the Mint. For they being allow'd 3 *s.* 6 *d.* it should be Sixteen pence half-penny for the Coinage of every Pound Troy, which

is

is very near Five and an half *per Cent.* If our Money be Six Millions, and muſt be Coin'd all over again, it will coſt the Nation to the Mint Three hundred thirty thouſand pounds. One hundred thirty thouſand pounds if the clip'd Money muſt ſcape, becauſe it is already as light as your new Standard; do you not own that this deſign of new Coinage is juſt of the Nature of Clipping?

This buſineſs of Money and *Coinage* is by ſome Men, and amongſt them ſome very Ingenious Perſons, thought a great *Myſtery*, and very hard to be underſtood. Not that truly in it ſelf it is ſo: But becauſe intereſſed People that treat of it, wrap up the Secret they make advantage of in myſtical, obſcure, and unintelligible ways of Talking; Which Men, from a preconceiv'd opinion of the difficulty of the ſubject, taking for Senſe, in a matter not eaſie to be penetrated, but by the Men of Art, let paſs for Current without Examination. Whereas, would they look into thoſe Diſcourſes, enquire what meaning their Words have, they would find, for the moſt part, either their Poſitions to be falſe; their Deductions to be wrong; or (which often happens) their words to have no diſtinct meaning at all. Where none of theſe be, there their plain, true, honeſt Senſe,

Senſe, would prove very eaſie and intelligible, if expreſs'd in ordinary and direct Language.

That this is ſo, I ſhall ſhew, by examining a Printed Sheet on this Subject. Intituled, *Remarks on a Paper given in to the Lords*, &c.

Remarks. *'Tis certain, That what place ſoever will give moſt for Silver by weight, it will thither be carried and Sold: And if of the Money which now paſſes in* England, *there can be* 5 s. 5 d. *the Ounce, given for Standard Silver at the Mint; when but* 5 s. 4 d. *of the very ſame Money can be given elſewhere for it, it will be certainly brought to the Mint; and when Coin'd, cannot be Sold, (having one Penny over-value ſet upon it by the Ounce) for the ſame that other Plate may be bought for, ſo will be left unmelted; at leaſt, 'twill be the Intereſt of any Exporters, to buy Plate to ſend out, before Money; whereas now 'tis his Intereſt to buy Money to ſend out before Plate.*

Anſw. The Author would do well to make it intelligible, how, *of the Money that now paſſes in* England, *at the Mint can be given* 5 s. 5 d. *the Ounce, for Standard Silver, when but* 5 s. 4 d. *of the ſame Money can be given elſewhere for it.* Next, *How it has one Penny over-value ſet upon it by the Ounce*; So that, *When Coin'd it cannot be Sold?* This, to an ordinary *Reader*, looks

looks very Myſterious; and, I fear, is ſo, as either ſignifying nothing at all, or nothing that will hold. For,

1. I ask who is it at the Mint, that *can give* 5 s. 5 d. *per Ounce, for Standard Silver, when no body elſe can give above* 5 s. 4 d? Is it the King, or is it the Maſter Worker, or any of the Officers? For to give 5 *s.* 5 *d.* for what will yield but 5 *s* 4 *d.* to any body elſe, is to give One ſixty fifth part more than it is worth. For ſo much every thing is worth, as it will yield. And I do not ſee how this can turn to account to the King, or be born by any body elſe.

2. I ask, How a *Penny over-value can be ſet upon it by the Ounce; ſo that it cannot be ſold?* This is ſo Myſterious that I think it near impoſſible. For an equal quantity of Standard Silver will always be juſt worth an equal quantity of Standard Silver. And it is utterly impoſſible to make 64 parts of Standard Silver equal to, or worth 65 parts of the ſame Standard Silver; which is meant by *ſetting a Penny over-value upon it by the Ounce*, if that has any meaning at all. Indeed, by the Workmanſhip of it, 64 Ounces of Standard Silver may be made not only worth 65 Ounces, but 70 or 80. But the Coinage, which is all the Workmanſhip

ſhip here, being paid for by a Tax, I do not ſee how that can be reckon'd at all: Or if it be, it muſt raiſe every 5 *s.* and 4 *d.* Coin'd, to above 5 *s.* 5 *d.* If I carry 64 Ounces of Standard Silver in Bullion to the Mint, to be Coin'd; ſhall I not have juſt 64 Ounces back again for it in Coin? And if ſo, Can theſe 64 Ounces of Coin'd Standard Silver, be poſſibly made worth 65 Ounces of the ſame Standard Silver uncoin'd; when they coſt me no more, and I can, for barely going to the Mint, have 64 Ounces of Standard Silver in Bullion turned into Coin? Cheapneſs of Coinage in *England*, where it coſts nothing, will, indeed, make Money be ſooner brought to the Mint, than any where elſe: becauſe there I have the convenience of having it made into Money for nothing. But this will no more keep it in *England*, than if it were perfect Bullion. Nor will it hinder it from being melted down; becauſe it coſt no more in Coin than in Bullion: And this equally, whether your Pieces, of the ſame Denomination, be lighter, heavier, or juſt as they were before. This being explain'd, 'twill be eaſie to ſee, whether the other things, ſaid in the ſame Paragraph, be true or falſe; and particularly, whether *'twill be the Intereſt of every Exporter, to buy Plate to ſend out before Money*

Remark.

Remark. *'Tis only barely asserted, That if Silver be raised at the Mint, That 'twill rise elsewhere above it; but can never be known till it be tried.*

Answ. The Author tells us in the last Paragraph, That *Silver that is worth but* 5 s. 2 d. *per Ounce at the Mint, is worth* 5 s. 4 d. *elsewhere.* This, how true, or what inconvenience it hath, I will not here examine. But be the Inconvenience of it what it will, this raising the Money he proposes as a Remedy: And to those who say, upon raising our Money Silver will rise too, he makes this Answer, That *it can never be known, whether it will or no, till it be tried.* To which I reply, That it may be known as certainly, without Trial, as it can, That two Pieces of Silver, that weighed equally yesterday, will weigh equally again to morrow in the same Scales.

There is Silver (says our Author) *whereof an Ounce* (i. e. 480 Grains) *will change for* 5 s. 4 d. (i. e. 496 Grains) of our Standard Silver Coin'd. To morrow you Coin your Money lighter; so that then 5 *s.* 4 *d.* will have but 472 Grains of Coin'd Standard Silver in it. Can it not then be known, without Trial, whether that Ounce of Silver, which to day will change for 496 Grains of Standard Silver Coin'd, will change to morrow but for 472 Grains of the

the ſame Standard Silver Coin'd? Or can any one imagine that 480 Grains of the ſame Silver which to day are worth 496 Grains of our Coin'd Silver, will to morrow be worth but 472 Grains of the ſame Silver, a little differently Coin'd? He that can have a Doubt about this till it be tried, may as well demand a Trial to be made, to prove, That the ſame thing is æquiponderant, or æquivalent to it ſelf. For I think it is as clear, That 472 Grains of Silver are æquiponderant to 496 Grains of Silver, as that an Ounce of Silver, that is to day worth 496 Grains of Standard Silver, ſhould to morrow be worth but 472 Grains of the ſame Standard Silver, all Circumſtances remaining the ſame, but the different Weight of the Pieces ſtamp'd: which is that our Author aſſerts, when he ſays, That *'tis only barely aſſerted*, &c. What has been ſaid to this, may ſerve alſo for an Anſwer to the next Paragraph. Only I deſire it may be taken notice of, That the Author ſeems to inſinuate that Silver goes not in *England*, as in Foreign Parts, by Weight: Which is a very dangerous as well as falſe Poſition; and which, if allowed, may let into our Mint what Corruption and Debaſing of our Money one pleaſes.

Remark. *That our Trade hath heretofore*

furniſhed us with an Overplus, brought home in Gold and Silver, is true; But that we bring home from any place more Goods than we now Export to it, I do not conceive to be ſo. And more Goods might be ſent to thoſe parts; but by reaſon of the great value of Silver in this part of the World, more Money is to be got by Exporting Silver, than by any other thing that can be ſent; and that is the reaſon of it. And for its being melted down, and ſent out, becauſe it is ſo heavy, is not by their Paper denied.

Anſw. *That we bring home from any place more Goods than we now export,* (The Author tells us) *he doth not conceive.*

Would he had told us a Reaſon for his Conceit. But ſince the Money of any Country is not preſently to be changed, upon any private Man's groundleſs Conceit, I ſuppoſe this Argument will not be of much weight with many Men. I make bold to call it a groundleſs Conceit: For if the Author pleaſe to remember the great Sums of Money are carried every Year to the *Eaſt-Indies*, for which we bring home conſumable Commodities; (though I muſt own that it pays us again with advantage.) Or if he will examine, how much only two Commodities, wholly conſum'd here, coſt us yearly in Money, (I mean *Canary* Wine and Currants) more than we pay for with Goods Exported to the *Canaries* and *Zant*; beſides

beſides the Over-ballance of Trade upon us in ſeveral other places, he will have little reaſon to ſay, *he doth not conceive we bring home from any place more Goods than we now Export to it.*

As to what he ſays concerning the melting down and Exporting our Money, becauſe it is heavy. If by *heavy*, he means, becauſe our Crown-pieces (and the reſt of our *ſpecies* of Money in proportion) are 23 or 24 Grains heavier than he would have them Coin'd: This, whoever grants it, I deny upon grounds, which I ſuppoſe, when examined, will be found clear and evident.

Indeed when your Debts beyond Sea, to anſwer the Over-ballance of Foreign Importations, call for your Money, 'tis certain the heavy Money, which has the full Standard Weight, will be melted down and carried away: becauſe Foreigners value not your Stamp or Denomination, but your Silver.

He would do well to tell us what he means by *the great value of Silver in this part of the World.* For he ſpeaks of it as a Cauſe, that draws away our Money more now than formerly; or elſe it might as well have been omitted as mentioned in this place: And if he mean, by *this part of the World*, England; 'tis ſcarce Senſe to ſay, That the great Value of Silver in

England ſhould draw Silver out of *England*. If he means the Neighbouring Countries to *England*, he ſhould have ſaid it, and not doubtfully *this part of the World*. But let him, by *this part of the World*, mean what he will, I dare ſay every one will agree, That Silver is not more valu'd in this, than any other part of the World; nor in this Age, more than in our Grandfathers Days.

I am ſorry if it be true, what he tells us, That *more Money is to be got by Exportation of Silver, than by any other thing that can be ſent.* This is an Evidence, that *we bring home more Goods than we Export.* For till that happens, and has brought us in Debt beyond Sea, Silver will not be Exported; but the Overplus of Peoples Gain, being generally laid up in Silver, it will be brought home in Silver; and ſo our People will value it as much as any other, in *this part of the World.*

The Truth of the Caſe in ſhort is this. Whenever we, by a loſing Trade, contract Debts with our Neighbours; they will put *a great Value on our Silver, and more Money will be got by tranſporting Silver than any thing can be ſent:* Which comes about thus. Suppoſe that by an Over-ballance of their Trade (whether by a Sale of Pepper, Spices, and other *Eaſt-India* Commodities, it matters not) we have received great quantities

quantities of Goods, within these two or three Months, from *Holland*, and sent but little thither; so that the accounts ballanced between the Inhabitants of *England* and the *United Provinces*, we of *England* were a Million in their Debt: What would follow from hence? This: That these Dutch Creditors, desiring to have what is due to them, give Order to their Factors and Correspondents here, to return it to them. For enquiring, as we do, what are the effects of an over-ballance of Trade, we must not suppose, they invest their Debts in Commodities, and return their Effects that way. A Million then being to be returned from *England* to *Holland* in Money, every one seeks Bills of Exchange: but Englishmen not having Debts in *Holland* to answer this Millon, or any the least part of it, Bills are not to be got. This presently makes the Exchange very high; upon which the Bankers, *&c.* who have the command of great quantities of Money and Bullion, send that away to *Holland* in Specie, and so take Money here to pay it again there, upon their Bills, at such a rate of Exchange, as gives them five, ten, fifteen, *&c. per Cent.* profit: And thus sometimes a 5 *s.* Piece of our mill'd Money may truly be said to be worth 5 *s.* 3 *d.* 4 *d.* 6 *d.* 9 *d.* in *Holland*.

And if this be *the great value of Silver in this part of the World*, I eaſily grant it him. But this great value is to be remedied, not by the alteration of our Mint, but by the Regulation and Ballance of our Trade. For be your Coin what it will, our Neighbours, if they over-ballance us in Trade, will not only have *a great value of our Silver*, but get it too; and there will be *more to be got by Exporting Silver to them, than by any other Thing can be ſent.*

Remarks. *The alteration of the Coins in* Spain *and* Portugal *are no way at all like this. For there they alter'd in Denomination near half, to deceive thoſe they paid, with paying thoſe to whom they owed one Ounce of Silver, but half an Ounce for it. But in the alteration here deſigned, to whoever an Ounce of Silver was owing, an Ounce will be paid in this Money; it being here only deſigned, that an Ounce of Money ſhould equal an Ounce of Silver in value, at home, as well as abroad, which now it does not.*

Anſwer. In this Paragraph the Author Confeſſes the alteration of the Coin in *Spain* and *Portugal* was a cheat; but the *alteration here deſign'd*, he ſays, *is not:* But the Reaſon he gives for it is admirable: viz. *Becauſe they there alter'd in Denomination near half*, and here the Denomination is alter'd but 5 *per Cent*; for ſo in Truth it

it is, whatever be designed. As if 50 *per Cent.* were a Cheat, but 5 *per Cent.* were not; because perhaps less perceiveable. For the two Things that are pretended to be done here by this new Coinage, I fear will both fail, *viz.* 1. That *to whomsoever an Ounce of Silver is owing, an Ounce of Silver shall be paid in this Money.* For when an Ounce of Silver is Coin'd, as is proposed, into 5 *s.* 5 *d.* (which is to make our Money 5 *per Cent.* lighter than it is now) I that am to receive an 100 *l. per Annum*, Fee Farm Rent; shall I in this new Money receive 105 *l.* or barely 100 *l.*? The first I think will not be said. For if by Law you have made it 100 *l.* 'tis certain the Tenant will pay me no more. If you do not mean that 400 Crowns, or 2000 Shillings of your new Coin shall be an 100 *l.* but there must be 5 *per Cent.* in tale, added to every 100, you are at the charge of new Coinage to no other purpose but to breed Confusion. If I must receive 100 *l.* by tale, of this new Money for my Fee Farm Rent, 'tis demonstration that I lose five Ounces *per Cent.* of the Silver was due to me. This a little lower he confesses in these Word, *That where a Man has a Rent-SEC. that can never be more, this may somewhat affect it, but so very little, that it will scarce ever at all be perceived.* This *very little* is

5 *per Cent.* And if a Man be cheated of that, ſo he *perceives* it not, it goes for nothing. But this loſs will not affect only ſuch Rents, as can never be more, but all Payments whatſoever, that are contracted for before this alteration of our Money.

2. If it be true, what he affirms, *That an Ounce of Money doth equal an Ounce of Silver in value abroad, but not at home*; then this part of the Undertaking will alſo fail. For I deny that the Stamp on our Money does any more debaſe it here at home than abroad, or make the Silver in our Money not equal in value to the ſame weight of Silver every where. The Author would have done well to have made it out, and not left ſo great a Paradox only to the credit of a ſingle Aſſertion.

Remarks. *And for what is ſaid in this Bill to prevent Exportation, relates only to the keeping in our own Coin, and Bullion, and leaves all Foreign to be Exported ſtill.*

Anſwer. What the Author means by *our own* and *Foreign Bullion*, will need ſome Explication.

Remarks. *There is now no ſuch thing as Payments made in weighty and Mill'd Money.*

Anſwer. I believe there are very few in Town, who do not very often receive a mill'd Crown for 5 *s*, and a mill'd half Crown

Crown for 2 *s.* 6 *d.* But he means I ſuppoſe in great and entire Sums of mill'd Money. But I ask, if all the clip'd Money were called in, whether then all the Payments would not be in weighty Money; and that not being call'd in, whether if it be lighter than your new mill'd Money, the new mill'd Money will not be melted down as much as the old? Which I think the Author there confeſſes, or elſe I underſtand him not.

Remark. *Nor will this any way interrupt Trade; for Trade will find its own courſe; the Denomination of Money in any Country no way concerning that.*

Anſwer. The Denomination to a certain Weight of Money, in all Countries, concerns Trade; and the alteration of that neceſſarily brings diſturbance to it.

Remark. *For if ſo be it occaſions the Coining more Money.*

Anſwer. He talks as if it would be *the occaſion of Coining more Money.* Out of what? Out of Money already Coin'd, or out of Bullion? For I would be glad to know where it is.

Remarks. *It may be ſome gain to thoſe that will venture to melt down the Coin, but very ſmall loſs (if any) to thoſe that ſhall be paid in the New: 'Tis not to be denied, but that where any Man has a Rent-SEC, that*

can

can never be more, this may somewhat affect it; but so very little, 'twill scarce ever at all be perceived.

Answer. As much as it will be gain to melt down their Coin, so much loss will it be to those who are paid in the new. *Viz.* 5 *per Cent.* which I suppose, is more than the Author would be willing to lose, unless he get by it another way.

Rem. *And if the alteration designed should have the effect of making our Native Commodities any way dearer.*

Answ. Here the Author confesses, that proportionably as your Money is raised, the Price of other things will be raised too. But to make amends, he says,

Rem. *It does at the same time make the Land which produces them, of more than so much more in value.*

Answ. *This more than so much more in value*, is more than our Author, or any body else for him, will ever be able to make out.

The Price of Things will always be estimated by the *quantity* of Silver is given in exchange for them. And if you make your Money less in Weight, it must be made up in Tale. This is all this great Mystery of raising Money, and raising Land. For Example, The Mannor of *Blackacre* would yesterday have yielded

One

One hundred thousand Crowns, which Crown-pieces, let us suppose *numero rotundo*, to weigh each of them an Ounce of Standard Silver. To day your new Coin comes in play, which is 5 *per Cent* lighter. There's your Money raised: The Land now at Sale yields One hundred and five thousand Crowns, which is just the same One hundred thousand Ounces of Standard Silver. Ther's is the Land raised. And is not this an admirable Invention, for which the Publick ought to be at above One hundred thousand pounds Charge for new Coinage, and all your Commerce put in disorder? And then to recommend this Invention, you are told, as a great Secret, That, *Had not Money, from time to time, been raised in its Denomination, Lands had not so risen too:* which is to say, Had not your Money been made lighter, fewer Pieces of it would have bought as much Land as a greater number does now.

Rem. *The loss of Payments there spoken of, will, in no sort, be so great as if the Parties to whom these Debts are owing, were now bound to receive them in the Money now passes, and then to melt the same down; so at this they will have no cause to complain.*

Answ. A very good Argument! The Clippers have rob'd the Publick of a good part of their Money (which Men will, some

ſome time or other, find in the Payments they receive) and 'tis deſired the Mint may have a liberty to be before-hand with thoſe to whom Debts are owing. They are told they will have no reaſon to *Complain* of it, who ſuffer this loſs; becauſe it is not ſo great as the other. The damage is already done to the Publick, by Clipping. Where at laſt it will light, I cannot tell. But Men who receive Clip'd Money, not being forced *to melt it down*, do not yet receive any loſs by it. When Cliped Money will no longer change for weighty, than thoſe who have Clip'd Money in their hands, will find the loſs of it.

Rem. *'Twill make the Cuſtoms better paid*, becauſe *there will be more Money.*

Anſ. That there will be more Money in Tale, 'tis poſſible: That there will be more Money in Weight and Worth the Author ought to ſhew. And then, whatever becomes of the *Cuſtoms*, (which I do not hear are unpaid now) the King will loſe in the Exciſe above Thirty thouſand pounds *per Annum.* For in all Taxes where ſo many Pounds, Shillings, or Pence are determined by the Law to be paid, there the King will loſe 5 *per Cent.* The Author here as in other places, gives a good reaſon for it. For, *His Majeſty being to pay away this Money by Tale, as he received it, it will be to him no loſs at all.* As

As if my receiving my Rents in full Tale, but in Money of undervalue 5 *per. Cent.* were not so much loss to me, because I was to pay it away again by Tale. Try it at 50 *per Cent.* The odds only is, That one being greater than the other, would make more noise. But our Author's great refuge in this is, *That it will not be perceiv'd.*

Remark. *If all Foreign Commodities, were to be Purchased with this new Species of Money sent out; we agree, That with* 100 l. *of it there could not be so much Silver or other Commodities bought, as with* 100 l. *in Crown Pieces as now Coined; because they would be heavier; And all Coin in any Kingdom, but where 'tis Coined, only goes by Weight; and for the same weight of Silver, the same every where still will be bought; and so there will, with the same quantity of Goods. And if those Goods (should cost* 5 per Cent. *more here in* England *than heretofore, and yield but the same Money (we mean by the Ounce abroad) the same Money brought home and Coin'd, will yield the Importer* 5 per Cent. *more at the Mint than it heretofore could do, and so no damage to the Trader at all.*

Answ. Here Truth forces from the Author a confession of Two Things, which demonstrate the vanity and uselesness of the Project. 1. That upon this change of your Coin, Foreign Goods will be rais'd. 2. Your own

own Goods will coſt more 5 *per Cent.* So that Goods of all kinds being thereupon raiſed; wherein conſiſts the raiſing of your Money, when an Ounce of Standard Silver, however minc'd, ſtamp'd, or denominated, will buy no more Commodities than it did before? This confeſſion alſo ſhews the Falſhood of that dangerous ſuppoſition, That Money, *in the Kingdom where it is Coin'd, goes not by weight*, i. e. is not valued by its Weight.

Rem. *'Tis true, The Owners of Silver will find a good Market for it, and no others will be damaged; but, on the contrary, the making Plenty of Money will be an advantage to all.*

Anſw. I grant it true, That if your Money were really raiſed, 5 *per Cent. the Owners of Silver* would get ſo much by it, by bringing it to the Mint to be Coin'd. But ſince, as is confeſſed, Commodities will (upon this raiſing your Money) be raiſed to 5 *per Cent.* this alteration will be an advantage to no body but the Officers of the Mint, and Hoarders of Money.

Rem. *When Standard Silver was laſt raiſed at the Mint, (which it was, from* 5 s. *to* 5 s. and 2 d. *the Ounce, in the* 43 d. *of* Eliz.) *and, for above Forty Years after, Silver uncoin'd was not worth above* 4 s. 10 d. *the Ounce, which occaſion'd much Coining; and of Money, none in thoſe days was Exported: Whereas*

Silver

Silver now is worth but the very ſame 5 *s. and* 2 *d. the Ounce ſtill at the Mint, and is worth* 5 *s.* 4 *d. elſewhere. So that if this Bill now with the Lords does not happen to paſs, there can never any Silver be ever more Coin'd at the Mint; and all the mill'd Money will in a very little time more be deſtroyed.*

Anſ. The reaſon of ſo much Money Coin'd in Queen *Elizabeth*'s Time, and afterwards, was not the leſſening your Crown Pieces from 480 to 462 Grains, and ſo proportionably all the reſt of your Money, (which is that the Author calls, raiſing Standard Silver from 5 *s.* to 5 *s.* 2 *d.* the Ounce) but from the over-ballance of your Trade, bringing then in Plenty of Bullion, and keeping it here.

How Standard Silver (for if the Author ſpeaks of other Silver, it is a fallacy) ſhould be worth its own Weight in Standard Silver at the Mint, (*i. e.* 5 *s* 2 *d.* the Ounce) and be worth more than its own Weight in Standard Silver, (*i. e.* 5 *s.* 4 *d.* the Ounce) in *Lombard-ſtreet*, is a Paradox that no body, I think, will be able to comprehend, till it be better Explain'd. It is time to give off Coining, if the value of Standard Silver be leſſened by it; as really it is, if an Ounce of Coin'd Standard Silver will not exchange for an Ounce of uncoin'd Standard Silver unleſs you add 15 or 16 Grains over-

overplus to it: Which is what the Author would have taken upon his word, when he ſays, *Silver is worth Five Shillings Four Pence elſewhere.*

Five Shillings Four Pence of Money Coin'd at the Mint, the Author muſt allow to be at leaſt 495 Grains. An Ounce is but 480 Grains. How then an Ounce of uncoin'd Standard Silver can be worth Five Shillings Four Pence, (*i. e.* How 480 Grains of uncoin'd Standard Silver can be worth 495 Grains of the ſame Standard Silver, Coin'd into Money) is unintelligible; unleſs the Coinage of our Mint leſſens the Value of Standard Silver.

SIR,

COIN *and* Intereſt *are Two Things of ſo great moment to the Publick, and of ſo great concernment in Trade, that they ought, very accurately to be examin'd into, and very nicely weigh'd, upon any Propoſal of an alteration to be made in them. I pretend not to have Treat'd of them here as they deſerve. That muſt be the work of an abler Hand. I have ſaid ſomething on theſe Subjects, becauſe you requir'd it. And, I hope, the readineſs of my Obedience will excuſe, to You, the Faults I have committed, and aſſure You that I am,*

SIR,

Your moſt humble Servant.

John Lock.

SHORT
Obſervations
ON A
Printed PAPER,
Intituled,
For encouraging the Coining Silver Money in England, *and after for keeping it here.*

THE Author ſays, *Silver yielding the propos'd* 2 d. *or* 3 d. *more by the Ounce, than it will do by being Coin'd into Money, there will be none Coin'd into Money; and matter of Fact ſhews there is none.*

'Twould be hard to know what he means, when he ſays, *Silver yields* 2 d. *or* 3 d. *more by the Ounce, than it will do by being Coin'd into Money:* But that he tells us in plain words at the bottom of the Leaf, that *an Ounce of Silver uncoin'd, is of* 2 d. *more value, than after it is Coin'd it will be;* which I take the liberty to ſay, is ſo far from being true, that I affirm it is im-

poſſible to be ſo. For which I ſhall only give this ſhort reaſon, *viz.* Becauſe the Stamp neither does nor can take away any of the intrinſick value of the Silver, and therefore an Ounce of Coined ſtandard Silver, muſt neceſſarily be of equal value to an Ounce of uncoined ſtandard Silver. For example; ſuppoſe a Goldſmith has a round Plate of Standard Silver juſt of the ſhape, ſize and weight of a Coin'd Crown-piece, which, for brevity's ſake we will ſuppoſe to be an Ounce, this Ounce of ſtandard Silver is certainly of equal value to any other Ounce of unwrought ſtandard Silver in his Shop; away he goes with his round piece of Silver to the Tower, and has there the Stamp ſet upon it; when he brings this numerical Piece back again to his Shop Coin'd, can any one imagine that it is now 2 *d.* leſs worth than it was when he carried it out ſmooth a quarter of an hour before, or that it is not ſtill of equal value to any other Ounce of unwrought ſtandard Silver in his Shop? He that can ſay 'tis 2 *d.* leſs worth than it was before it had the King's Image and Inſcription on it, may as well ſay, that 60 Grains of Silver brought from the Tower are worth but 58 Grains of Silver in *Lombard-ſtreet.*

But

But the Author very warily limits this ill effect of Coinage only to *England*; why it is so in *England*, and not every where, would deserve a reason.

But let us grant it to be true, as our Author affirms, that Coin'd Silver in *England* is One thirtieth worse, or of less value than uncoin'd, the natural Consequence from this, if it be true, is, that it is very unfit that the Mint should be employed in *England* where it debases the Silver One thirtieth; for if the Stamp lessens the value of our Silver this Year, it will also do so the next, and so on to the end of the World, it always working the same way. Nor will the altering the Denomination, as is propos'd, at all help it.

But yet he thinks he has some Proof for his Proposition, because it is *matter of Fact* that there is *no Money Coin'd at the Mint*. This is the great Grievance, and is one indeed, but for a different reason from what seems to inspire that Paper.

The matter in short is this; *England* sending more consumable Commodities to *Spain*, than it receives from thence. The Merchants who manage that Trade, bring back the *overplus* in Bullion, which at their return they sell as a Commodity. The Chapmen that give highest for

this, are, as in all Caſes of buying and Selling, thoſe who can make moſt profit by it; and thoſe are the Returners of our Money by Exchange into thoſe Countries where our Debts any way contracted make a need of it; for they getting 6, 8, 10, *&c. per Cent.* according to the want and demand of Money from *England* there, and according to the riſque of the Sea, buy up this Bullion as ſoon as it comes in, to ſend it to their Correſpondents in thoſe Parts, to make good their Credit for the Bills they have drawn on them, and ſo can give more for it than the Mint rate, *i. e.* more than an equal weight of mill'd Money, for an equal weight of Standard Bullion, they being able to make more profit of it by Returns.

Suppoſe the balance of our Trade with *Holland* were in all other Commodities equal, but that in the laſt *Eaſt-India* Sale we bought of them of *Eaſt-India* Commodities to the value of a Million, to be paid in a Month; within a Month a Million muſt be returned into *Holland*, this preſently raiſes the Exchange, and the Traders in Exchange ſell their Bills at high rates; but the balance of Trade being (as is ſuppos'd in the caſe) equal in all other Commodities, this Million can no way

way be repaid to their Correſpondents on whom thoſe Bills were drawn, but by ſending them Money or Bullion to reimburſe them.

This is the true reaſon why the Bullion brought from *Spain* is not carried to the Mint to be Coin'd, but bought by Traders in Foreign Exchange, and Exported by them to ſupply the *overplus* of our Expences there, which are not paid for by our Commodities. Nor will the propoſed *raiſing of our Money*, as 'tis call'd, whether we Coin our Money for the future One thirtieth, or One twentieth, or One half lighter than now it is, bring one Ounce more to the Mint than now, whil'ſt our Affairs in this reſpect remain in the ſame poſture. And I challenge the Author to ſhew that it will, for ſaying is but ſaying: Bullion can never come to the Mint to be Coin'd, whil'ſt the over-balance of Trade and Foreign Expences are ſo great, that to ſatisfie them, not only the Bullion your Trade in ſome parts now Yearly brings in, but alſo ſome of your formerly Coin'd Money is requiſite, and muſt be ſent out; but when a change in that brings in and lodges Bullion here, (for now it ſeems it only paſſes through *England*) the increaſe of Silver and Gold ſtaying in *England*, will again bring it to the Mint to be Coin'd.

This makes it eaſily intelligible how it comes to paſs, that when now at the Mint they can give but 5 *s.* 2 *d. per* Ounce for Silver, they can give 5 *s.* 4 *d.* the Ounce (in *Lombard-ſtreet*, which is what our Author means when he ſays, *Silver now is worth but* 5 s. 2 *d. the Ounce at the Mint, and is worth* 5 s. 4 d. *elſe where.*) The reaſon whereof is plain, *viz.* becauſe the Mint giving weighty Money for Bullion, can give ſo much and no more for Silver than it is Coin'd at, which is 5 *s.* 2 *d.* the Ounce, the Publick paying all the odds that is between the Coin'd and Uncoin'd Silver, which is the Manufacture of Coinage: But the Banker or Returner of Money having uſe of Silver beyond Sea, where he can make his Profit of it by anſwering Bills of Exchange, which he ſells dear, muſt either ſend our Money in *ſpecie*, or melt down our Coin to tranſport, or elſe with it buy Bullion.

The ſending our Money in *ſpecie*, or melting it down, has ſome hazard, and therefore if he could have Bullion for 5 *s.* 2 *d. per* Ounce, or a little dearer, 'tis like he would always rather chuſe to exchange Coin for Bullion, with ſome little loſs, rather than run the riſque of melting it down, or Exportation.

But

But this would ſcarce make him pay 2 *d.* in the Crown, which is almoſt Three and an half *per Cent.* if there were not ſomething more in it, than barely the riſque of melting or Exportation; and that is the lightneſs of the greateſt part of our Current Coin. For Example: *N.* has given Bills for Thirty thouſand pounds *ſterling in Flanders*, and ſo has need of Ten thouſand weight of Silver to be tranſported thither; he has Thirty thouſand pounds *ſterling* by him in ready Money, whereof Five thouſand pounds is weighty mill'd Money, what ſhall hinder him then from throwing that into his Melting-Pot, and ſo reducing it to Bullion, to be tranſported? But what ſhall he do for the other Twenty-five thouſand pounds, which tho' he has by him, is yet clip'd and light Money, that is at leaſt 20 *per Cent.* lighter than the ſtandard? If he tranſports or melts down this, there is ſo much clear loſs to him; it is therefore more advantage to him to buy Bullion at 5 s. 4 *d.* the Ounce with that light Money, than to tranſport or melt it down; wherein tho the Seller of the Bullion has leſs weight in Silver than he parts with, yet he finds his Accompt as much as if he received it in weighty Coin, whil'ſt a clip'd Crown-piece or Shilling paſſes as well in payment

for any Commodity here in *England* as a Mill'd one. Thus our Mint is kept from Coining.

But this Paper, *For encouraging the Coining, &c.* would fain have the Mill at work, though there be no griſt to be had, unleſs you will grind over again what is ground already, and pay Toll for it a ſecond time; a Propoſition fit only for the Miller himſelf to make; for the meaneſt Houſewife in the Country would laugh at it as ſoon as propos'd. However the Author pleaſes himſelf, and thinks he has a good Argument to make it paſs, *viz.* becauſe the Toll to be paid for it will not amount to Three hundred and thirty thouſand pounds as is ſaid in a late Treatiſe about the *raiſing the value of Money*, (p. 170) for, ſays he, that Writer is miſtaken, in ſaying that 3 *s.* and 6 *d.* *is allowed at the Mint for the Coinage of every pound Troy*, whereas *there is but* Sixteen pence half penny *there allowed for the ſame* which Sixteen pence half penny being above one third of 3 *s.* 6 *d.* it follows by his own Computation, that the new Coining our Money will coſt the Nation above One hundred and ten thouſand pounds; a ſmall ſum in this our plenty of Riches, to be laid out for the purchaſing theſe following Inconveniencies without any the leaſt advantage.

1. A loſs to the King of One fiftieth (if you Coin your Money 2 *d. per* Crown, One twentieth if you Coin your Money 3 *d. per* Crown lighter) of all his ſtanding Revenue.

2. A like loſs of One twentieth or One thirtieth in all Rents that are ſetled, for theſe have, during the term, the nature of Rent-ſeck: But 5 *per Cent.* loſs in a Man's Income he thinks ſo little, *it will not be perceived.*

3. *Trouble to Merchants in their Trade.* Theſe Inconveniencies he is forc'd to allow. He might have ſaid diſorder to all People in their Trade, though he ſays it will be but a *little trouble to Merchants*, and without any *real damage to Trade.* The Author would have done well to have made out this and a great many other aſſertions in that Paper; but ſaying is much eaſier, if that may paſs for Proof.

Indeed he has, by a ſhort way, anſwer'd the Book above-mentioned, in the concluſion of his Paper, in theſe words: *And he that ſo groſly miſtakes in ſo material Points of what he would aſſert, 'tis plain is not free from miſtakes.* It does not appear that he who publiſhed that Book, ever thought himſelf free from miſtakes; but he that miſtakes in two material Points, may be in the right in two others, and thoſe will ſtill need an Anſwer. But one

of

of these material Points will, I think, by what is already said, appear not to be a mistake; and for any thing the Author of the Paper has said, or can say, it will always be true, that an Ounce of Silver Coin'd or not Coin'd, is, and eternally will be of equal value to any other Ounce of Silver. As to any other mistake, concerning the rate of Coinage, 'tis like he had his information from some disinteressed Person whom he thought worthy of Credit, and whether it be 3 *s* 6 *d.* as he was told, or only Sixteen pence half penny *per* Pound Troy, as the Paper says, whether the Reader will believe the one or the other, or think it worth his more exact enquiry, this is certain, the Kingdom ought not to be at that or any other Charge where there is no advantage, as there will be none in this propos'd Coinage, but quite the contrary.

In his Answer to

Object. 1. He says from *Edw.* III. *Silver has from time to time (as it grew in esteem) been by degrees raised in all Mints.* If an Ounce of Silver now not exchanging or paying for what One tenth of an Ounce would have purchased in *Edw.* III's time, and so being ten times less worth now than it was then, be *growing in esteem*, this Author is in the right, else Silver has not since *Edw.* III's Reign, *from time to time grown*

in

in esteem. Be that as it will, he assigns a wrong Cause *of raising of Silver*, as he calls it in our Mint. For if *growing thus in request*, *i. e.* by lessening its value, had been the reason of altering our Money, this change of Coin, or raising the denomination of Silver in ours and other Mints, ought to have been greater by much since *Henry* VII's time, than it was between that and *Edw.* III's. because the great change of the value of Silver has been made, by the plenty of it pour'd into this part of the World from the *West-Indies*, not discovered till *Henry* VII's Reign. So that I think I may say that the value of Silver from *Edw.* III. to *Henry* VII. changed not One tenth, but from *Henry* VII. till now it chang'd above Seven tenths, and yet Money having been raised in our Mint Two thirds since *Edw.* III's time, the far greater part of the raising of it was before *Henry* VII's time, and a very small part of it since; so that the cause insinuated by our Author, 'tis evident, was not the cause of lessening our Coin so often, whatever was it: And 'tis possible there wanted not Men of Projects in those days, who for private ends, by wrong Suggestions, and false Reasonings, cover'd with mysterious terms, led those into mistakes, who had not the time and will nicely to examine, tho' a

Crown-

Crown-piece three times as big as one of ours now might, for its ſize alone, deſerve to be reformed.

To *Object.* 2. He ſays, *The raiſing the Denomination of Money in* Spain *and* Portugal, *was making it go for more when Coin'd, than its true value.*

This, I ſay, is impoſſible, and deſire the Author to prove it. It did in *Spain* and *Portugal*, juſt what it will do here and every where, it made not the Silver Coin'd go for more than its value in all things to be bought, but juſt ſo much as the Denomination was raiſed, juſt ſo much leſs of Commodity had the Buyer in exchange for it: As it would be here, if you ſhould Coin Six-pences into Shillings; if any one went to Market with this new Money, he would find that whereas he had a Buſhel of Wheat laſt Week for Eight Shillings of the former Coin, he would have now but half a Buſhel for Eight of the new Shillings, when the ſame Denomination had but half the quantity of Silver. Indeed thoſe who were to receive Money upon former Contracts, would be defrauded of half their due, receiving in their full Tale of any Denomination contracted for, but half the Silver they ſhould have; the

the Cheat whereof they would find, when they went to Market with their new Money. For this I have above proved, that one Ounce of Silver is, and eternally will be equal in value to another Ounce of Silver; and all that can possibly put a difference between them, is only the different value of the workmanship bestowed on one more than another, which in Coinage our Author tells us in this Paper is but Sixteen pence half penny *per* pound *Troy*. I demand therefore of our Author, to shew that any sort of Coinage, or, as he calls it, raising of Money, can raise the value of Coin'd Silver, or make it go for more than uncoin'd, bating the charge of Coinage, unless it be to those who being to receive Money upon former Contracts, will by receiving the tale agreed for, receive less than they should of Silver, and so be defrauded of what they really contracted for.

What effect such a raising of their Money had in one particular, I will tell our Author. In *Portugal* they count their Money by Reys, a very small, or rather imaginary Coin, just as if we here should count all our Sums by Farthings. It pleased the Government, possibly, being told that it would raise the value of their Money to raise in Denomination the

the ſeveral *ſpecies*, and make them go for a greater (let us ſuppoſe double the) number of Reys than formerly. What was the Conſequence? It not only confounded the Property of the Subject, and diſturb'd Affairs to no purpoſe; but Treaties of Commerce having ſettled the Rates of the Cuſtoms, as ſo many Reys on the ſeveral Commodities, the King immediately loſt in value half his Cuſtoms. The ſame that in proportion will happen in the ſetled Revenue of the Crown here upon the propoſed change.

For tho' our Author in theſe words, *Whereas all now deſired by this Act is, to keep Silver when Coin'd of the ſame value it was before*, would inſinuate, that this raiſing the Denomination, or leſſening our Coin, as is propoſed, will do no ſuch thing; yet 'tis demonſtration, that when our Coin is leſſened 3 *d.* in 5 *s.* the King will receive 5 *per Cent.* leſs in value in his Cuſtoms, Exciſe, and all his ſetled Revenue, and ſo proportionably, as the quantity of Silver in every *ſpecies* of our Coin ſhall be made leſs than now it is Coin'd in thoſe of the ſame Denomination.

But whatever our Author means by *making Money go for more when Coin'd than its true value, or by keeping Silver when Coin'd*

Coin'd of the ſame value it was before; This is evident, that raiſing their Money thus by Coining it with leſs Silver in it than it had before, had not the effect in *Portugal* and *Spain*, which our Author propoſes from it here: For it has not brought one Penny more to the Mint there, nor kept their Money or Silver from Exportation ſince, tho' forfeiture and death be the Penalties joined in aid to this trick of *raiſing* to keep it in.

But our Author tells us in Anſwer to *Object.* 4. This *will ſcarce ever at all be perceived.* If of 100 Guinea's a Man has in his Pocket, 5 ſhould be picked out ſo as he ſhould not perceive it, the fraud and the loſs would not be one jot the leſs; and tho' he perceived it not when or how it was done, yet he will find it in his Accompts, and the going ſo much back in his Eſtate at the end of the Year.

To the 3d *Objection* he ſays, The *raiſing* your Coin (*it may be*) *may raiſe the price of Bullion here in* England. An Ounce of Silver will always be equal in value to an Ounce of Silver every where, bating the Workmanſhip. I ſay it is impoſſible to be otherwiſe, and require our Author to ſhew it poſſible in *England*, or any where, or elſe hereafter to ſpare his

may

may be's. To avoid Fallacies, I desire to be understood, when I use the word *Silver* alone, to mean nothing but Silver, and do lay aside the consideration of baser Metals that may be mixed with it: For I do not say that an Ounce of standard Silver that has almost One twelfth of Copper in it, is of equal value with an Ounce of fine Silver that has no alloy at all, but that any two Ounces of equally alloy'd Silver, will always be of equal value; the Silver being the measure of Commerce, tis the quantity of Silver that is in every piece he receives, and not the Denomination of it which the Merchant looks after, and values it by.

But this raising of the Denomination our Author would have pass, because 'twill be *better for the Possessors of Bullion*, as he says, *Answ.* 3. But who are they who now in *England* are possess'd of so much Bullion? Or what private Men are there in *England* of that consideration, that for their advantage all our Money should be new Coin'd, and of a less weight, with so great a charge to the Nation, and loss to His Majesty's Revenue?

He farther adds, Answ. 3. *It doth not thence inevitably follow, it will raise the price of Bullion beyond Sea.*

It

It will as inevitably follow, as that 19 Ounces of Silver will never be equal in weight or worth to 20 Ounces of Silver: So much as you leſſen your Coin, ſo much more muſt you pay in Tale as will make the quantity of Silver the Merchant expects for his Commodity, under what Denomination ſoever he receives it.

The Clothier thus buying his *Spaniſh* Wool, Oil, and Labour at 5 *per Cent.* more in Denomination, ſells his Woollen Manufacture proportionably dearer to the *Engliſh* Merchant, who Exporting it to *Spain*, where their Money is not changed, ſells it at the uſual Market-rate, and ſo brings home the ſame quantity of Bullion for it which he was wont, which therefore he muſt ſell to you at the ſame raiſed value your Money is at: And what then is gain'd by all this? The Denomination is only chang'd to the prejudice of the Publick, but as to all the great matters of your Trade, the ſame quantity of Silver is paid for Commodities as before, and they ſold in their ſeveral Foreign Markets for the ſame quantity of Silver. But whatever happens in the rate of Foreign Bullion, the raiſing of the Denomination of our Money, will bring none of it to our Mint to be Coin'd; That depends on the Balance of our Trade, and not on leſſening our

Coin under the ſame Denomination: For whether the Pieces we call Crowns be Coin'd 16, 24, or 100 Grains lighter, it will be all one as to the value of Bullion, or the bringing more or leſs of it into *England*, or to our Mint.

What he ſays in his Anſwer to *Object* 4. beſides what we have already taken notice of, is partly againſt his Bill, and partly miſtake.

1. He ſays, *It may be ſome (as it is now) Gain to thoſe that will venture to melt down the mill'd and heavy Money now Coin'd*, That Men do venture to melt down the mill'd and heavy Money, is evident, from the ſmall part of mill'd Money is now to be found of that great quantity of it that has been Coin'd; and a farther evidence is this, that mill'd Money will now yield 4 or 5 more *per Cent.* than the other, which muſt be to melt down, and uſe as Bullion, and not as Money in ordinary Payments. The reaſon whereof is, the ſhameful and horrible debaſing (or as our Author would have it *raiſing*) our unmill'd Money by Clipping.

For the odds betwixt mill'd and unmill'd Money being now, modeſtly ſpeaking, above 20 *per Cent.* and Bullion, for Reaſons elſwhere given, being not to be had, Refiners, and ſuch who have need of Silver, find it the cheapeſt way to buy Mill'd Mo-

Money for Clip'd, at 4, 5, or more *per Cent.* loſs.

I ask therefore this Gentleman, What ſhall become of all our preſent mill'd and heavy Money, upon the paſſing of his Act? To which his Paper almoſt confeſſes what I will venture to anſwer for him, *viz.* That as ſoon as ſuch a Law is paſſed, the mill'd and heavy Money will all be melted down; for it being 5 *per Cent.* heavier, *i. e.* more worth than what is to be Coin'd in the Mint, no body will carry it thither to receive 5 *per Cent.* leſs for it, but ſell it to ſuch as will give Four or Four and an half *per Cent.* more for it, and at that rate melt it down with advantage: For *Lombard-Street* is too quick-ſighted to give 60 Ounces of Silver for 57 Ounces of Silver, when bare throwing it into the Melting-Pot, will make it change for its equal weight; ſo that by this Law 5 *per Cent.* Gain on all our mill'd Money, will be given to be ſhared between the Poſſeſſor and Melter of our mill'd Money, out of the honeſt Creditor and Landlord's Pocket, who had the guaranty of the Law, that under ſuch a Tale of Pieces of ſuch a Denomination as he let his Land for, he ſhould have to ſuch a value, *i. e.* ſuch a weight in Silver. Now I ask whether it be not a direct and unanſwerable Reaſon againſt this Bill, that he confeſſes that

it will be *a Gain to those who will melt down the mill'd and heavy Money* with so much loss to the Publick, and not, as he says, *with very small loss to those that shall be paid in the new*, unless he calls 5 *per Cent. very small loss*, for just so much is it to receive but 57 Grains or Ounces of Silver for 60, which is the proportion in making your Crowns 3 *d.* lighter. This is certain, no body will pay away mill'd or weighty Money for Debts or Commodities, when it will yield him 4 or 5 *per Cent.* more; so that which is now left of weighty Money, being scatter'd up and down the Kingdom into private hands, which cannot tell how to melt it down, will be kept up and lost to our Trade. And as to your Clip'd and light Money, will you make a new Act for Coinage, without taking any care for that? The making a new standard for your Money, cannot do less than make all Money which is lighter than that standard unpassable, and thus the mill'd and heavy Money not coming into Payment, and the light and Clip'd not being Lawful Money, according to the new standard, there must needs be a sudden stop of Trade, and, 'tis to be fear'd, a general confusion of Affairs, tho' our Author says, *it will not any ways interrupt Trade.*

2. The

2. The later part of this *Section* about raiſing the value of Land, I take the liberty to ſay is a miſtake; which though a ſufficient Reply to an Aſſertion without Proof, yet I ſhall not ſo far imitate this Author, as barely to ſay things: And therefore I ſhall add this Reaſon for what I ſay, *viz.* becauſe nothing can truly raiſe the value, *i. e.* the Rent of Land, but the increaſe of your Money; but becauſe *raiſing the value of Land* is a Phraſe which, by its uncertain ſenſe, may deceive others, we may reckon up theſe ſeveral meanings of it.

1. The value of Land is raiſed, when its intriſick worth is increaſed, *i. e.* when it is fitted to bring forth a greater quantity of any valuable Product. And thus the value of Land is raiſed only by good Husbandry.

2. The value of Land is raiſed, when remaining of the ſame Fertility, it comes to yield more Rent, and thus its value is raiſed only by a greater plenty of Money and Treaſure.

3. Or it may be raiſed in our Author's way, which is, by raiſing the Rent in tale of pieces, but not in the quantity of Silver received for it, which, in truth, is no raiſing of it at all, no more than it could be accounted the raiſing of a Man's Rent, if

if he let his Land this year for 40 Sixpences, which laſt year he let for 20 Shillings. Nor would it alter the Caſe, if he ſhould call thoſe 40 Sixpences 40 Shillings for having but half the Silver of 40 Shillings in them, they would be but of half the value, however their Denomination were changed.

In his Anſwer to the 5th *Objection*, there is this dangerous Inſinuation, That Coin in any Country where it is Coin'd *goes not by weight*, i. e. has its value from the ſtamp and denomination, and not the quantity of Silver in it. Indeed in Contracts already made, if your *ſpecies* be by Law Coin'd a fifth part lighter, under the ſame denomination, the Creditor muſt take 100 ſuch light Shillings, or 20 ſuch light Crown-pieces for 5 *l.* if the Law calls them ſo, but he loſes One fifth in the intrinſick value of his Debt. But in Bargains to be made, and things to be purchaſed, Money has and will always have its value from the quantity of Silver in it, and not from the ſtamp and denomination, as has been already proved, and will ſome time or other be evidenced with a witneſs in the Clip'd Money. And if it were not ſo, that the value of Money were not according to the quantity of Silver in it, *i. e.* that it goes by weight, I ſee no reaſon why Clipping ſhould be ſo ſeverely puniſhed. As

As to Foreigners he is forced to confeſs, that 'tis all one what our Money is, greater or leſs, who regard only the quantity of Silver they ſell their Goods for, How then can the leſſening our Money bring more plenty of Bullion into *England*, or to the Mint?

But he ſays, *The Owners and Importers of Silver, will find a good Market at the Mint*, &c. But always a better in *Lombard-ſtreet*, and not a Grain of it will come to the Mint, as long as by an under-balance of Trade, or other Foreign Expences, we contract Debts beyond Sea, which require the remitting of greater Sums thither than are imported in Bullion. *If for above Forty Years after Silver was raiſed in the* 43 *of* Eliz. *from* 5 s. *to* 5 s. 2 d. *the Ounce, uncoin'd Silver was not worth above* 4 s. 10 d. *per Ounce*; the cauſe was not that raiſing of Silver in the Mint, but an over-balance of Trade, which bringing in an increaſe of Silver Yearly, for which Men having no occaſion abroad, brought it to the Mint to be Coin'd, rather than let it lie dead by them in Bullion; and whenever that is the Caſe again in *England*, it will *occaſion Coining* again, and not till then. *No Money was in thoſe days Exported*, ſays he; no nor Bullion neither, ſay I; why ſhould, or how could it, when our Exported Merchandize

paid

paid for all the Commodities we brought home, with an overplus of Silver and Gold, which ſtaying here ſet the Mint on work. But the paſſing this Bill, will not hinder the Exportation of one Ounce either of Bullion or Money, which muſt go if you contract Debts beyond Sea; and how its having been *once melted in England*, which is another thing propos'd in this Bill, ſhall hinder its Exportation, is hard to conceive, when even Coining has not been able to do it, as is demonſtrable, if it be examined, what vaſt Sums of mill'd Money have been Coin'd in the two laſt Reigns, and how little of it is now left. Beſides, if the Exportation of Bullion ſhould be brought under any greater difficulty than of any other Commodity, it is to be conſidered whether the management of that Trade which is in skilful Hands, will not thereupon be ſo ordered, as to divert it from coming to *England* for the future, and cauſe it to be ſent from *Spain*, directly to thoſe places where they know *Engliſh* Debts will make it turn to beſt Accompt, to anſwer Bills of Exchange ſent thither.

FINIS.